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Abstract 
Social Scientists have developed a research agenda that seeks to explain prohibition 
policy adoption through the theory of collective action or the economic theory of 
regulation. They have found that the relative strength of interest groups has indeed played 
a role in the adoption of prohibition policy at the state and national level. I have chosen to 
take a diierent approach to the study of the prohibition era. In this thesis, 1 have chosen 
to make the state and federal constitutions the primary focus in determining what shaped 
prohibition policy outcomes at both the state and national levels. 
I have sought to show three things. First, state institutions played a key role in the spread 
of prohibition policy. Second, the state's ability to enforce prohibition was compromised 
by the conflict between state police powers and the federal interstate commerce powers. 
Third, the ambiguous wording of the Eighteenth Amendment was a major factor in the 
failure of national prohibition enforcement. 
In chapter 2, I showed that pro-prohibition forces preferred constitutional amendments to 
statutory laws. The ability to adopt state constitutional amendments, however, was 
hampered in some states by high institutional harriers at both the initiation stage and 
ratification stage. In chapter 3, I showed that prohibition states had limited success in 
prohibiting alcohol sales because their police powers conflicted with federal interstate 
commerce powers. 
In chapter 4, I show that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ambiguous wording of 
the Eighteenth Amendment gave states incentives to free ride on the federal enforcement 
effort. Consequently, the asymmetry in capabilities between the states and federal 
government was a chief cause in the failure of enforcement of the Eighteenth 
Amendment. 
I conclude that prohibition policy might shed some light on the current direction of 
research on how policies, particularly moral policies, diffuse across states. Second. the 
federalism perspective I have adopted may shed some light on the likely life cycle of 
moral policies, the "war on drugs," that are tending toward prohibition today. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The convention wisdom concerning Prohibition holds that it was a national experiment, 
the product of a cultural schism that long existed in America and which came to a head 
with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 (Gusfield 1963; Sinclair 
1964). This amendment banned the sale of intoxicating liquors in all the states and 
territories of the U.S. It represented the triumph of Protestant-dry-native-rural American 
values on one side over Catholic-wet-foreign-urban on the other. It is widely accepted 
that the repeal of National prohibition in 1933 resulted kom shift in the balance of power 
between these two cultural blocs, and that this shift was hailed by the presidential 
election of 1932. Roosevelt's victory, by this view, signaled the triumph of the urban 
working class (Lichtman 1979). 
Another common belief is that, instead of temperance, Prohibition engendered disrespect 
for the law, crime, violence, federal corruption, and the persistent, widespread demand 
for intoxicating beverages. Policy experts, searching for clues kom the failed experiment, 
often conclude that the current prohibition of drugs leads to the same form of 
enforcement problems that the federal government experienced during the Prohibition 
Era. However, after acknowledging that national prohibition can teach us something 
abaut the futility of trying to enforce a national drug policy, policy scholars typically find 
little that is important about this period. 
Historical Studies of Prohibition: A Brief Overview 
As indicated above, historians studying the reform movements of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century have focused on the role that ethnocultural cleavages have played 
in initiating social reform. Gusfield (1963) asserts that social elites from Nevi. England, 
once having great status and influence in shaping society, lost this power after the Civil 
War in the face of growing immigration. In order to regain their status and influence, they 
championed temperance crusades in order to control the social behavior of new urban 
immigrants. Supporting this view of rural influence over the urban masses are Clark 
(1965) and Odegard (1928). Clark studies the influence of rural interests as manifested in 
prohibition policy in Washington. Odegard, studying the Anti-Saloon League, examines 
rural influence in terms of its power to shape the preferences of political elites. 
Several scholars have also studied the goals, structure and philosophy of a variety of 
temperance groups in U.S. history. The three groups that have received the most attention 
are the Prohibition Party, the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), and the 
Anti-Saloon League (ASL). Because temperance reformers were unable to persuade the 
Republican Party to take a strong stand behind prohibition, there was a mass exodus in 
1869 to form the Prohibition Party. The Women's Christian Temperance Union was 
formed in 1874 in response to the externalities that the saloon imposed upon the home 
(Blocker 1992). The last and most influential temperance groups was the Anti-Saloon 
League. It was founded 1893, amidst the disarray in goals and perspectives of the 
Prohibition Party and the WCTU. 
Each group made its own distinct contribution to the success of the prohibition 
movement. The Prohibition Party is responsible for linking prohibition with other 
progressive reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Blocker 1976). 
The WCTU also believed in broad based reform (Donovan 1995). The ASL, in contrast, 
devoted itself solely to the adoption and enforcement of prohibition laws (Hamm 1994). 
According to Hamm, in its first 15 years of existence, the ASL had participated in over 
31,000 cases of liquor law enforcement. During Prohibition, the League also took the 
lead in enforcement efforts. 
Differences in goals and strategies tended to undermine the collective impact of the major 
groups seeking prohibition (Munger and Schaller 1997). Opposition interest groups such 
as the Volunteer Committee of Lawyers (VCL), the Women's Organization for National 
prohibition Reform (WONPR), the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the 
Association Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA) also began to gain strength 
during the mid 1920s.' These organizations, with the exception of the AFL, represented 
middle and upper class opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment (Kyvig 1989). 
Prohibition also meant that the federal government was forgoing a large source of tax 
revenue. The Great Depression, along with problems with enforcement, gave opposition 
interest groups the opportunity to mobilize alongside former alcohol producers to press 
for repeal. 
Important Quantitative Studies of Prohibition 
Subsequent to much of the historical research on prohibition, recent scholarship has 
turned to quantitative analysis of prohibition adoption. Three papers (Goff and Anderson 
1994; Hersch and Netter 1989; and Munger and Sehaller1997) have primarily sought to 
test the extent of interest group influence over prohibition policy after controlling for 
ethnocultural factors. Hersch and Netter (1989) apply the economic theory of regulation 
to their study of prohibition. Looking at the period between 1907 and 1919, the authors 
seek to explain why 30 states adopted prohibition laws prior to National prohibition. 
They hypothesize that the stronger the pro-prohibition interest groups were relative to the 
economic interest supporting alcohol production, the earlier a state should have adopted 
state-level prohibition. Herseh and Netter employ a Tobit model (three states were 
censored from the dataset) to assess the difhsion of prohibition across the states. Using 
percent protestant as a proxy for the religious composition of a state, the authors find that 
the prohibition force was a significant predictor of the timing of prohibition adoption. 
Goff and Anderson (1994) examine support for and opposition to prohibition in the U.S. 
Senate. They too seek to examine how organized interest groups influence Congress in 
the face of strong public pressure. They find that support for national adoption, as well as 
for repeal, was influenced not only by public opinion, but also by the distillkg and 
brewing interests, both legitimate and illegitimate. 
Munger and Schaller (1997) address the question of whether voters changed their 
preferences during the Prohibition Era or whether prohibition and repeal were largely the 
consequences of interest group activity. How can one explain such overwhelming 
support for prohibition in 1919 and, just 14 years later, explain the overwhelming support 
for repeal? Forty-five of the foriy-eight states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, with 
more than eighty percent of the legislatures voting for it (Merz 1930). The authors assert 
that citizen preferences did not change much during prohibition. Following Brennan and 
Lomasky (1993), they instead argue that voters faced a collective action problem that 
they could not resolve. Although they were opposed to moral policies in private, voters 
were supportive of them in public. If all voters have incentives to support moral policies 
in public and opposed them privately, we have an n-person prisoner's dilemma, in which 
an unwanted policy passes. This collective action problem left prohibition policy to 
organized interests. They hrther hypotheske that support for Prohibition arose from a 
coalition of economic and political interest groups. The economic interests were the 
large industrialists, who were seeking a more productive work force (see also Rumbarger 
1989). To this group, they add the boot~eggers.~ The main pro-prohibition interest groups 
were the Anti-Saloon League and the Women's Christian Temperance Union. 
The key argument is that these interests were an alliance held together through the 
common interest of prohibition. However, their underlying goals were different. The 
industrialists and bootleggers sought profits. The WCTU primarily wanted social reform. 
including women's suffrage and election reform. The ASL's sole focus was prohibition. 
Once prohibition was written into the Constitution, the alliance had great difficulty 
holding together. This is evident in the failure of the pro-prohibition alliance to mobilize 
in 1933. Accord'mg to Munger and Schaller, the Depression gave the opposing political 
entrepreneurs a window of opportunity in which to couple the federal government's need 
for revenue with a proposal for the taxation of beer. Thus, changes in economic 
conditions caused business interests to abandon the coalition. 
Munger and Schaller also argue that another factor underlying the pro-prohibition 
coalition was the successful passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, which required states 
to grant women's suEage. Now that women could vote, women's' political 
organizations lost membership and energy. In other words, prohibition was a means to an 
end for many women, who really were interested in their voices being heard through the 
right of suBage as opposed to it being heard on a particular subject. 
The dependent variable in Munger and Schaller's regression equation for adoption is the 
Eighteenth Amendment ratification votes in the lower and upper chamber of state 
legislatures in 1919. For repeal, the authors' dependent variable is support for 
prohibition repeal in the state convention votes for ratification of the Twenty-tirst 
Amendment (repeal) in 1933 .~  For citizen preferences, percent Catholic is used as a 
measure of the strength of public opinion against Prohibition. Farm income and state 
wealth were used as measures of the strength of the rural and middle class citizenry that 
presumably favored prohibition, 
The authors found that states having womens' sufiage prior to National prohibition were 
also more likely to support prohibition. This follows &om the strong support women's 
movements such as the WCTU gave to the prohibition cause.' Surprisingly. the economic 
interests of states (alcohol production before prohibition) had no effect on support for the 
Eighteenth Amendment. 
These three studies provide quantitative support for the hypotheses that the relative power 
of interest groups, as well as ethno-cultural factors, shaped prohibition policy outcomes. 
In fact, these studies largely recapitulate the findings of each other, largely because their 
frame of reference regarding prohibition is based upon conventional understanding of the 
era. The primary objective of this dissertation is to change the frame of reference to 
better understand the phenomenon of prohibition at both the state and national level. It 
does so by assessing the role that federalism and state political institutions played in 
shaping prohibition policy outcomes. 
Influence of Political Institutions Prohibition Policy Outcomes 
Instead of attempting to gauge the power that interest groups wielded in the battle over 
prohibition, I examine the power of institutions to shape policy outcomes. By 
understanding how federalism and state political institutions were able to constrain 
government and interest group power, a better understdmg is gained as to why the 
policy was adopted by so many states and yet was so short-lived at the national level. 
In the following chapters I seek to show that political institutions have shaped prohibition 
policy outcomes in three basic ways. In chapter 2, I demonstrate that state political 
institutions significantly affected state prohibition policy outcomes in the years prior to 
National prohibition. In chapter 3, I argue that federal institutions, in particular the 
Interstate Commerce Clause, limited the effectiveness of state prohibition. In chapter 4 I 
find that federal institutions severely limited the cooperation of state and federal 
governments enforcing in national prohibition, thus undermining possibilities for success. 
In chapter 2, I examine the adoption of state-level prohibition in the years preceding 
national prohibition. I depart from the standard presentation of prohibition policy by 
distinguishing between constitutional amendments and statutory laws. Pro-prohibition 
groups preferred state constitutional amendments to statutory laws. However, the hurdles 
for adoption were higher for constitutional amendments than for statutes. Statutory 
prohibition only required simple majorities of the state legislature to enact it. For 
constitutional amendments, the hurdles to adoption of this policy were substantially 
higher. Constitutional amendments require both legislative and voter approval through 
the process of submission and ratification. Some states required two consecutive 
legislatures to take action before an amendment could be submitted to the people for 
ratification. This meant that after one legislature voted to approve the amendment, the 
next newly elected legislature would have to concur in that vote before the amendment 
could be submitted to the people. The length between proposal and submission of an 
amendment limited pro-prohibition interest influence over the adoption of prohibition 
policy in these states. 
The next hurdle for constitutional amendments was one of ratification. Unlike Munger 
and Schaller (1997), who posit that voters could not resolve the collective action 
problems, leaving prohibition policy up to interest group influence, I assert that voters 
played a major role in the prohibition outcomes. Pro-prohibition interest groups could not 
gain the ratification of a prohibition policy without the support of the voters. 
State institutional requirements, however, varied in their ratification requirements. Some 
states required a simple majority of those voting on the amendment, while others required 
an absolute majority of those voting at the election or of the electorate in the state as a 
whole. Burnham (1965) found that voter turnout tends to be lower in off presidential 
election years and of those who turnout, a lower proportion tends to vote for ballot 
propositions then for candidates. Burnham calls these phenomena of voter roll-off and 
drop-off respectively. When considering the relationship between absolute majority 
ratification requirements and voter behavior, one can see how enormous the hurdle of 
adoption typically was. 
In chapter 3 I examine how the Interstate Commerce Clause limited the effectiveness of 
state prohibition. States without prohibition imposed externalities on neighboring states 
that had prohibition. Dry states could not remain dry as long as alcohol could be shipped 
kom wet states into dry states under federal protection through the Interstate Commerce 
Clause. Because the Constitution makes the federal government the supreme power of the 
land, federal interstate commerce powers trumped the states Tenth Amendment police 
and regulatory powers. This conflict meant that the national government would have to 
become part of the prohibition solution. 
In chapter 4 1 examine the F i t s  the federal constitution put on state and national 
cooperation in enforcing national prohibition. In order for national prohibition to he 
successful, it would require a massive enforcement effort and an experienced police force 
was required. The federal government could not enforce national prohibition within the 
states because the Tenth Amendment had given that power to the states. Consequently, 
the Eighteenth Amendment was designed to transfer state police powers to the federal 
government, to limit state police powers, and to create a uniform prohibition policy 
across the states. 
During the ratification period for the Eighteenth Amendment, the Anti-Saloon League 
encouraged states that did not already have state prohibition to adopt enforcement codes 
that would replicate federal law. The hope was that one policy would be set at the 
national level, and that states would use their enforcement machinery to carry out the 
policy. Relying upon state law enforcement would also mean relatively little money 
would have to be allocated by the federal government to enforcement. 
The Constitution, however, l i i ted the coercive power of the federal government over 
state police actions. These l i tat ions meant that the federal government would either 
have to find the money and train the personnel to properly enforce National prohibition, 
or to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of the states to do the majority of the 
enforcement. As in countless other contexts, voluntary cooperation did not extend very 
far. 
In short, this dissertation aims to show that by changing the paradigm from which we 
view prohibition, we can gain additional understanding of how this phenomenon swept 
the country only to fizzle out fourteen years later. I switch the focus from the relative 
power of interest groups to the impact of political rules and institutions. In so doing, I 
hope to demonstrate the important contributions that an institutionalist perspective can 
make to our understanding of policy diffusion. 
Notes 
' Samuel Gompers, representing the AFL in testimony before Congress against national 
prohibition, argued that prohibition was a discrimination against the wageworker, who 
depended on the saloon and the drink after a hard day's work. 
2 These three states are Kansas, Maine, and North Dakota, which d l  adopted prohibition 
prior to 1907. The authors insist that the factors determining prohibition adoption in these 
states were probably different because they were adopted in the 1880's. 
3 Munger and Schaller claim that bootleggers were envisioning rent-seeking opportunities 
that prohibition would undoubtedly provide. Thus, the bootleggers promoted prohibition 
on economic grounds. The authors admit that they have no way to measure specific 
activities and or levels of influence. Goff and Anderson attempt to measure the influence 
of bootleggers in senators' votes to continue prohibition in 1933, as discussed above. 
They attempt to do this by measuring the amount of unreported income in a state. Their 
assumption is that bootleggers are d i n g  a large non-taxable profit which they are 
depositing in their checking accounts. I find the bootlegger argument rather strange and 
not credible predictor on prohibition policy outcomes. I make no attempts to measure or 
discuss their activities in this dissertation. 
4 For 38 states, percent support for repeal was used as the dependent variable because 
these states had &reel elections for delegates to the constitutional convention voting on 
repeal. 
5 These W i g s  are not contrary to Herseh and Netter (1989), who found that women's 
suffrage was not a significant factor in adoption. Munger and Schaller find a significant 
effect on the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment. 
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Chapter 2 Prohibition Forces and State 
Institutions 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the role that state political institutions played in shaping historical 
prohibition policy outcomes in the states. After the experiences of the 1850's, in which 
laws passed by state legislatures were frequently overturned, prohibition interest groups 
adopted a new strategy of advocating constitutional amendments banning alcohol 
manufacture and sales. A constitutional amendment, once adopted, is usually harder to 
overturn. Consequently, state constitutions. in most cases, required a larger percentage of 
votes in the legislature and in the electorate in order to amend them Thus, prohibition 
interest groups, wanting lasting societal reform, desired constitutional prohibition in 
every state. The prohibition movement was largely unsuccessful in attaining state 
prohibition adoption, however, until the Anti-Saloon League (ASL) arrived on the scene. 
The ASL recognized the importance of state institution?, and incorporated institutional 
considerations into their strategies. 
To test my hypotheses concerning state prohibition adoption, I use a multinomial logit 
event history model. This type of model is ofien called a competing risk model, in that 
subjects in the study can "fail" from more than one cause. In my model, states are the 
subjects, and the "failure" events are either a statutory prohibition adoption or a 
constitutional prohibition adoption. Much of the power attributed to the Anti-Saloon 
League can be explained by the variation in state institutions and their requirements for 
adoption. Before we examine how institutions shaped the ASL strategy and prohibition 
policy outcomes at the state level, we start at the beginning of the movement for state- 
level prohibition. 
An Institutional Perspective on State Prohibition 
Prior to 1750, with the exception of the Quakers. nearly all Americans drank distilled 
spirits on regular occasions. Early American tradition, which stemmed &om European 
traditions, held that rum gin, and brandy were nutritious and healthful. Distilled spirits 
were believed to be able to cure colds, fevers, snakebites and a host of other ailments. 
Early Americans drank their liquor in social environments, makiig the American tavern a 
central focus in the community. Besides fim and games, business transactions and public 
debate were conducted in the tavern. Because of the important function that the tavem 
played in the life of the community in New England, the upper class believed that the 
tavern should be regulated to insure that upper-class individuals of good moral character 
would operate and own these tavern. Thus began the licensing of the sale of liquor in 
America. 
A major factor that changed the social position of the tavem was the drop in the price of 
distilled spirits during the 1730s. The drop in price stimulated demand. Increased 
consumption brought with it public drunkenness, especially in the lower classes. Because 
public drunkenness was accompanied by lewd conduct, profanity, and a collapse of other 
inhibitions. it is no surprise that the clergy were the first to attack public drunkenness. 
The clergy were eventually joined by many in the upper classes, who felt that the tavern 
was getting out of control. John Adams launched one of several crusades during the 
1760s to reduce the number of taverns in Massachusetts (Rorabaugh, 1986). Public 
crusades were largely a failure, however, because there was a large demand for taverns 
by the mass public. Other methods were attempted, such as discouraging Sunday sales, 
requiring all taverns to provide lodging for travelers, revoking licenses if gaming were 
permitted on the premises, and prohibiting sales to seamen and slaves. The growing 
independence of the tavern &om upper-class control was seen as a sign of the growing 
independence of the lower classes. 
The elite citizenry were given help in moderating the drinking behavior of the mass 
public by the decision of the Methodist church in 1780 to push for moderation in drinking 
by its members. Unlike the Quakers, many Methodists did not come from backgrounds of 
privilege. John Wesley, who founded the Methodists, broke kom other protestant 
denominations in his attempt to reform sinners through "methods." One of the methods 
advocated by the Methodists was abstinence horn distilled spirits. 
The medical profession also gradually turned against strong drink. In 1784, Dr. 
Benjamin Rush wrote '.An Inquiry into the effects of Spirituous Liquors." Rush's essay 
held that liquor had little or no beneficial effect; it did not protect against either hot or 
cold weather, as commonly thought. In addition, liquor caused s tonah  sickness, 
vomiting, hand tremors, liver disorders, madness and palsy. His essay also discussed the 
effects of spirits on crime, including murder. He recommended that distilled spirits 
should be replaced with beer and light wines. 
Over the next forty years, consumption of distilled spirits in the United States continued 
to increase. Part of the rise in consumption was due to the growth of the American 
market. Early in the nineteenth century, the western frontier opened up and allowed 
farmers to discover a profitable crop in corn. Western fanners in the Ohio Valley began 
to use the corn grown to make whiskey, which they sold to the eastern markets. 
Meanwhile, in the east, Marcus Morton, along with other wealthy Protestants &om 
Massachusetts, founded the American Temperance Society in 1826. The ATS formed 
with the intention of coercing the evangelical church into ceasing to condone moderate 
drinking. The ATS found a foothold among evangelical denominations in the Northeast, 
particularly the Methodists and Baptists, who held that liquor, especially spirits, was an 
unadulterated evil. The early activists believed that by abstaining &om drink themselves, 
they would be able to convince other d r i e r s  of the virtue of abstinence (Tyrell 1976). 
While the ATS's strategy was to reach groups that controlled the supply of distilled 
spirits in the community, such as distillers and traders, the ATS also hoped to reach the 
drinker and supplier with tracts and by sending agents to churches to preach temperance. 
Despite the efforts, the ATS strategy was ineffective in reducing the consumption of 
distilled spirits and the resultant problems of drunkenness and debauchery. Members of 
the ATS began to believe that weaker beverages such as beer and wine merely whetted 
the appetite of the drinker for stronger spirits. Thus, the ATS turned to a radical reform 
effort known as teetotalism, which meant that members would abstain &om aU fermented 
drink. The ATS also turned their attention to the supplier of alcohol (Tyrell 1976). As 
long as the seller sold alcohol, the drink would always be a temptation to the man 
pledged to abstinence. It was believed that license gave a cloak of respectability to the 
alcohol markets. Therefore, attempts to eradicate liquor traffic started at the local level, 
targeting those responsible for granting liquor licenses. The target of temperance 
coercion became the town selectmen, whom the temperance groups tried to prevent from 
recommending licenses to the county commissioner, thus achieving prohibition at the 
local level. 
In 1838, the ATS and other temperance organizations in Massachusetts were able to 
successfully press for passage of the first statewide partial prohibition law. It stipulated 
that liquor could not be sold in quantities smaller than meen gallons. The purpose of the 
law was to make it impossible for the individual consumer to purchase alcohol cheaply. 
The consumer would have to purchase alcohol from the retail dealer fifteen gallons at a 
time. Hence, the law became known as the "fifteen-gallon law" (Tyrell 1976). 
Around this same time, temperance reformers in other states also began to favor coercive 
public policy over moral suasion. Tennessee nude the retail sale of ardent spirits an 
offense punishable by fine, and Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Illinois 
passed new state laws allowing local option on liquor licensing. Local option allowed 
towns or counties to vote themselves dry of all alcohol. By 1838, temperance 
organizations in South Carolina, Georgia, New York and Pennsylvania were pushing for 
statewide prohibition of all intoxicating beverages (Cherrington 1920). 
During the 1840's, several events occurred that aided efforts to achieve statewide 
prohibition. In Baltimore, a group of working-class men formed the Washingtonians. 
The members pledged total abstinence, and promised to convert other drinkers through 
the -'experience" meeting. In the experience meeting, members would stand up and give 
an account of their struggle to overcome the temptation of drink. The movement spread 
throughout the country during this decade. In 1842, another group emerged in New York 
called the Sons of Temperance. The Sons of Temperance spread a message similar to that 
of the Washingtonians, and had a strong impact, primarily in the east. 
Statewide prohibition was first achieved in Maine. A member of the Maine state 
legislature, General Appleton, introduced the first state prohibition bill in 1837. The hill 
failed to pass, but its introduction sparked widespread debate on the merits of the idea. 
Neal Dow, a prosperous businessman of Quaker origin, took over the reigns of the 
movement for a state prohibition law shortly thereafter. With his hard work. along with 
the Maine Temperance Union, a weak prohibition law was adopted in 1847, and 
subsequently strengthened in 185 1. The 1 85 1 law provided search and seizure provisions, 
steep fines for the sale of liquor, prevented dismissal of cases by prosecution in state or 
local courts, and gave liquor law violations priority over all other non-violent cases. 
Several states followed the Maine prohibition innovation and the first prohibition wave 
was underway. All of these state prohibition laws were statutory in nature and required 
no popular approval of the people to be implemented. However, in order to guide their 
decisions, several states legislatures did allow referenda to be held. According to 
Oberholtzer (1912), the reason for the advisory referendum was that prohibition was a 
vexing question. 1,egisiators often preferred to disown the controversial policy. For 
advisory referendas, prohibition advocates had to muster the signatures of several 
thousand supporters. Colvin (1926) notes that it took a petition of 40,000 signatures in 
order for legislatures to agree to pass the Maine law. The Massachusetts legislature 
considered a hill after 160,000 petition signatures. The New York and Pennsylvania 
legislatures were each faced with over 300,000 petition signatures for prohibition. 
The successfUl adoptions of the first wave began to unravel as early as 1853. In that year, 
the courts declared certain features of the prohibition laws unconstitutional in Michigan. 
In Indiana, the state supreme courts deemed the submission of a law to the people for 
their approval in the form of a referendum "a delegation of power to a foreign body 
which is unknown to the Constitution." By passing the law to be voted upon to the people 
in the form of a referendum, the legislature was not seen as performing its duty as 
authorized by the state constitution. The next legislature in Maine dropped prohibition, 
adopting instead a statute allowing for the license of liquor dealers. This innovation lasted 
for two years when in 1858 Maine returned to prohibition. In 1858 Nebraska and Iowa 
both adopted statutes allowing for the licensing of liquor dealers. By the end of the Civil 
War, however. only five states maintained prohibition laws on the books. Connecticut 
and Massachusetts repealed in the next couple of years, leaving only the New England 
states of Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire with prohibition. Table 1 summarizes the 
first wave of state prohibition legislation. 
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Tyrell (1976) lists several reasons why the wave of state statutory prohibition collapsed. 
First, the innovation was ofien met with strong popular resistance. Second, some state 
supreme courts declared the "Maine laws" unconstitutional because some of the 
provisions violated the rights of the individual guaranteed by the state. Third, large 
numbers of immigrants from Ireland and Germany, who were largely hostile to the laws, 
had settled in some of these states. 
The large immigration of German and Irish began redefining the perception of the 
alcohol problem along ethnic and class limes. The Germans and the Irish brought with 
them their drinking customs as well as improved technology for beer manufacturing. At 
this time, nativist movements targeted these immigrants. Members of the Know- 
Nothings, for example, seized upon prohibition as a means of reigning in the immigrant 
hordes. 
In response to the growing threat of prohibition, liquor merchants and manufacturers 
began to organize in opposition. In 1855, Liquor Leagues appeared in Philadelphia. New 
York, Boston, and Milwaukee to provide legal defense h d s  for prosecuted dealers and 
to support legal challenges to restrictive or prohibitory laws (Blocker 1989). This 
opposition was successful in helping strike down state prohibition laws in New York, 
Michigan and Indiana. 
In contrast to Tyrell and Blocker, Colvin (1926) contends that it was comparatively easy 
to secure a prohibition law because the liquor industry at that time was not well 
organized. It therefore did not exert the strong influence over the legislature that it did in 
subsequent prohibition efforts. Colvin also asserts that the movement was characterized 
by a lack of concern over enforcement, meaning that many believed that mere passage of 
the law would be enough to stop the manufacture and sale of alcohol. No one calculated 
the heavy financial burden that proper enforcement of the law would entail. 
The Change of Strategy to Constitution Amendment 
The prohibition movement at this time also acknowledged a more practical frustration 
with the adoption of statutory laws. As Henry Blair, one of the leaders of the post- Civil 
War prohibition crusades, put it: 
Though a Prohibitory Act of the most satisfactory character may be 
carried by a majority through a given legislature, there is 110 assurance, so 
long as the Constitution makes no explicit direction, that it will be retained 
on the statute-books for a period long enough to admit of a fair trial: the 
very next Legislature, meeting at the end of a year or at the utmost of two 
years, is then at liberty to repeal it (p.97). 
Concurring with Blair, Wittet (1989) also believes that prohibitionist turned to 
constitutional amendments because they were more stable, and directly reflected the will 
of the people. 
The frst efforts to enact a constitutional prohibition amendment took place in New York 
in 1856. The Sons of Temperance of Eastern New York proposed a constitutional 
amendment worded as follows: 
The sale of intoxicating liquors shall not be licensed or allowed in this 
State excepting for chemical, medicinal or manufacturing purposes, and 
then only under restrictive regulations to be made by the legislature. It 
shall be the duty of the Legislature to prescribe proper penalties for the 
sale of liquors in violation of this provision, such liquors being hereby 
declared a common nuisance, and liable to confiscation. (Cyclopaedia of 
Temperance and Prohibition. 1891, p. 99) 
Both the Senate and the Assembly adopted the amendment in 1860. In order for the 
amendment to be submitted to the people, the state constitution required the next elected 
legislature to endorse the bill as well. The outbreak of the Civil War caused the 
abandonment of the New York campaign. It would be another twenty years before 
prohibition advocates would see the h i t s  of their efforts end in the adoption of a state 
constitutional amendment. 
Constitutional Campaigns of the 1880's 
With the repeal of prohibition laws and the collapse of the first wave, the liquor industry 
expanded rapidly and drinking became centered in the saloon. Technological advances 
after the Civil War also played a role in encouraging alcohol consumption. The modern 
beer industry emerged when brewers introduced German yeast cultures that produced a 
light beer that they could store (lager). Lager beer appealed to American tastes. By 1867, 
there were about 3,700 separate brewing Fms, manufacturing and marketing beer in 
every state and territory in the nation. 
The introduction of mechanical refrigeration relieved brewers of the dependence on 
natural ice. Prominent hrewers thus concentrated in big cities. Pabst, Schlitz, and Blatz 
were located in Milwaukee, while Anheuser-Busch was located in St. Louis. Brewers 
employed a strategy of vertical integration to control local markets called the "tied house 
system." The tied house system meant that big breweries would finance saloons as long 
as the saloons sold only their beer. In other instances, the brewery owned the saloons 
outright. The high concentration of saloons, however, meant competition was forcing the 
saloonkeepers to compete in major markets without much profit. Thus. some 
saloonkeepers began to encourage customers to drink more at an earlier age, and allowed 
prostitution and other vices to take place in order to stimulate demand. In addition, 
saloonkeepers violated local Sunday closing ordinances. In order to stay in business and 
maintain lawless behavior, the saloonkeeper had to resort to bribing police officials as 
well as render support to urban political machines. 
The proliferation of these abuses supplied prohibition pressure groups with their fuel 
(Ken 1985). In their view, saloons were places where a man could take his day's wages 
and spend it on drinking, gambfig, and prostitution. After he was finished spending the 
money that was meant to take care of the household, so the story went he would come 
home drunk and beat his wife and kids. Women had very little protection against these 
negative externalities. The temperance movement thus revived in the early 1870s, when 
women decided to take the lead (Blocker 1989). 
Scenarios as that just described helped make the "Women's Crusades" of 1873 and 1874 
a national movement. This crusade originated in the town of Washington Courthouse in 
southern Ohio. By 1873, Washington Courthouse had eleven saloons and three liquor 
dealers. A non-violent protest march was organized, led by three women -Bethiah Ogle 
and her daughters Alfretta and Florence. The peaceful march was successful, in that two 
liquor dealers turned over their stock to the protestors. Other marches ensued in small 
towns throughout the country. The success of the movement culminated in the founding 
of the Women's Christian Temperance Union in 1875, which was the largest women's 
organization to that point in history. Under the leadership of women, the movement 
shifted strategies to statewide constitutional campaigns and the second wave of state 
prohibition adoption was underway. 
Added to the W T U ' s  strength was the founding of the Prohibition Party in 1869. 
Prohibition Party adherents were primarily disgruntled Republicans, who believed that 
the prohibition of alcohol was the next great reform to be achieved now that slavery had 
been erased. The Prohibition Party gained most of its support in the Northeast. In addition 
to the belief in state constitutional prohibition, the Prohibition Party also believed in 
nationwide prohibition. The Women's Temperance Union and the Prohibition Party also 
supported other social reform issues, such as women's suffrage, a graduated income tax, 
and compulsory education. These two large prohibition organizations, along with other 
smaller organizations, began a strategic campaign for statewide constitutional 
prohibition. One of the states that needed reforming the most was Kansas. 
Kansas became a state in 1861. In the early years of statehood, Kansas was known mostly 
as a collection of cow towns. The male to female population ratio was 4 to l(Bader 
1986). Demand for gambling, prostitution, relaxation, self-expression, and drink was 
strong, especially among the working class. Consequently, saloons spread rapidly to meet 
that demand. By the early 1870's, Kansas had a population of 400,000. To serve this 
population, Kansas had 2 distilleries, 46 breweries, and 1,600 retail establishments 
carrying a pennit to serve drinks. 
At the same time that Kansas's towns were growing, temperance reformers from New 
England were migrating west with their families to settle in eontier states like Kansas. 
These New Englanders, of Protestant middle class stock, brought with them their strong 
moral codes and ideas. These reformers would find opportunities for prohibition in 
Kansas very strong, because Kansans had shown signs of progressive leanings early on. 
According to Bader (1886), Kansas, in 1867. became the &st state to consider women's 
suffrage. The amendment did not pass at that time, hut indeed the mere consideration was 
some evidence of reform-rnindedness on the part of Kansans. 
Joshua Rollins Detwiler, a member of the Kansas Grand Lodge of the Independent Order 
of Good Templars was given credit for the idea of a constitutional prohibition 
amendment campaign in Kansas. Bader (1986) seems to suggest that the idea of a 
constitutional prohibition amendment stemmed from the existing law at the time, and not 
the attempt that New York prohibitionists made at a constitutional amendment in 1856. 
The law regarding atcohoi regulation in Kansas, as of 1877, was called a dram shop law. 
The dram shop Law was realty just a local option law. It required a vote on the prohibition 
question every two years for towns with populations under 2,000 people. At this time, 
temperance groups were considering pressing for an amendment to the dram shop law, 
which would require all towns to take the vote every two years. 
Bader (1986) contends that the wets took advantage of the prohibition amendment and 
helped push for its consideration because they believed that it would take emphasis away 
from the dram shop amendment, which they believed had a realistic possibility of being 
adopted into law. What the wets did not consider was the wide support and the 
organizational strength of the temperance groups. In 1878, rallies and conventions were 
organized in which members from temperance organizations from around the entire 
country came to speak. These speakers included African-Americans, Native-Americans, 
and women. The rallies also included pledge campaigns in which those who attended 
were encouraged to sign petition? pledging voting allegiance. In addition to these rallies, 
state legislators received many letters pressuritlg them to consider the prohibition 
an~endment. To the surprise of the wets and the drys, not only was the amendment 
submitted to the voters, but the voters ratified the amendment. 
In 1880 Kansas thus became the first &*ate to adopt an amendment to its constitution 
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Iowa, Ohio, Maine, South 
Dakota, and Rhode Island soon followed. Despite the early success in Kansas and several 
other states, the second prohibition wave also ended largely in failure. After 1887, no 
state adopted a prohibition amendment for the next two decades. Blair (1891) cites 
several reasons for the failure of the second wave. One was that after observing the rapid 
spread of prohibition, pro-liquor forces became alarmed and began to mobiie. Another 
reason was that alternative methods for regulation were developed in the 1880's as 
substitutes for prohibition. Among the methods used were local option elections and 
"high iicense."' It was argued that these alternatives were used to pacify the more 
moderate elements of the temperance movement. 
What was not explicitly addressed by Blocker and Tyrell was the variation in the 
requirements to amend state constitutions. This was not an issue with the statutory laws 
of the 1850's, which were easier to pass but also easier to repeal. Constitutional 
amendments were harder to pass. but were more durable once passed. 
State Constitutional Amendment Requirements 
State constitutional amendments are more difficult to adopt than ordinary statutes. Most 
state constitutions require a two-part amendment process of submission and ratification. 
Statutory laws adopted in the 1850's did not require voter approval, although as indicated 
earlier some states submitted the question to voters in the form of advisory referenda. 
Several accounts %om the constitutional campaigns of the 1880's and the subsequent 
campaigns at the turn of the century reveal the hurdles that constitutional amendment 
requirements presented. 
Proposal Submissions 
Legislative requirements for submission were the first obstacle that temperance 
advocates faced. Whereas some states required only a simple majority vote of the 
legislature to submit a constitutional amendment, other states required a super-majority, 
either three-fifths or two-thirds. According to Blair (1891), in 1887 more than 100,000 
citizens signed a petition asking the legislature of New York to submit a constitutional 
amendment to the vote of the people. Submission, however, was defeated in the House 
by a vote of 61 yeas to 32 nays, just under the two-thirds necessary to submit to the 
people. 
Blair also notes that in 1887, the West Virginia House voted fbr submission by a vote of 
55 to 10. However, the Senate. while favoring the measure by a majority, refused to give 
the necessary two-thirds until the prohibition managers threatened to pass a statutory law 
granting complete prohibition. This threat enabled the submission resolution to gain 
approval. 
The hurdle was even higher in New Hampshire. New Hampshire requires amendments to 
be made by constitution convention. Thus in order for any amendment to be submitted to 
the people, a constitutional convention must be called. Blair (1 891) states that because of 
this requirement, prohibitionists were forced to appeal to the state legislature for a 
statutory law, but the legislature rehsed to consider the question. 
Many states required that in order for an amendment to be submitted to the people for a 
ratification vote, two consecutive legislatures had to first approve the amendment. On the 
surface, this may only seem like a minor obstacle. The problems this requirement posed, 
however, were formidable. Recall that some of the statutory laws adopted in the 1850's 
were overturned by the next elected legislature. Between submissions, opposing interest 
groups can rally their constituents to petition legislators not to vote for the pending 
amendment. Incumbents face the threat of being voted out of office by a mobilized 
opposition. In some districts, legislators that voted for the first submission might be voted 
out of office between sessions. Some legislators may find it wise to just vote against a 
prohibition proposal if they know that anti-temperance groups will mobilize against the 
amendment between submission proposals. 
Lutz (1994) provides good support for this position. In an attempt to build a theory of 
constitutional amendments, he finds that the more difficult the process of initiation, the 
fewer the amendments proposed and thus the fewer passed. His analysis also suggests 
that the most effective way to increase the difficulty of amendment at the initiation stage 
is to require the approval of two consecutive legislatures based upon a two-thirds 
majority each time. 
Ratification 
Another hurdle associated with the adoption of a prohibition amendment is the share of 
the popular vote required for ratification. As with submission proposals, states vary in 
their rules for ratifying constitution amendments. Some states required a majority of 
those voting at the election or of the electorate of the state in order to ratifl a proposed 
amendment. According to Colvin (1926), in 1918 a prohibition constitutional 
amendment was defeated in Minnesota, although it had received a majority of those 
voting on the proposal. The amendment failed, however, to receive a majority of those 
voting at the election. This is the difference between mhat we shall call a simple majority 
versus an absolute majority requirement. The same situation occurred in Mississippi in 
1908. 
Scholars commenting on the 1883 Ohio constitutional prohibition vote have made 
passing reference to the institutional requirement anomaly of Ohio (Colvin, 1926; Willet, 
1989)~ Blair (1891), also conjecturing as to the failure of the Ohio of 1883 subnlission, 
writes that: 
There were indisputable evidence of tiaud in the count, and the result was 
that though the prohibitory amendment had a majority of 82,214 of those 
voting in the question, it lacked 37,467 of a majority of all the votes polled 
on state candidates, and therefore, according to the requirements or  the 
Ohio Constitution, failed of adoption" (p. 108). 
Cherrington (1920), speaking of the failed Ohio amendment of 1883, also notes that 
although the prohibition amendment had a majority of votes cast on that issue, it did not 
have the absolute majority of the electorate necessary for adoption. In general early 
twentieth-century scholars tended to place a heavy emphasis on variation in popular vote 
requirements as a determinant of constitutional amendment adoption (Dealey 191 4; 
Gamer 1906). 
Eleven states required a majority of those voting at the election, whether on the question 
of amendment or not. For example, if at an election in Indiana 600,000 votes were cast 
for governor, a proposed amendment, in order to be adopted, must receive an affirmative 
vote of at least 300,001. Dealey (1914) states that because more interest is usually taken 
in candidates than in measures, proposed amendments usually fail in these states fbr the 
reason that not enough votes are cast for them to give them the absolute majority that is 
constitutionally required. Ten other states require a majority of the electors as a whole to 
pass an amendment. If 700,000 people are registered to vote in a state and at a particular 
election if only 300,000 people vote, a constitutional amendment could not be adopted 
even if all of the people voted for the amendment.' 
Two voting phenomena can thus potentially affect constitutional amendment prospects 
within an absolute majority state. Burnham (1965) defines "drop ofP' as the decline 
between presidential and succeeding off-year elections. The other phenomenon, "roll 
off," measures the tendency of the electorate to vote for presidential offices but not for 
lower offices on the same ballot and in the same election. When an electorate does not 
turn out for special elections or state elections, the drop-off phenomenon has obvious 
consequences for absolute-majority ~ t a t e s . ~  Roll off becomes a problem when the 
electorate is asked to vote on more than one issue on the ballot, as discussed in the 
Indiana example above. Consequently, states requiring an absolute majority of those 
voting in an election have posed a major obstacle to the passage of constitutional 
 amendment^.^ 
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Table 2 illustrates the potential problem that roll-off played in constitutional amendment 
campaigns. Column 3 represents the percent of those voting on the amendment that voted 
for prohibition. Column 4 represents the total voting at the election that did not vote on 
the amendment. We see. for example, that in the 1880 Kansas election, 13.6 percent of 
those voting in the election (for president) did not vote for prohibition. Special elections 
represent the vote on the amendment alone. Thus, seven states held special elections on 
the issue of prohibition adoption. In these states. where roll-off is not an issue. the 
amendment failed to pass in all but one state, Iowa. What the table indicates is that had 
Maine, Kansas, South Dakota, and Rhode Island had absolute majority requirements, the 
outcomes may have not been a victory for the drys. 
The Quiet Period of 1890-1906 
By 1890. states had chosen a variety of mechanisms to regulate the traffic in intoxicating 
liquors. Still, the second wave of prohibition saw fewer states adopt a prohibition policy 
than in the first. In addition to the disappointment of the constitution amendment 
campaigns of the ISUO's, prohibition advocates were faced with the knowledge that 
mobilization of sufficient public sentiment to attain a constitutional amendment was, in a 
large number of states, a daunting prospect. Subsequent years, however, saw the rise of 
several nlovements that focused on putting an end to government corruption and the 
mixing of political institutions with "big business" through corporate elites and boss 
governments at the local level. The Populists mobilized in reaction to rapid 
industrialization and consequent economic dislocation. The Progressives, concerned with 
the increasing political power of concentrated wealth, claimed that corporate money in 
politics corrupted politicians and the political process. The Progressives thus favored the 
initiative as a means of removing legislation %om the trusts. 
The rise of Populism and the Depression of 1893 largely turned the focus of people away 
tiom moral issues and toward the economic and agricultural crises. According to Storm 
(1972), populism caused internal dissension within both the WCTU and the Prohibition 
Party. The leadership of these largely middle class interest groups was divided as to how 
to deal with the growth and power of the Populists. 
In 1893, Howard Hyde Russell founded the Oluo Anti-Saloon League, which by 1895 
became a national organization. The ASL broke fiom the strategies and focus of the 
WCTU and the Prohibition Party (Blocker 1976; Donovan 1995; Storm 1972). It focused 
on the issue of obtaining prohibition exclusively, and did not concern itself with other 
social or moral issues. Realizing that state constitutional prohibition campaigns could be 
costly and unsuccessful; the ASL worked to secure any form of prohibition, whether local 
option, statutory, or constitutional. Part of the ASL's success was thus based on its 
pragmatic approach, in that they were willing to settle for second best when first best 
could not be attained. The ASL's pragmatic approach meant compromise with any group 
willing to support its goals. Depending on the local political context. this could be the Ku 
Klux Klan, Southern Democrats, Northern Democrats, or the Republicans. The 
organization supported any candidate, regardless of ideology, who would vote for the 
cause of prohibition and would favor strong enfbrcement of the laws once adopted. 
The Initiative and Referendum in the Third Wave 
The Populist and Progressive movements greatly aided the Anti-Saloon League and the 
Women's Christian Temperance Union for with these movements came the advent of 
direct democracy. Prohibition forces attempted to take advantage of direct democracy 
institutions during the third wave of prohibition, which extended from 1907 to 1919. Like 
a standard constitutional amendment, the initiative required the vote of the people, 
usually under the same rules as constitutional amendment. When a state required an 
absolute majority of the electorate to pass a ballot measure, the relative advantages of the 
initiative and referendum depended upon whether this strategy was more cost-effective 
than mobilizing the required votes in the legislature to submit the bill to the people. The 
initiative and referendum had petition requirements that varied by state. As indicated 
earlier, states had legislative submission requirements that varied also. Prohibition forces 
had to weight the advantages ofthe initiative and referendum on a state-by-state base. 
In addition to whether the petition requirements of states were more costly than 
pressuring state legislatures for submission. the initiative was subject to the same 
institutional constraints as regards to ratification. If a state required an absolute majority 
of the electorate of the state to ratify a legislative constitution submission, it required the 
same for an initiative. In other words, the referendum requirements for both forms of 
submission were the same. 
Blocker (1976) contends that the initiative strategy did not work well for the ASL. He 
attributes the losses experienced in statewide prohibition campaigns dufing the 1909- 
1913 period to the shift in Anti-Saloon League strategy from legislative chambers to 
ballot boxes: 
The League's balance-of-power tactics were best suited to bringing 
pressure upon individual politicians in contested districts. When the 
prohibition question was the sole issue to he voted upon by citizens of an 
entire state, the League's voting bloc wielded no power greater than its 
actual numbers, which usually constituted a decided minority (p. 215). 
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Although Blocker's arguments are plausible, they do not explain the empirical evidence 
based on the pattern of prohibition adoption. Table 3 shows the states adopting 
prohibition laws prior to National prohibition going into effect. This table shows that 
twenty states had adopted prohibition into their constitutions, and of these twenty, eight 
of them were adopted by the initiative process. Of these eight, however, three of the 
states required absolute majority requirements. These states were Colorado, Ohio and 
Idaho. Colorado experienced an unsuccessfitl campaign in 1912 before adoption in 1914, 
and the Ohio prohibitionists lost three times before victory in 1918. 
ASL Strategy, Political Institutions, and Policy Outcomes 
Unlike previous waves, the third wave of prohibition adoption began in the South, and 
the pattern of adoptions was a mixed bag of both statutory and constitutional prohibition 
laws. Some of the statutory adoptions followed the rejection of constitutional 
amendments by the voters. In three states, Arkansas, New Hampshire, and Iowa, a 
statutory law was adopted in the year or two following to voter rejection of the 
amendment at the ballot box. If we assume that prohibition interest groups were primarily 
responsible for pushing prohibition hills, then it would seem in the face of rejection by 
the electorate, a subsequent statutory bill was submitted. This would be consistent with 
the ASL strategy as discussed above. The League was interested in securing the 
maximum outcome possible. Sometimes this meant only a statutory law could be 
obtained; other times only a local option prohibition. 
Gerber (1999) corroborates the strategic methods of the ASL. She posits that groups 
pursue forms of influence and political strategies that involve low costs, relative to the 
expected benefits of pursuing strategies. In addition, these costs are a function of the 
institutional and behavioral hurdles associated with each strategy. 
Several cross tabulations are presented in tables 4-5. These cross tabutations represent the 
relationships between the key institutional factors and state prohibition policy outcomes. 
States had several policy choices, as seen previously in table 3. States could have chosen 
to remain a non-prohibition state (wet) or a prohibition state by either a statutory law or a 
constitutional amendment.' The pattern of adoption in these states should indicate that 
the more resistant a state constitution is to amendment. the more likely states are to be 
distributed among the other two alternatives i.e., wet or statutory prohibition. 
Table 4a, shows the relationship between the two consecutive legislature action 
requirements and the type of policy outcome observed in a state.7 As can be clearly seen, 
there is a clear relationship between this institutional hurdle and the policy outcome of 
the state. Two consecutive legislature states were far less likely to have a constitutional 
amendment and much more likely to be statutory or wet.' 
Table 4a here 
The relationship is in the same direction for table 4h as it was in table 4a. but is not as 
strong. Simple majority states were more likely to have a constitutional amendment. 
Table 4b here 
Table 4c presents a cross-tabulation of the supermajority requirement versus prohibition 
policy. The pattern here is not in the expected direction. We might expect that states that 
require a super-majority of at least one house to be less likely to adopt a constitutional 
amendment than states with a statutory prohibition 
Table 4c here 
According to Dodd (1922), states that require the action of two successive legislative 
bodies for the most part did not require super-majority votes of the legislature. This 
would imply that wet states are likely to have action of two successive legislatures, 
whereas dry states are likely to have super-majority requirements as their constraints 
against hasty adoption. 
Early twentieth-century state constitution scholars perceived the most significant barriers 
to submission and ratification to be the two-consecutive-legislatures requirement for 
submission of a referendum and the absolute majority of the electorate requirement for 
ratification (Dealey 1915; Dodd 1922: Garner 1906). None of the scholars gives any 
mention of the size of the legislature vote for submission being an institutional hurdle to 
submission. The entries in tables 4a-4c certainly appear to be consistent with their 
observations. 
If constitutional amendments were truly harder to pass than statutory laws, we would 
expect them to be adopted more slowly relative to ordinary statutes. The time variable in 
table 4d is divided into two intervals: 1907 to 1916 ( less than ten years fiom the start of 
the third wave) and 1917 to 1919 (which is the category greater than ten years). Table 4d 
indicates that there is a relationship between the type of policy outcome and the timing of 
adoption. A majority of states with constitutional prohibition adopted after 1916, while 
the opposite was true for states statutory laws. 
Table 4d here 
Why did some states with serious obstacles to constitutional amendments? One solution 
is to examine the role of the initiative, which, as discussed above, may have usefiil in 
circumventing these obstacles. Table 5 reports the duration interaction with the initiative. 
The table indicates that of the four constitutional states that adopted it early, three of them 
had the initiative. A majority of the constitutional states that adopted it in 1917 or after 
did not have the initiative. 
Table 5 here 
Table 6 presents all of the constitutional amendment votes in all of the states requiring an 
absolute-majority of the electorate for ratification between 1898 and 1908. Column 2 lists 
the number of amendments voted upon in each state. Column 3 lists the number of 
amendments that received a majority votes on the question, but were rejected because 
they did not receive an absolute majority of those voting in the election. Column 4 gives 
the average roll-off percentages over all the amendments. 
Table 6 here 
The influence that this institutional requirement has on amendment adoption is apparent. 
Tennessee had all seven of its amendments approved by a majority of those voting on the 
question, but all seven were rejected because they failed to receive an absolute majority 
of the state electorate. Nine of Minnesota's amendments were also rejected although they 
had received a simple-majority of those voting on the question, as were six of Ohio's. 
Such strong institutional obstacles may have shaped the strategy of the ASL away from 
pushing for prohibition in states in which an amendment was believed to be unfeasible. 
The large roll-off percentages on these constitutional amendments indicated that voting 
on amendments to the constitution were not nearly as important as other ballot issues in 
the state. The empirical evidence, then, suggests that strong institutional constraints, 
combined with low turnout, meant that working for a constitutional amendment made 
little sense in many states. 
Cross-tabulations do not provide a means for controlling for the influence of other factors 
on the observed outcomes. Controlling for certain factors such as a state's demographics, 
or whether a state had the initiative, will affect the association between constitutional 
amendment requirements and the distribution of state policy outcomes. In the next 
section, we thus employ more sophisticated estimation techniques to identie the impact 
of institutional factors more rigorously. 
Event History and Competing Risk Analysis 
The third wave of prohibition adoption (1907-1919) has the greatest variation of pattern 
of state adoptions. While some states had no prohibition (wet states), other states adopted 
constitutional amendments, while others adopted statutory prohibition laws. Thus, the 
third wave, which was the mos successCul wave of prohibition adoptions, becomes the 
ideal period to examine the variation in state policy adoptions and to assess whether 
different stochastic processes govern different modes of prohibition adoption. 
The main purpose of this analysis is to determine how the institutional variables 
described above influenced the rate and type of prohibition policy adopted by the states. 
The model we develop, the competing risk model can be tested using an event history 
formulation. What the competing risk model assumes is that in certain social processes, 
individuals or entities are "at risk" of experiencing a number of mutually exclusive 
events. In this case, a state cannot simultaneously adopt a constitutional amendment and a 
statutory law. The resultant policy outcome in a state depends upon the characteristics of 
that state, including the preferences of legislature, constituents, the interest groups, vote 
aggregation rules, and other measurable and immeasurable factors. Finally, we also 
assume the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
The following section provides an overview of duration models, the competing risk 
formulation, and the multinomial event history formulation used in this analysis. We 
specify the distribution of state adoption times with a density function j[tf(tl X, P) and the 
cumulative distribution h c t i o n  with F(t/ X, p). In the event history specification, we 
estimate the probability that a state will adopt prohibition in a given time period, 
conditioned on not already having adopted prohibition in all previous time periods. The 
dependent variable is thus a conditional probability function, called the hazard rate. We 
will let the hazard rate h(t/ X,P) be the probability that a state adopts prohibition in time 
period t, given that the state has not previously adopted. A state not adopting prohibition 
up to son% time period t is 1- F(t/ X. P), which we will designate as S(t/ X, /3) . Thus the 
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hazard rate of a state adopting prohibition in time period t is 
A competing risk framework modifies the fornulation above by introducing risk-specific 
hazard rates h,(t/ X,P), where j = 1,. .... r are r possible events. In this paper, there are two 
risk-specific events, statutory adoption, and eonrtitutional amendment adoption. 
Therefore r = 2. The competing risk hazard rates are specified as 
The likelihood function is specified following (e.g., Dienneier and Stevenson 1999). 
A state that fails by either a statutory law or a constitutional amendment contributes the 
following information to the likelihood function: 
L, =f , ( t , /x , ,~ , )ns ,  (~, Ix,J,}  
J'J 
The equation above says the likelihood of observing adoption j at time period t is the 
product of surviving the other policy adoption up to tkne t, and adopting policy j in time 
period t. Where the notation jf j simply means to take the product over all risks except j. 
Next substitute hj(tjX,B) forfit,/ X,,.@,) to obtain 
Now let T, be the observed risk, i.e.. T, = minjT1, T,}, with corresponding failure times 
t,, , I = 1 ,......, n, is the number of failures due to risk j. Then we can rewrite the 
likelihood function as 
Finally, if we define the following indicator function: 
d ,  = 1 ifi failed due to risk j 
d,, = 0 
we can write 
Each observation in the dataset either fails by one of the two j failures h, (ti/ x ~ ~ , P ~ ) ~ ~ ~  or 
survives to censoring S(ti1 Xri,Bj). In this paper, I posit that the functional form that the 
hazard takes is multinomial logit. That is if a state fails &om risk-specific hazard j, then 
The survival probability is the baseline hazard of a state never experiencing the event, 
which we designate as 
S(t,l X,J,pJ) is equivalent to 1-hJ (ti X,,PJ). 
X(t) is a time varying covariate. The multinomial event history formulation takes the 
likelihood for each time period for all non-censored  observation^.'^ The overall 
likelihood function is 
Time is index &om period s=l to the last period t. But this is equivalent to writing the 
likelihood function as 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable has three possible outcomes. A state may choose prohibition by 
a constitutional amendment, by statutory law, or remain wet and enact no prohibition law 
at all." 
The key assumption needed in order for the multinomial logit model to be an appropriate 
model for the data is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives ( I1A) assumption. On 
the other hand, conversely, the assumption means that the multinomial logit model is not 
appropriate when two or more alternatives are close substitutes. This analysis hinges on 
this assumption being valid. I assume that a constitutional amendment was the preferred 
choice of interest groups and a statutory amendment was a second best alternative for 
prohibition interest groups. Because the independents of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption might be problematic, I will use a Hausman McFadden Test to test whether 
12 the restricted choice set obeys the properties of IIA, Parameters 0 ,  0, and their 
covariance's are estimated from the efficient (full choice) and the restricted choice set. A 
quadratic function is created to measure how different the parameters are. If the 
parameters are approximately the same, then the MNL specification is not rejected. 
Independent Variables 
Duration 
I model the baseline hazard as a sequential counter of years in the risk set before an event 
occurrence.13 I hypothesize that absent other measurable covariates. states should face a 
higher risk of a statutory adoption than of a constitutional adoption. In other words, a 
statutory adoption should provide a lower overall hurdle to a prohibition adoption than a 
constitutional amendment. This would follow if statutory adoptions were chosen when 
hurdles for constitution adoptions were high. 
The main purpose of the analysis is to estimate the extent to which diEerent institutional 
factors influenced the probability of state adoption by one of two policy choices. One 
reason for a dynamic specification is the need to understand how growth of neighboring 
state prohibition policy adoptions influenced the chances of a state going dry. This is the 
wave or cascade phenomenon. Another reason is that changes in demographic factors 
may increase or decrease the likelihood of a state adoption. I dynamically model the state 
movement toward national prohibition from 1907 to 1919. Scholars typically consider 
1907 as the first year of the third wave of prohibition adoptions.'4 The three states that 
had adopted prohibition before 1907 are coded as "failing" in the first period. The onset 
of national prohibition in 1919 thus censors those states that had not yet adopted. 
For the regression analysis. a robust variance-covariance estimator was used in which 
observations on each state were grouped together. This was necessary to control for the 
heteroskedasticity within the time series for each state.l5 
Political Institutional Variables 
The main variables we focus on are the requirements for constitutional amendment. 
These variables are the legislative requirements for submissions, the number of 
legislatures required to approve submission of a proposal, the ratification requirement for 
a constitutional amendment, and whether a state has the initiative or not. Each variable is 
discussed below. 
Legislative Super-Majority 
States requiring a super-majority of at least one of the two houses to submit an 
amendment for popular approval will have a lower hazard of adopting a constitutional 
amendment than a statutory law. The effect of this variable is not expected to be as strong 
as that of requiring two legislatures for reasons argued above. 
Sessions 
States requiring two-consecutive-legislatures to approve submission of an amendment to 
the people will have a reduced risk of adopting constitutional amendments relative to 
states that require only one legislature to propose an amendment. 
48 
Absolute Majority Requirement for Ratification 
States requiring an absolute majority vote of the electorate will have reduced the hazard 
of adopting a constitutional amendment relative to states only requiring a simple majority 
vote on the amendment.I6 
Initiative 
This is a dichotomous variable, which takes on the value of 1 indicates that the state has 
the initiative, a zero. The presence of the initiative will reduce the hazard of adopting a 
constitutional amendment or a statutory amendment. As discussed above, the initiative 
should have a strong effect in states that require two legislatures to approve an 
amendment before submissions. In absolute majority states, its effects should be much 
weaker. 
Neighbor Effects 
This variable measures the number of states that have previously adopted prohibition and 
that are a neighbor of the state in the risk set. The logic is that as neighboring adopt 
prohibition; the cost of enforcement should diminish". I therefore hypothesize that the 
more neighbors around a state that has adopted a prohibition amendment, the higher the 
likelihood that the state currently in the risk set is to adopt either a constitutional or a 
statutory policy. This is because states will face reduced cost of policing their borders 
when other surrounding states adopt prohibition. The reduced cost may make prohibition 
policy appear more beneficial. 
Social and Demographic Variables 
As indicated in the introductioa certain demographic factors are correlated with the 
adoption of prohibition. I control for percent urban in 1910, percent Catholic, and 
percent Black, and percent foreign born. In order to estimate the effects of changes in 
demographic factors, data were interpolated. I used census data from 1900, 1910, and 
1920 to construct a trend, using STATA linear interpolation was constructed for each 
state. In other words, missing values were interpolated for the years in between. Up to 13 
years (1907-1919) were taken from each of the four socio-demographic variables 
(percent Catholic, percent Black, percent Foreign born, and percent Urban) for each state 
dependmg on the number of years a state appeared in the risk set." Higher percentages 
of those groups usually thought to be against prohibition should decrease the likelihood 
of a constitutional adoption. Because the popular vote is not directly involved in a 
statutory adoption, these factors should have a smaller effect on statutory adoption. 
Many Southern states at this time had a very high percentage of blacks in their 
population. According to the ASL, African-Americans, like many immigrant groups, 
were largely opposed to prohibition. It must be noted, however, that the African- 
American vote was suppressed during this period, and it is therefore possible that, 
African-Americans did not significantly hider prohibition adoption. 
Results 
Table 5 shows the results of the competing risk analysis. The second variable in the 
column label is the hase reference category. For Constitution vs. No Prohibition. the hase 
comparison category is the No prohibition category. Significant coefficients are 
discussed below. 
The sessions coefficients, -3.22 and 5.75, support the hypothesis that two consecutive 
legislatures have a significant (.01 level) and negative impact on the chances of adopting 
a constitutional amendment. Faced with the hurdle of requiring two legislatures to suhmit 
an amendment, a state is more likely to adopt either a statutory law or no prohibition law 
at all. The ratify coefficient -2.67 indicates that requiring an absolute majority also 
significantly reduces the likelihood of adopting a constitutional amendment. 
Next, we see that the supermajority coefficients of 1.40, indicates that a state requiring a 
supermajority of at least one house to suhmit a proposal is likely to adopt a constitutional 
amendment. As was discussed earlier, this could be an artifact of the fact that most states 
that require two successive legislature actions compensate for this harsh requirement by 
only requiring a simple majority of each house to submit an amendment. Indeed, 56% of 
the states that had simple majority requirements required action of two legislatures, 
compared to only 24% of all super-majority states. The coefficient of -.61 is larger than - 
.44, which supports the hypothesis that states are likely to adopt statutory prohibition 
before constitutional prohibition. The main thesis of this paper is that institutions are 
significant hindrances to constitutional policy adoptions. This result is consistent with 
this view. 
The neighboring state variable is significant for both constitutional and statutory policy, 
respectively. This validates the hypothesis that a neighbor's adoption increases the 
chances of a state adopting prohibition. Once again, two factors are believed to be at 
work here. A dry state bordering a wet state might expect to have a higher cost to 
enforcement, because the state borders will have a higher illegal traffic. A social learning 
phenomenon may have also been a factor. 
Finally, the results indicate that the initiative was not a signifieant factor in helping 
prohibition interest groups overcome institutional barriers. These results validate 
Blocker's (1976) belief that the initiative did not aid the ASL in gaining prohibition. The 
initiative usually had the same ratification requirement as the constitutional amendment. 
Thus, to the extent that a state's ratification requirement was a hurdle for legislative 
submissions the initiative did not provide a remedy. 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables 
We see that the greater the percent foreign born and black, respectively, the lower the 
chances of a constitutional adoption, as expected. The percent urban has the right sign hut 
is not signifieant. Pereent Catholic is signifieant (.03), but the sign is not in the expected 
direction. In an alternative specification used Pereent Protestant Denominations known to 
support the ASL. This specification did not yield signifieant results. although the sign 
was in the right directioni9. Next, 1 tested to see if there were any saturation in the model 
due to high collinearity of the demographic variables. I found that percent Catholic was 
correlated with foreign born with anr2 of .66. 
Table 6 here 
Many of the constitutional amendment states were western states, which typically had 
high percentages of Catholic. For instance. New Mexico which according to the census of 
1920, was 84% Catholic, had adopted a constitutional amendment. 
Simulations 
The coefficients and standard errors in nonlinear models are often difficult to interpret 
and are only indirectly related to the substantive issues that motivated the research. Thus, 
in order to illuminate the analysis results, simulation analysis was performed on the key 
factors in the competing risk model. The two key institution constraints from the 
regression results are the requirement of two legislatures to vote to submit an amendment, 
and the absolute-majority requirement of the electorate in order to ratiEy an amendment. 
Predicted values were generated &om the data. Using the infomtion from the observe 
data, this prediction was simulated 1000 times to generate 1000 predicted policy 
outcomes. 
Three ternary plots were created (see Katz and King 1999). The coordinates in the plots 
represent the predicted odds of a state adopting either one of the prohibition policy 
outcomes or remaining wet. A point closer to one of the vertices indicates a higher 
probability of a state moving into that state. Each plot represents the mapping of 1,000 
predicted policy outcomes. A point in the exact middle would indicate a .33 chance of 
that state adopting either of the prohibition policies or remaining wet. 
Table 9 here 
Table 9 presents the predicted probabilities under three different scenarios. Figures 1-3 
correspond to each of the conditions. Under counterfactual condition 1, all states require 
two consecutive legislature sessions to approve an amendment, and all require an 
absolute majority of the electorate to ratify the amendment. Under these high constraints, 
the simulations predict that a state will adopt a statutory law 55% of the time, a state will 
remain wet 44% of the time, and in only one percent of time would we observe a state 
adopting a constitutional amendment. 
Figures 1-3 here 
Condition 2 allows all states to have a simple majority requirement but two sessions to 
approve a submission. A change from absolute majority to a simple majority increases 
the chances of a constitution adoption from one percent to ten percent. 
Condition 3 relaxes both institution constraints. All states require only one legislature to 
vote to approve a submission of an amendment and a simple-majority to ratify an 
amendment. These are easiest possible conditions for prohibition interest groups. Under 
these conditions, there is a dramatic swing in predicted probabilities. Nearly 80% of the 
predicted outcomes are constitutional amendments. 
Conclusion 
The results of this chapter clearly show that political institutions played a role beyond the 
power of interest groups and public opinion in shaping prohibition policy outcomes. 
States that required two legislatures to approve a constitutional amendment before 
submission, or an absolute majority of the electorate to ratifji an amendment, were 
significantly less likely to adopt a constitutional prohibition amendment. 
The event history analysis indicated that states were more likely to adopt a statutory law 
sooner than a constitutional amendment. These results are in keeping with the ASL's 
strategy. That is a pragmatic approach led to a distribution of states that included a strong 
mix of both constitutional and statutory states before the advent of national prohibition. 
In states in which institutional harriers stood in the way of a constitutional amendment, 
they settled for statutory prohibition. 
Table 1: Statutory Prohibition Adoptions 1851-1860 
State Adoption Repeal Date Nature of Repeal 
Date 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Maine 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
New Hampshire 
New York 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
Replaced with license 
Overturned by Legislature 
Rejected by Supreme Court 
Overturned by Legislature 
Replaced with license 
Overturned by Legislature 
Rejected by Supreme Court 
Overturned by Legislature 
Overturned by Legislature 
Replaced with Local Option 
Overturned by Legislature 
Overturned by Legislature 
Overturned by Legislature 
Source: Ty-rell(1976) 
The Standard Encyclopedia of Alcohol Prohibition (1926) 
Table 2: Constitutional Amendment Campaigns 1880-1889 
State Vote Date Percent for Percent Outcome Election Majority 
Amendment Roll Off Requirement 
Kansas 1880 52.2 13.6 Approved Presidential Simple 
Iowa 1882 55.2 Approved Special Simple 
Ohio 1883 57.2 21.8 Failed State Absolute 
Maine 1884 74.8 34.6 Approved State Simple 
South Dakota' 1885 50.3 64.4 Approved Constitution Simple 
Rhode Island 1886 62 9.5 Approved State Simple 
Michigan 1887 49.2 4.7 Failed State Simple 
Texas 1887 36.9 Failed Special Simple 
Tennessee 1887 44.7 Failed Special Absolute 
Oregon 1887 41.6 Failed Special Simple 
West Virginia 1888 35.2 25.9 Failed Presidential Simple 
New 1889 45.4 37.6 Failed Town Simple 
Hampshire 
Massachusetts 1889 39.4 Failed Special Simple 
Pennsylvania 1889 37.9 Failed Special Simple 
Rhode Island 1889 26 Failed Special Simple 
South Dakota 1889 54.1 6.2 Approved State Simple 
North Dakota 1889 51.6 5.6 Approved State Simple 
Washington 1889 38.2 12.7 Failed State Simple 
Connecticut 1889 30.9 53 Failed Town Simple 
Source: Cyclopaedia ofProhihition. (1 891) p. 102 
Table 3: Prohibition Adoptions 1880-1919 
Vote 
STATE Date Policy Means Vote For Against 
Maine 1884 Constitutional Submission 70,783 23.81 1 
Kansas 1880 Constitutional Submission 92,302 84,304 
North Dakota 1889 Constitutional Submission 18,522 17,393 
Georgia 1907 Statutory Legislative 
Oklahoma 1907 Constitutional Const'l Conv 130,361 112,258 
Mississippi 1908 Statutory Legislative 
North Carolina 1908 Statutory Submission 1 13,612 69,4 16 
Tennessee 1909 Statutory Legislative 
West Virginia 1912 Constitutional Submission 164,945 72,603 
Virginia 1914 Statutory Enabling Act 94,25 1 63,886 
Oregon 1914 Constitutional Initiative 136,842 100,362 
Washington 1914 Statutory Initiative 189,840 171,208 
Colorado 1914 Constitutional Initiative 129,589 118,017 
Arizona 1914 Constitutional Initiative 25,887 22.743 
Alabama 1915 Statutory Legislative 
Arkansas 1915 Statutory Legislative 
Iowa 1915 Statutory Legislative 
South Carolina 1915 Statutory Submission 41,735 16,809 
Idaho 1916 Constitutional Initiative 90.576 35,456 
Montana 1916 Constitutional Submission 102,776 73,890 
South Dakota 1916 Constitutional Initiative 65,334 53,360 
Michigan 1916 Constitutional Initiative 353,378 284,754 
Nebraska 1916 Constitutional Initiative 146,574 117,132 
I n d i i  1917 Statutory Legislative 
New Hampshire 191 7 Statutory Legislative 
New Mexico 1917 Constitutional Submission 28,732 12,147 
Nevada 191 8 Statutory Initiative 13,248 9,060 
Ohio 1918 Comtitutional Initiative 463,654 437,895 
Wyoming 1918 Constitutional Submission 3 1,439 10,200 
Florida 1918 Constitutional Submission 21 $5 1 13,609 
Utah 1918 Constitutional Submission 42,691 15,780 
Texas 1919 Constitutional Submission 159,723 140.099 
Kentucky 1919 Constitutional Submission 208.905 198,671 
2,837,580 2,274,863 
Maioritv for: 
Table 4a: One vs. Two Consecutive Legisfature action, 1880-1919 
One Legislature Two Legislatures 
constitution I 19 1 0 1 
Table 4b: Simple vs. Absolute Majority Ratification Requirements 
Statutory 
No Prohibition 
Simple Absolute 
Constitution I 13 I 6 1 
6 
6 
I 
statutory 1 8 6 1 
7 
9 
No Prohibition 1 7 I 7 I 
Table 4c: Legislative Simple vs. Super-majority Requirements 
Simple Super 
Constitution 
Statutory 
No Prohibition 8 7 
Table 4d: Short vs. Long Duration for Adoptions 
I 
No Prohibition 1 0 I 15 I I 
Less than Ten Ten Years or More 
Constitution 
Statutory 
4 
10 
15 
3 
Constitutional Hurdles 
Table 5: The Initiative vs. Time to Adoption 
Initiative 
Yes 
3 
5 
Duration 
Short 
Long 
No 
1 
10 
Table 6: State Constitution Amendments and Absolute Majority 
Requirements 1898-1908 
state Number of Number of Roll-off 
Amendments Absolute- 
Majority 
Rejections 
Alabama 5 1 .20 
Arkansas 7 2 .26 
Illinois 2 -- .30 
Indiana 3 3 .53 
Michigan 22 1 .46 
Minnesota 13 9 .39 
Mississippi 8 3 .26 
New Hampshire 1 1 5 .58 
North Dakota 9 -- .29 
Ohio 14 6 .34 
Rhode Island 3 1 .39 
Wyoming 3 2 .61 
1. Dodd claims that the state government of Tennessee did not make the 
election statistics available. 
2. After 1906, Oregon repealed the absolute-majority requirement. 
Source: Dodd (1914) P.295-344. 
Table 7: The Effects of Institutions and Demographic Factors Upon 
State Prohibition Policies, 1907-1919 
X2 = 171.25 Psuedo R' = .4023 Log Likelihood = -70.32 N = 124 
Degrees of Freedom 20 Prob > X' = 0.0000 Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Political 
Institutions 
s u ~ ~ ~ ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~  
Sessions 
Ratify 
Initiative 
Demographics 
Foreign 
Black 
Catholic 
Urban 
1-40 (-65) 
-3.22 (1.22) 
-2.67 (.74) 
.23 (.61) 
-.019 (.OO) 
1 1  (.OO) 
.034 (.01) 
-.000 (.00) 
1.90 (1.30) 
2.53 (1.43) 
-1.07 (.88) 
1.31 (1.55) 
-.007 (.01) 
-.002 (.00) 
-.031 (.03) 
.001 (.00) 
.49 (1.49) 
5.75 (1.85) 
1.60 (1.08) 
1.07 (1.78) 
.012 (.01) 
-008 (.OO) 
-.065 (.03) 
.001 (.OO) 
Table 8: Predicted Probabilities from the Simulations 
Condition 2 
I I 
Condition 1 
/ Simulated probability 1 Mean / Std. Dev. 1 
/ Simulated probability 
I 
Condition 3 
/ Simulated probability I / Mean Std. Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Plot 1 
Plot 2 
Plot 2 : All States Require:Two Sessions, Simple Majority 
wet constitution 
Predicted Hazards of 1,000 Simulations 
Plot 3 
Plot 3 : All States Require:One Sessions, Simple Majority 
statutory 
:-& 
4. 
Predicted Hazards of 1.000 Simulations 
Appendix 
Data Sources 
Data for the demographic variables were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (file 001 5), a dataset compiled originally by Hofferbert. All 
the variables were derived from the 1910 and 1920 census. As mentioned earlier, linear 
interpolation was used to predict the values of the demographic variables. The 
institutional variables are taken from two sources. The first is Dodd's (1917) treatise on 
variation in state constitutions and the Book of the States (1955). The Percent Catholic 
variable comes from the Census of Religious bodies' (1916) table 38. This table reports 
the percent Roman Catholic for all states in 1890, 1906, and 1916. The neighboring states 
variahle comes from Berry and Berry ( 1  990) who generously provided me with this data. 
Left Censoring and Other Data Issues 
There was no left censoring perse in the data set. Left censoring occurs when the 
researcher does not know the time the observation first became at risk. However, two 
variables entered the risk set later than the other states. Ariiona and New Mexico do not 
officially become states until 191 1, and thus cannot enter the risk set until that year. 
Oklahoma was eliminated from analysis because it adopted prohibition directly into its 
constitution upon becoming a state. Thus, its adoption was by constitutional convention 
and not by amendment, which means that Oklahoma could have never entered the risk 
set. 
Coding Issues 
The Sessions variable was coded one if a state required two votes of the legislature before 
submission to the people otherwise. Three states required that a legislature vote for 
submission of an amendment to the people, then the people were to vote on the 
amendment. and then a second vote of the legislature was to be taken at the next 
convening session. They were nevertheless coded one on this variable, because the key 
issue is the lapse of time between submission and complete ratification. Following is a 
table of state institution requirements for the time periods between 1907-191 9. 

Notes 
' A "high license" policy @lies that very high fees are charged for retail liquor licenses, 
and that such licenses come with tight restrictions on operating hours, etc. This was 
intended to result in small numbers of saloons being licensed. Consequently those 
receiving a license have shown they have an incentive to be responsible in obeying local 
laws for fear of losing their large and lucrative investment 
* Ohio submitted two amendments to the people at the same time. Ohio had been under a 
no license policy since the 1850's. The voters chose prohibition over a high license 
policy. 
' Most states have since repealed absolute-majority requirements. At the time of the 
prohibition movement. between 1907 and 1919, however, twenty-one states had these 
requirements. Gamer (1906) only lists eighteen states. Subsequent to Garner's article, 
several states either joined the Union and added absolute-majority requirements or 
existing states changed their requirements from simple to absolute. 
4 During this period, only West Virginia and Kansas had prohibition amendments votes 
during presidential elections. Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Iowa had special election votes. 
5 Whether the absolute majority of the electorate in the state or of those voting at an 
election presents the greater hurdle is not specified by the state constitutional scholars 
writing at the time. I too reserve judgment as to which hurdle is higher. 
States with or without local option were considered wet if they did not have a state 
prohibition law. By the time of the third wave just about every state had either statutory, 
constitutional or local option policies. There were four states that did not have local 
option and were wet; these were Connecticut, Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. 
' The time period for which the data was recorded in tables 4a-c are the dates prior to 
each state's adoption during the third wave and the onset of national prohibition. 
North Dakota is the one state that required two consecutive actions of the legislature 
prior to submission of a constitutional amendment. It did so the same year that it became 
a state. The vote for prohibition was separate and was not a part of the constitutional 
convention as was Oklahoma. It is not clear how the vote was taken on this amendment. 
There seems to be evidence that only one legislature action was necessary to submit the 
amendment. I could not find enough information on the constitutional amendment 
campaign of 1889 to justify switching North Dakota to the one legislature requirement. 
The initiative is not an institutional barrier to state constitution adoptions and thus is not 
modeled. 
'O Each state contributes several observations to the likelihood function. In time period 1, 
each state either adopts an amendment or does not adopt. If a state adopts in the first 
period, it drops out of the risk set and does not contribute any information to the 
likelihood function in time period 2. The remaining states either adopts in time period 2 
from one of the risk-specific hazards or are censored (experience the non-event). The 
explanatory variables may have changed values &om time period 1 to period 2. The 
likelihood function would be structured to capture the fact that the explanatory variables 
change over time. 
Similarly, multinomial logit likelihood's can be formulated for each of the remaining 
time periods, with the number of observations contributing to these likelihood's 
diminishing as individuals are censored or leave the non-adoption state. A giant 
likelihood can then be formed by multiplying together all of these separate period 
likelihood. Thus, each state contributes several terms to this overall likelihood, one term 
for each time period for which that state was at risk of leaving the non-adoption state. 
" Theoretically a state can transition fiom no prohibition to a statutory law and then to a 
constitutional amendment. This actually happened in two states, which would suggest a 
misspecification of the model. 1 get around this misspecification two ways. First, this 
study is interested in the final prohibition outcomes. not all of the transition states in 
between. Second, in each of the cases in which a state moved from a statutory law to a 
constitutional amendment, there was only one year in between the transition, which 
appears to be a situation in which the prohibition interest groups took the safe, easier 
route, to secure the passage of a statutory law, and then when an election year came 
around, they tested the public sentiment as regards the statutory law. In the two cases in 
which the transition occurred, the prohibitionist won. It may have been bad judgment on 
my part, hut I chose to ignore these transition between these two states because of the one 
year gap, and two observations are too small to use in the formulation of a fourth policy 
route. 
l 2  A Hausman test was performed to test the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
assumption. The results of the test were not significant which is an indication that the 
assumption is valid. A x2 of 12.30 with a probability value of .2657 indicates that the 
differences in the coefficients from a model including both the statutory and the 
constitutional alternatives is not systematically different than the model that excludes one 
of the prohibition alternatives. 
l 3  Like Jones (1997), I tried several specifications for the baseline hazard. 1 attempted an 
exponential specification, a log transformation of duration, as well as adding dummy 
variables for each year. Neither the log transformation nor the exponential increase the 
model's significance over the linear specification. I found, like Jones, that the coefficient 
became highly unstable, as the number of dummy variables increased. I lost many 
degrees of freedom, although the variables of interest were still significant under all 
specifications, the linear specification was the cleanest to interpret. Modeling the dummy 
variable interaction within a logit setting is clearly a good choice for the haseline hazard, 
when there are many subjects within the risk pool relative to the dummy variable count 
and when there are strong theoretical reasons for doing this. The typical researcher 
modeling of duration of an individual or other living organism has substantive reason to 
believe that the baseline hazard may increase nonlinearly over time. With prohibition, it 
is not clear that in the absence of any of the covariates that I have model that we should 
expect the hazard of adoption to increase nonlinearly. Another alternative is to 
parameterize the baseline distribution, hut again there is no substantive theory that should 
lead me to believe that the baseline hazard of prohibition adoption fbllows some known 
baseline distribution. 
l4 This fact might pose a problem with the model specification, because the likelihood 
h c t i o n  does not account for reversals of policies. Technically Alabama's prohibition 
law was not formally reversed. In 1911, a Whiskey-option law was adopted allowing 
counties to vote themselves wet. Thus the statutory law was nullified but not formally 
reversed. After several counties voted wet, a statutory law was adopted in 1915 making 
those counties dry. If the policy reversal were a constitutional amendment reversal, it 
would have strong implications for any hypothesis concerning institutions as barriers to 
amendment adoption. It tums out that the legislature overturned the law and then 
readopted it in 191 5. 
l 5  The probability that a state adopts a prohibition policy depends on its x-values and an 
error term e. Each year, a state has a probability of adopting a policy as well as an error 
associated with this probability of adopting a prohibition policy. Each year states values 
of x might change, thus changing the chances a state adopts a prohibition policy. As x 
changes, so does the error term. This is due to the inherent structure of the discrete choice 
formulation. Thus the variance of the error term can increase or decrease with changes in 
X. The heteroskedastic nature of the data within states overtime needs to be accounted 
for. The Huber-White robust sandwich estimator accounts for this. 
16 There were two states that did not require both proposal and ratification at the time of 
the third wave. New Hampshire required amendments to the constitution be by state 
convention only. Delaware requires that amendment be by legislature action only. There 
are other methods of state ratification, such as conventions, commissions and the 
initiative-referendum, this as seen in the table 3.1 above. 
17 I don't consider contemporaneous correlation of the errors in the model because I 
believe that the inclusion of neighbor effects accounts for the heterogeneity caused by 
adoptions in one state being potentially related to adoptions in another state. As will be 
seen below, this variable is significant. 
'* 1n event history analysis, once an observation fails, it exits the dataset (risk set). Thus, 
if Idaho adopts a constitutional amendment in 1916. then I will have no more 
observations on Idaho in the data set after 1916. So I would have less than 13 
observations on the state of Idaho, only states that never adopt prohibition have the full 
13 observations. 
l 9  I followed the specification used by Hersch and Netter (1989). They aggregated five 
groups &om the census of religious bodies, as I did. These groups were Baptist, 
Methodists, Presbyterians, Disciples of Christ, and Congregationalist. According to the 
authors these groups were known to support prohibition. Their religion variable was 
significant in the regression that they ran. However, they added Mormons to his 
specification, which I know were not explicit supporters of the Anti-Saloon League; 
Toma (1988) used a religion variable in trying to explain county option adoption in 
1980. He was unable to find any effect of religion, as measured as percent of population 
affiliated with religious organizations exclusive of Jewish. Catholic, and Episcopalian. 
Another study, by Goff and Netter (1994), used Baptist and Methodist for their religious 
variable in an attempt to determine if religious affiliation played a role in the adoption of 
prohibition. The coefficient on this measure, taken from the 1916 Census of Religious 
Bodies, was also insignificant. 
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Chapter 3 State Prohibition and Federal 
Institutions 
Introduction 
We saw in the previous chapter how interest groups favoring prohibition often faced 
formidable obstacles posed by the requirements for constitutional amendment adoption. 
In this chapter, we investigate the limitation? imposed by the federal constitution upon 
state prohibition. These limiting factors made enforcement of dry state laws highly 
problematic at best. 
Merchants operating near the borders of dry states became the chief source of supply of 
alcohol to prohibition states. Because economic transactions between states and foreign 
countries were the jurisdiction of the federal government through the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, dry states were powerless to exercise their Tenth Amendment rights 
as long as the jurisdiction over liquor transportation was lett in the hands of the federal 
government. 
The Original Package Doctrine 
The Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Maryland in 1827 is the first instance of federal 
and state conflict involving the regulation of liquor. Brown was convicted in Maryland of 
selling foreign goods without paying state taxes. The Supreme Court heard the case on 
appeal after Brown lost the case in state court. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
Maryland law violated the Constitution's provisions prohibiting states from levying 
duties on imports. State power, brthermore, could not attach until federal commerce 
ended. This did not happen until the good became mixed up with the mass of property 
within the state. Justice Marshall interpreted mixed up to mean that the goods had been 
broken %om their original package. In other words, the wholesaler took the goods out of 
the shipping box with the intent to sell. The Chief Justice reasoned, since the purpose of 
importation was to sell the good that state laws could not interfere before sale of the 
goods. With the ruling in Brown v. Maryland, the Supreme Court had drawn a line 
indicating when federal power would end and state power would begin. The precedent set 
by the Supreme Court was referred to as the "Original Package" doctrine (Hamm 1995). 
The Original Package doctrine received its first test in the 1847 License Cases, wherein 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on several state alcoholic beverage regulations. Before the 
first wave of prohibition, several states experimented with partial prohibition laws. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Massachusetts '%fieen-gallon law" was one example. Rhode 
Island had a similar law that forbade sales of alcohol in quantities less than ten gallons.' 
New Hampshire's law required licenses for all liquor sellers. The plaintiff, in Pierce v 
New Hampshire, charged that the laws enacted by Rhode Island. Massachusetts and Neu 
Hampshire interfered with the federal authority to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations and among the several states (Calvin 1926).* The judgments in the Rhode Island 
and Massachusetts cases relied on the clear precedence established in Brown v. 
Maryland. The Court ruled that laws in question did not violate the Constitution because 
liquor shipments had been broken out of their original package and had been sold in 
quantities smaller than what the state laws forbade (Hamm 1995). Once liquor had been 
taken from its original package, it was no longer protected by the Original Package 
doctrine. 
The Pierce v. New Hampshire case was slightly different. In this case, dealers purchased 
a barrel of gin in Boston and took it (in its original package) to New Hampshire. The 
vendors sold the barrel of gin in its original package without having acquired a license to 
sell liquor in the state of New Hampshire. A prosecution was initiated and the vendor was 
convicted. The case was taken to the Supreme Court, where the Court opinion favored the 
states' police power. According to Chief Justice Marshall 
Upon the whole, therefore, the law of New Hampshire is in my judgment a 
valid one. For, although the gin was an import fiom another State and 
Congress have clearly the power to regulate such importations. under 
grant of power to regulate commerce among the several states, yet as 
Congress has made no regulation on the subject, the traffic in the article 
may be lawhlly regulated by the state as soon as it is landed in its 
territory, and a tax imposed upon it, or a license required, or the sale 
altogether prohibited, accordiig to the policy which the state may suppose 
to be its interest or duty to pursue (Quoted by Stubble (D, IA) in CR- 
House, 51" Cong 1 sess., p. 495). 
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that none of these state laws was in conflict with the 
Interstate Commerce Clause, or with the Original Package doctrine established 20 years 
earlier. Thus, even if the liquor was in its original package a state could prohibit its sale. 
These rulings opened the way for the first wave of prohibition in the 1850's, which we 
discussed in the previous chapter 
Federal Civil War Tax 
In 1862, the federal government instituted a nuniber of taxes to raise revenue in order to 
h d  the Civil War effort. One of the taxes was imposed upon the production of distilled 
spirits. This tax remained in place long after the war ended. Between 1873 and 1890, the 
alcohol tax generated between 15 and 20 percent of total federal revenue. Hamm (1995) 
contends that the liquor tax created a symbiotic relationship between the liquor producers 
and the federal government. 
Because collection of the taxes on distilled spirits was threatened by avoidance and 
corruption, the federal government took strong enforcement measures. Federal regulators 
directed construction of all distilleries. Distilleries were required to maintain bonded 
warehouses, and liquor was released for sale only upon payment of tax. 
Pro-prohibition groups opposed the federal liquor tax, labeling it a "sin" tax because in 
their view the federal government was licensing vice. Prohibitionists also believed that 
the tax made the liquor industry a potent political force. They further contended that the 
tax should have been repealed with the other taxes that were repealed after the Civil War. 
Many drys contended that the federal government should replace the revenues it obtained 
from liquor taxation by a direct tax or by a progressive income tax (Hamm 1995). 
In the years following the Civil War, pro-prohibition forces found that those opposed to 
prohibition had a new tool to employ in the cause. With the abolition of slavery came 
three new amendments to the constitution. One of these, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
was designed to prevent states from taking away the privileges and immunities of 
citizens. 
The Fourteenth Amendment Defense 
In 1887, Peter Mugler was charged with illegally manufacturing beer and maintaining a 
nuisance, thus violating Kansas's prohibition laws. The state authorities had closed the 
brewery in a civil proceeding without a jury trial. Mugler argued that his business had 
been illegally enjoined and that his property had been confiscated without compensation 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. His argument hinged upon the fact that he had 
been selling beer brewed before the passage of the state prohibition law (Colvin 1926). 
in addition to this argument, Mugler contended that the building structure had been 
constructed especially for the purpose of manufacturing beer and thus had limited 
alternative usage. 
The case built by Kansas's attorneys was based upon the arguments espoused by 
prominent prohibitionist, John Finch, in a famous debate in Detroit. He reasoned that 
liquor was not a common food or drink article and that a series of decisions by state 
courts had not deemed it to be in the same class as other legitimate business. Any 
individual engaging in the manufacture or sale of liquor was thus putting himself at risk, 
knowing that at anytime the liquor trade could be suppressed. Precedents for prohibition 
were seen in similar evils, such as slavery and lotteries. States had never been compelled 
to compensate slaveholders and lottery keepers for loss of property, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not change this 
The Court, in answering the challenges as presented by Mugler, clearly expressed the 
right of the state to define and prohibit externalities caused by markets against third 
parties. The Court said: 
But by whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined whether the 
manufacture of particular articles of d*, either for general use or 
personal use of the maker, will injuriously affect the public? Power to 
determine such questions, so as to bid all, must exist somewhere; else 
society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only their own 
appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and security of 
the many, provided only they are permitted to do as they please. Under our 
system, that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the 
government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the 
police powers of the State. and to determine primarily what measures are 
appropriate or needhl for the protection of the public morals, the public 
health, or the public safety. (Quoted in Colvin 1926, p.526) 
The essential issue before the court was whether the prohibition statute of Kansas was in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court asserted that precedent decisions had 
made clear that state legislation prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating 
liquors did not necessarily infringe any right, or privilege secured by the Constitution of 
the United ~tates."rohibitionists thus felt themselves empowered by what they called 
"The Great Prohibition Decision". 
~Mugler v. Kansas was a triumph for prohibitionists. The ease validated a states right to 
define what markets constituted harm to its people and thus could be prohibited without 
compensation. The decision greatly aided state enforcement efforts through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Just one year later, however, the Supreme Court would deliver a 
severe blow to efforts to enforce state prohibition. 
The Interstate Commerce Challenge 
Iowa adopted state prohibition in 1882. Its dry laws were difficult to enforce, however, 
because its neighbors, Missouri and Illinois, remained wet. Two Supreme Court cases 
bearing on Iowa's attempts to enforce its prohibition laws reveal the unresolved 
externality problem. 
The &st case was Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railroad 1888. George and 
Fred Bowman were Iowa wholesalers who sought to import liquor from out of state for 
sale in state. The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad refused to deliver liquor into dry 
states. The Bowman Brothers sued the railroad for interfering with interstate commerce. 
Attorneys representing the state of Iowa and the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad 
argued the contrary position that states are given police powers through the Tenth 
Amendment, and therefore it is the right of a state to enforce its prohibition laws. 
The Supreme Court, while acknowledging Iowa's right to protect the welfare and morals 
of its people, ruled that the Iowa statute on transporting liquor was unconstitutiona~.~ The 
statute was held to be an effort to exercise control over property within the limits of other 
states and thus an unauthorized interference with the commerce power of Congress. The 
Bowman ruling established the right of an individual fiom a wet state to export alcoholic 
beverages into a dry state. On the other hand, it did not rule against the rights of states to 
ban the sale of liquor within their boundaries. 
The Bowman ruling encouraged some manufacturers to switch to retail sales to meet the 
demand in dry Iowa. Gus Leisy, a Keokuk brewer who had been shut down by Iowa's 
state prohibition laws, moved his manufacturing plant to Peoria, Illinois, and opened a 
retail outlet in the brewery building that had been shut down by Iowa's prohibition 
statute. Leisy, using the original package doctrine as a shelter, sold beer to customers in 
full kegs or cases with federal government revenue stamps attached. 
In 1888, a reform regime came to power in Keokuk, determined to stamp out liquor 
traEc. The Leisy Company found itself the target of these efforts. Sheriff A.J. Hardin, 
who sympathized with the wets, was forced to confiscate the company's entire stock. 
Leisy subsequently sued A.J. Hardin for compensation. Leisy's argument was that the 
power to regulate interstate commerce rested exclusively with Congress, and that this 
power extended within state borders. The attorney for Hardin asserted that the 
prohibitory laws were regarded as valid regulations under the states' police power. and 
that the silence of Congress acknowledged the right of the state to enact such laws. 
Moreover, the power to tax, regulate, and control took hold as soon as imported goods 
were delivered to the consignee. Thus, the sale of beer should not be protected by the 
federal interstate commerce power. 
The Court ruled in favor of Leisy, stating that the absence of any law by Congress as 
regards to the subject matter is equivalent to the requirement that commerce shall be free 
of state laws. In other words, Congress must actively delegate its powers over commerce 
to the states in order for states to prevent the sale of alcohol in its original package. The 
Prohibition Party, seeing that the Supreme Court had ruled against state police powers in 
this case, concluded that the Supreme Court had made prohibition a national question 
(Harnrn 1995). 
The effects of the two Supreme Court rulings were substantial. The Bowman decision 
weakened state prohibition laws because individuals were allowed to import liquor from 
wet states. The Leisy mling essentially nullified state laws because retail sales were 
protected under the Interstate Commerce Clause as long as the liquor remained in its 
original package. In other words, the Supreme Court ruled that only by sale did the beer 
become mingled in the common mass of property of the state. In absence of 
congressional permission to do so, the states had no right to interfere with interstate 
commerce. As long as goods remained in their original package, they could be sold under 
the protection of the federal government. 
Bader (1986) provides a good example of just how S i t e d  state police powers were 
following Bowman and Leisy. His account reveals the great difficulty that the attorney 
general of Kansas had in enforcing Kansas's prohibition laws. Because of the original 
package ruling, liquor dealers from Missouri could legally ship their products into Kansas 
and sell it to customers through an agent. Nevertheless, arrests were made for nuisances, 
selling from opened packages or permitting drii ing on premises. As soon as arrests were 
made, however, lawyers gained the release of violators through habeas corpus 
proceedings in the federal district court. The federal courts became inundated with cases 
and complaints. In response to this congestion, the federal court enjoined county 
attorneys and other local officers &om making further prohibition related arrests. 
The Wilson Act 
In the wake of the Leisy v. Hardi decision, prohibition advocates pressed Congress to 
act quickly to protect the prohibition laws of dry states. The Fifty-First Congress took 
action grudgingly. From the Congressional Record, it is evident that both sides were 
aware that the Supreme Court had reversed the precedents established in the License 
Cases of 1847 and wanted Congress to resolve the renewed confiict between wets and 
drys. This was not a task that Congress was eager to take on. 
What prohibitionists desired was for Congress to move the point of state power from the 
sale of goods to the point at which goods crossed state boundaries. The Senate passed the 
bill that was intended to ban the sale of spirits, beer, and wine only. The House Judiciary 
Committee offered a substitute bill, intended to give states police powers over all 
commerce deemed harmkl to the public welfare and morals. After a debate in the House 
upon the bill, the Senate version was adopted. 
The bill reads as follows: 
All fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into 
any state or territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage 
therein, shall upon arrival in such state or territory be subject to the operation and 
effect of the laws of such state or territory enacted in the exercise of its police 
powers to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or 
liquors had been purchased in such state or territory, and shall not be exempt there 
&om by reason of heiig introduced therein in original packages or otherwise 
(quoted by Colvin 1926, p.534). 
It was not long before liquor dealers challenged the limits of the Wilson Act. In 1898, the 
Rhodes v. Iowa case raised the question of where and when did alcohol cease to be 
subject to interstate commerce laws and become suhject to Iowa law. John Rhodes a 
Western Railroad attendant. moved a box of liquor bottles six feet from the train platform 
to a warehouse. The liquor was seized and Rhodes was indicted for violating Iowa's 
transportation law. The Supreme Court, faced with another prohibition case from Iowa. 
sought to interpret the Wilson Act in such away as to prevent commercial anarchy 
(Hamm 1995). It was believed that giving states the power to stop any good that was en 
route through a state would give the states extraterritorial power. In Rhodes v. Iowa, the 
Supreme Court ruled that states could not act upon the good until its arrival to the 
consignee. This decision did not bring back the original package saloons, but it did allow 
f?ee importation of liquor against a state's prohibition law. Thus, the Rhodes v. Iowa 
significantly limited the extent of prohibition that could be achieved within a state. 
Adam's Express, American Express Company and other "Cash On Delivery" businesses 
flourished under the Rhodes Supreme Court ruling. Consumers simply ordered alcoholic 
beverages through the mail and receive shipments delivered directly to them. Previously, 
states could not confiscate liquor within their borders if the liquor had a federal revenue 
stamp attached to it, because to do so violated the Interstate Commerce Clause and the 
original package doctrine. With the passage of the Wilson Act, states were given the 
power to confiscate the liquor in its original package once it crossed state lines. 
Subsequent Supreme Court dings, however, allowed states to confiscate liquor only 
after it had reached the hands of the purchaser. Such restrictions meant that no state could 
become completely "bone-dry." 
By the latter part of the Nineteenth Century, pro-prohibition groups were losing strength, 
as new reform movements arose in the wake of the Depression of 1892 and the problems 
associated with urbanization and industrialization. Couple these problems with the 
nullification of the Wilson Act that Rhodes v Iowa decision produced, and one can easily 
understand the dissipation of the movement by the turn of the century. 
Given the overwhelming enforcement problems, the Anti-Saloon League sought to use 
the federal government's liquor tax as a way to aid states in enforcing their prohibition 
and local option laws. The League encouraged dry states to adopt "primae facie" laws, 
which simply said that the payment of a federal liquor tax was primae-facie evidence of 
the intent to sell intoxicants. Thus, because of the tight regulation of the distilled spirits 
industry, dry states could use this information to help them enforce their prohibition laws. 
In 1906, Congress passed the Certified List Law. This legislation required the federal 
government to furnish a list of all those who had paid federal liquor taxes to any state or 
locality that requested the information. Through the Certified List Law. the federal 
government aided the state enforcement effort. 
Although this Certified List law did assist dry states, prohibition advocates sought even 
greater enhancement of state police powers vis-a-vis the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
Two factors aided the drys in their efforts to persuade the 62nd Congress (1912) to revisit 
the issue. Fist, eight more states had adopted prohibition laws. Second, Congress had 
passed a series of laws using their interstate commerce powers to protect the rights of 
states. 
Several of these laws were: 
The Lacey Act of 1900, which supported State efforts to conserve game bids by 
banning interstate transportation of game contrary to state laws. 
The P u e  Food and Drug Act of 1906 
The Mann Act (White Slavery) of 1908, which used the Commerce powers to ban 
prostitution from interstate trade. 
Immigration Act of 1910, intended to slow the tide of immigration. 
As it turns out, however, the Interstate Commerce Clause was something of a two-edged 
sword. Until this point in time, it had been an obstacle preventing dry states from 
enforcing prohibition. In subsequent years, however, Congress would use the authority 
given it by the Interstate Commerce Clause to materially assist the cause of prohibition. 
Following this same strategy, the temperance movement under the lead of the ASL 
sought to pressure Congress to use the Interstate Commerce Clause as a tool to solve the 
externality problem between the states. In 1912, four bills were presented before a 
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary for discussion. Kenyon (R-IA) 
sponsored the bill that emerged. After passing the Senate, the bill moved to the House, 
where it was co-sponsored by Webb (D-NC). 
The argument for the Webb-Kenyon bill was that the state should not only punish those 
who illegally sell liquor, hut also prevent illegal sale. States had found it impossible to 
effectively enforce their prohibition laws, when compelled to wait until the offense had 
been committed. The states sought the power to confiscate alcoholic beverages in bulk 
before it reached the consumer. 
Those in favor of Webb-Kenyon argued that the federal government was a partner in the 
liquor traffic through the shelter it provided under the Interstate Commerce   la use.^ In 
1913, temperance advocates succeeded in achieving passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act, 
which, by divesting the federal powers over liquor, essentially banned liquor from 
interstate commerce protection. 
The bill read as follows: 
Be it enacted, etc., That the shipment or transportation, in any manner or 
buy any means whatsoever, of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, 
or other intoxicating liquor of any kid,  from one State, Territory, or 
District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to, but subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign country into any State, Territory, 
or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to, hut subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof. which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, 
or other intoxicating liquor is intended by any person interested therein, to 
be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original 
package, or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or 
District of the United States. or place noncontiguous to, but subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited. 
After the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act, the adoption of prohihition, by states began 
to increase rapidly. In 1914, five states adopted prohibition laws. In 1915, five more 
states were added. By 1916, some states were also adopting bone-dry laws, which banned 
the importation of intoxicants into the state. 
In January 1917, the validity of the Webb-Kenyon law was challenged in Clark Distilling 
Company v. Western Maryland Railroad Company. This case was similar to the 1888 
Bowman case, where a railroad company refused to ship liquor in violation of state laws. 
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Webb-Kenyon Act. 
In the same year that the Supreme Court upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act, another piece of 
legislation aided the cause of state prohibition. At this time, purveyors of alcoholic 
beverages were able to advertise freely in dry states. Several bills were presented before 
the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads to ban the advertising of liquor through 
the mail. Senator Reed (D-MO), a staunch wet, introduced a rider (a "killer" amendment) 
in an attempt to defeat the liquor advertisement bill. The Reed Amendment would outlaw 
the transportation of liquor into any state that had a prohibition law. Reed shared the 
belief of many wets that prohibitionists were not truly serious about prohibition; if they 
were, they would push for a ban on the importation of liquor as well as its sale. This idea 
of forcing every prohibition state to become bone-dry would also serve to undue the Anti- 
Saloon League's pragmatic approach, of settling for small gains to avoid huge losses. 
The ASL was aware of Reed's game plan and vigorously opposed the rider. To the 
surprise of the drys the bill passed. The Reed Amendment thus made every state that had 
prohibition bone-dry. Yet, instead of a backlash against the Reed Amendment from states 
that had allowed the importation of liquor for personal use, several more states adopted 
prohibition laws. 
With the passage of Reed, states had thus been delegated complete police power over 
intoxicating beverages. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various limitations that states faced in being able to 
exercise their Tenth Amendment rights over alcohol markets. States faced great 
limitations in exercising their rights to practice prohibition, In addition to the instability 
caused by statutory prohibition and the difftculty in attaining constitutional prohibition, 
this chapter has addressed the difficulty of states enforcing their prohibition laws in the 
context of a federal system. In chapter 2 we saw how interest groups were influenced by 
state institutions. In this chapter we saw how state police laws were influenced by federal 
institutions. 
Federal institutions originally helped spark the first wave of prohibition through the 
Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the interstate commerce powers of the federal 
government. Afier the Civil War, however, the state prohibition movement was hampered 
by the narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court of the federal interstate commerce 
powers. It was not until after 1912 that Congress and the Supreme Court worked in favor 
of dry state rights against externalities created by wet states. Once Congress gave up its 
power over alcohol markets, the state prohibition movement spread rapidly. To this point, 
much of the scholarship of the prohibition era has given credit for the spread of 
prohibition to the relative strength of economic interests versus religious interests. This 
chapter shows that some of the credit ought to go to federal institutions. 
Notes 
i These laws required the purchaser to buy fifieen gallons (ten gallons) all at one time. 
The purchaser would have to find a way to transport all fifteen gallons away from the 
retailer or tavern. 
1 have not seen any author that has identified the name of the other to Supreme court 
cases. All scholars writing on the subject that I have read refer only to Pierce V. New 
Hampshire. 
The malt liquor tax rate was low compared to the distilled spirits tax rate; the incentives 
to cheat were also not the same (Hamm 1995). 
There were several cases during the 1870's that challenged state laws concerning 
alcohol regulation in terms of confiscation of property based upon nuisance laws. Beer 
co V. Massachusetts was litigated in 1877. There were several other cases previous to 
this one. Mugler v. Kansas was a unique decision because it validated some state 
prohibition laws as being legitimate. 
Much of this history of federal involvement can be found in Hamm's treatise of 
prohibition. 
Congressional Record, December 16, 1912. The 62* Congress, 2nd session-Senate, p. 
700. 
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It must be borne in mind that the federal government is one of limited 
powers. Except as granted to the United States or implied in those granted, 
all powers are jealously reserved to the state. Certain traditional lines of 
federal activity had become well developed and understood. Policing, 
except incidental to certain relatively narrow and specialized functions of 
the general government was not one of them. Importation, transportation 
across state lines, and the enforcement of excise tax laws were natural 
subjects of federal action. But prohibition of manufacture, distribution and 
sale within the states had always been solely within the scope of state 
action until the Eighteenth Amendment. This radical change in what had 
been our settled policy at once raised the question how far the federal 
government, as it was organized and had grown up under the Constitution, 
was adapted to exercise such a concurrent jurisdiction. (House Document 
no. 722, 71" Cong, 3d sess.56) 
Chapter 4 National Prohibition and the Collapse 
of Concurrent Enforcement 
Introduction 
Historians of the Prohibition Era have emphasized the growth and mobilization of 
opposition interest groups, combined with the apparent shift in public opinion, as 
explanations for the repeal of National prohibition (Dohyns, 1940; Sinelair, 1963; Kyvig 
1979). Only passing reference has been given to the nature of the construction of the 
Eighteenth Amendment. and to the role it played in shaping state and federal enforcement 
efforts. 
The Eighteenth Amendment created a peculiar arrangement under which the federal 
government was delegated a share of responsibility for state police powers, hut was not 
transferred access to state law enforcement machinery. At the time of prohibition there 
was a huge asymmetry in enforcement capabilities. The federal government had not yet 
established the Federal Bureau of investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firedrms, or the host of other federal policing agencies that exist today. In contrast, the 
states had relatively large judicial institutions present throughout many localities within 
their borders. The federal government also had a minimal number of courts in which to 
prosecute cases. As a result, the states were vital in determining whether National 
prohibition could be enforced. 
1 hypothesize in this chapter that the second section of the Eighteenth Amendment, which 
specified that both the state and the federal government "shall concurrently enforce 
National prohibition," essentially gave states the ability to n u l ~  federal law. These 
nullification rights dramatically increased the burden on the federal government because 
of the asymmetries in capabilities. 
The Adoption of National Prohibition 
Just months prior to the introduction of the National prohibition amendment into both 
Houses of Congress in 1914, the Webb-Kenyon Act was passed. As discussed in chapter 
3, Webb-Kenyon forbade the transportation of alcohol from one state to another against 
the wishes of the dry state. It removed the protection of the federal govemment from 
alcoholic beverages, thus giving states the right to confiscate liquor that entered the state 
with a federal revenue stamp attached. The Webb-Kenyon Act also strengthened state 
power over liquor regulation. Less than one year later, during the second session of the 
63* Congress, several proposals for a nation-wide prohibition had reached the floor of 
the House for debate. 
The major alternatives were the Morrison plan and the Hobson plan. Martin Morrison (D- 
IND), part of the solid voting bloc known as the Indiana Thirteen, believed in the 
principle of prohibition but was also a strong advocate of state's rights. His amendment 
originally had the support of the Anti-Saloon League, largely because the ASL needed an 
alternative in the event they could not win enough support for the Hobson plan. 
The Morrison Amendment (House Joint Resolution 389), which would further protect dry 
states from the importation of liquor, read as follows: 
Section 1. The importation of any spirituous vinous, malted, fermented, or 
other intoxicating liquors into any state of the United States, or into the 
District, Territory country, place, or region, domestic or foreign, is forever 
prohibited. 
Section 2. It shall be the duty of the Congress from time to time to enact 
appropriate legislation for the effective enforcement of the provisions of 
this article. 
Richard Hobson (D-AL) was a young Progressive Democrat and an avid proponent of 
national prohibition. After more than 1,000 prohibitionists marched to the steps of the 
Capital in 1913, EIobson was picked to represent the ASL's prohibition bill in the House, 
Senator Morris Sheppard (D-TX) in the Senate 
The Hobson Resolution ( House Joint Resolution 168) provided for federal enforcement 
within every state: 
Section 1. The sale, manufacture for sale, transportation for sale, 
importation for sale, and exportation for sale of intoxicating liquors for 
beverage purposes in the United States and all territory subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are forever prohibited. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to provide for the manuhcture, sale, 
importation, and transportation of intoxicating liquors for sacramental, 
medicinal, mechanical, pharmaceutical, or scientific purposes, or for use 
in the arts. and shall have power to enforce this article by all needhl 
legislation. 
The first section of both the Morrison and Hobson Resolutions defined what was to be 
prohibited. The Morrison Amendment would prohibit importation of intoxicating liquors, 
into the United States kom foreign countries, as well as prohibit importation &om one 
state to the next. Hobson, on the other hand. would prohibit both importation and 
exportation "for sale," as well as the transportation and the manufacture of alcohol "for 
sale." The Hohson prohibition only applied to intentions for sale. It purposely did not 
refer to home manufacture for personal use. 
The Morrison plan would not transfer any powers over to Congress from the states. It 
was, in some ways, a natural extension of the Webb-Kenyon Act. By only banning 
importation, Congress would be well within its defined constitutional powers. Congress 
had been enforcing laws related to interstate commerce and the protection of the U.S. 
borders throughout its history. Morrison argued that his plan would allow wet states to 
manufacture alcohol for themselves, but would not allow states to import liquor kom 
other states or foreign countries. 
Morrison's plan seemed to be little different kom the Webb-Kenyon Act, but it did have 
severe implications for the alcohol industry. By banning interstate commerce of alcohol, 
it would effectively destroy alcohol markets. Soil and climate are important to the proper 
production of beer, wine and spirits. Good beer cannot be made in Florida, nor can good 
whiskey be made in Arizona. The profit margins enjoyed by the alcohol industry were 
heavily dependent upon the ability to export their product into other states. The Morrison 
amendment would thus deal many alcohol producers a lethal blow. 
In contrast, the Hobson Resolution would require Congress to expand its power to 
regulate markets beyond that of interstate commerce and the U.S. borders. It would 
require Congress to enforce a prohibition within the states as well. Arguments against 
Hobson during the House floor debates centered on the infeasibility of enforcing a 
prohibition against sale. The dry proponents of Hobson had difiiculty answering 
questions concerning enforcement. How, for example, does one tell for certain if the 
intention of transportation is for sale? 
The debate over Hobson also focused on state's rights. President Tafl feared that the bill 
would greatly expand federal power. States' rights advocates, fearing a return to the 
Reconstruction Era, attacked the bill as well. Although little emphasis was given to 
federal enforcement capabilities, it is clear that asking the federal government to police 
the importation, exportation, manufacture, and transportation of alcohol within the states 
and along its borders would be vastly more costly than the Morrison plan. 
This may partly explain why the Hobson Resolution was revised ten times before 
reaching the floor. The key changes made to the Hobson Resolution were in the second 
section, which defined which sovereignty had the power to enforce section 1 .  The House 
Judiciary Committee version, H.J.R. 168, held that "Congress shall have the power to 
enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation." By the day scheduled for floor 
debate, an amended version, H.J.R. 277, was offered as a substitute for the original 
resolution (H.J.R. 168). It stipulated instead that "Congress or the States shall have the 
right to enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation." 
Witherspoon (D-MS) announced that state's rights advocates were not assuaged by the 
change in wording protecting state powers. Under the amendment's provisions, if the 
Congress were to Act at all, however feebly, all state jurisdiction and power would 
terminate. Witherspoon argued that only an imaginary adherent to the doctrine of state 
rights could deceive himself into believing that there is a substantial difference in his 
favor in Resolution 277 instead of Resolution 168. 
Hobson Wins Over Morrison 
Both advocates and opponents of nation-wide prohibition objected to the Morrison 
Amendment. The ASL and their congressional backers had three major objections. Fist, 
no constitutional amendment was needed to adopt this provision. The Congress already 
had the power to prohibit importation of alcohol from foreign countries, while states 
already had the power to forbid the use of alcohol. The Hobson Resolution forbade the 
manufacture and sale of liquor in all states, whereas the Morrison Amendment only 
applied to dry states and the federal. The Morrison plan was rejected ovenvhehningly by 
a voice vote. 
There is another reason for the rejection of the Morrison's proposal. Although Morrison's 
proposal seemed to preserve the rights of both dry and wet states, as well as confine the 
federal government's power within its existing bounds, the amendment had severe and 
very real consequences for alcohol producers and for state tax revenues. The ASL also 
believed that the country would not be ready for true prohibition and that the bill would 
not pass the House. Therefore, it was important to them that a bill be proposed that would 
maximize the chance that some form of prohibition would be adopted. Once adopted, any 
weaknesses in the bill could be fixed through changes in an enforcement clause. 
Wets, on the other hand, believed that its unambiguous construction and feasibility made 
the Morrison plan a likely candidate for passage. Thus neither group had any incentives 
to support the measure. This may be why Morrison believed that there was a suspicious 
alliance between the brewers and distillers on the one hand and the Anti-Saloon League 
on the other to get the Hobson bill out of committee and on to the floor for a vote. Thus, 
the ambiguities in the Hobson Amendment made it more likely to gain the support of 
both sides than in the Morrison Amendment. 
Despite attempts by drys to clear up ambiguities, the Hobson Amendment failed to 
achieve the two-thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment to pass the 
House. In the end, the Hobson Resolution went down in defeat with a simple majority for 
the bill, 197 to 190.' 
After the House version of the bill failed in 1914, the Senate version never reached the 
floor for debate. Nevertheless, while Americans were increasingly focused on the War in 
Europe, prohibition forces were actively campaigning for state prohibition. Between 1914 
and 1916, twelve more states passed prohibition amendments, raising the total of clq 
states to twenty-one. 
World War L and the Revival of the Hobson Plan 
The 65" Congress convened on April 2, 1917. This Congress would have ordinarily not 
met until December, but President Wilson called it into special session in order to declare 
war. Two days later, the Hobson Resolution was revived in the form of Senate Joint 
Resolution 17. S.J.R. 17 was sent from the Senate Judiciary Committee to the floor for 
debate. Just two days after that, Congress declared war. According to prohibition 
advocates, this meant that food would have to be conserved for the armed forces and the 
soldiers would have to be sober and ready to fight. Prohibition forces hoped that the war 
would aid the passage of S.J.R. 17. 
S.J.R.17 sponsored by Senator Morris Sheppard (D-TX), was close in form to I3.J.R. 168. 
It provided "Congress to have the power to enforce the legislation by appropriate 
measures," which was the provision of the original Hobson Resolution. In floor debate, 
the method of enforcement, as defined in section 2, was rarely discussed. 
The bill was tabled from April to August. In the meantime, other temporary prohibition 
measures to aid the war effort were debated and acted upon. On May 18, 191 7. Congress 
passed the Selective Service Act, which, among other things, created dry zones around 
military camps, and forbade the sale or gift of any liquor to any member of the military 
establishment. According to Merz (1930), the passage of this Act greatly aided the 
arguments for national prohibition. 
By August 1917 the drys were able to force national prohibition onto the agenda as top 
priority for floor debate. There were seven proposed Senate amendments to Sheppard's 
bill. Amendments ranged from prohibiting distilled spirits only, to putting a time limit on 
adoption by the states. It was clear that sentiment had swung strongly in favor of passage 
of some form of nationwide prohibition. Historians have attested to the fact that the war 
greatly aided the passage of the national prohibition bill. The b i  passed the Senate on the 
same day it was introduced. The hill specified a seven-year time limit for the necessary 
thirty-six states to rat@ the amendment. It was then sent to the House where it was 
referred to the Judiciary Committee. Meanwhile, to conserve grain, Congress wrote into 
the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act of 1917 an amendment that forbade the production 
of distilled spirits, and authorized Congress to give the president the power to S i t  the 
use of food products in the production of beer and wine. 
Passage of the Eighteenth Amendment 
While Congress was passing wartime prohibition measures. the national prohibition hill 
was being amended during House Judiciary Committee hearings. Two changes were 
made to the bill. First, the time limit for adoption was changed from seven years to six. 
The other change was a concurrent enforcement clause, which took the place of the 
"Congress shall have the power to enforce." The clause states "Congress and the several 
States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
Wayne Wheeler, lawyer for the ASL, testlfylng before the House Judiciary Committee in 
the 66" Congress, in 191 9, explained why. 
The section in controversy was inserted by the House: 
The Judiciary Committee of the House raised the question whether the 
States would have complete and ample authority to enforce prohibition if 
the Senate provision was adopted. Such power was not exactly given. 
Many of the ablest lawyers in the Senate contended that states would have 
power to enforce prohibition under the clause, which they adopted, 
because power was not specifically limited or taken from the states. If the 
Senate provision had been adopted, the courts probably would have 
construed the amendment to give ample power to the States to enforce 
laws providing for the prohibition of the beverage liquor traflic. It will 
therefore be seen that the clause, which the wets hope will weaken the 
amendment and render it unenforceable, was designed to strengthen it and 
give it effectiveness. (CR-House 66, 1" session: 2469). 
There was surprisingly little debate on this version of the bill in the House. On December 
22, 1917, the bi passed the House by the necessary two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, 
the approval of the Eighteenth Amendment with the concurrent enforcement provisions 
confused many in Congress. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) predicted that states 
would cease to enforce prohibition laws after the ratification of the Eighteenth in order to 
avoid the expense of enforcement (Hamrn 1995). The drys, on the other hand, believed 
that concurrent enforcement meant that the states would lend their machinery to the 
federal government, while the federal government would be in charge. As will be 
discussed shortly, the drys hoped to use the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution as a 
coercive tool to implement National prohibition from Capital Hi. 
The Eighteenth Amendment had passed both houses, the war had ended, and the 
armistice had been signed for eight months, yet prohibition forces pressed on for 
additional wartime prohibition legislation. On November 21, 1918, Congress passed an 
amendment to the agricultural appropriation bill. This measure, known as the War 
Prohibition Act, forbade the manuhcture of beer and wine after May 1, 1919, and 
outlawed the sale of all intoxicating beverages after June 30, 1919. Both provisions were 
to remain in effect until after the termination of demobilization. The War Prohibition Act 
thus essentially implemented the Eighteenth Amendment while states were busy 
considering ratification and the country was still caught up in the war. Drys maintained 
that demobilization was so difficult that it should be considered as part of the war. Wets 
argued that the measure was a dishonest attempt by the drys to go hack on their promise 
to give the liquor trade a year to wind up its business. By passing the War Prohibition 
Act, the drys were able to close up the gap between passage of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, which occurred on January 16, 1919. and the start of National prohibition 
one year later. 
The next step for Congress was to adopt an enforcement Act to implement prohibition. 
The ASL composed a draft of an enforcement hill to present before Congress. This bill. 
sponsored by Andrew Volstead (R-MN), was reported to the House &om the Committee 
on the Judiciary on May 19, 191 9. 
The Volstead Act 
Opponents and proponents of the Eighteenth Amendment understood that an enforcement 
Act would have to be written in order to make the amendment operational. The Volstead 
Act prohibited the manufacture, sale, barter, transportation, importation, exportation, 
furnish'i or possession of any intoxicating liquor. In addition, it defined the 
maintenance of any property where intoxicating liquors were manufactured, kept, sold, or 
bartered to be in violation of the Act as a common nuisance. 
The Act contained other important provisions in addition to its criminal proscriptions. It 
broadly defined the term "intoxicating liquor" to include any beverage that contained 
more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume, and it included several noteworthy 
enforcement provisions. Another section provided for the forfeiture of vehicles used to 
transport intoxicating liquor. Another gave federal courts power to issue "padlock 
injunctions" that could order establishments where intoxicating liquor was sold to be 
closed for a year. Notwithstanding these provisions, the Volstead Act was not as extreme 
as opponents of Prohibition sometimes portrayed it. Neither possessing liquor in one's 
private residence nor purchasing liquor was a crime under Volstead. Furthermore, the 
Act allowed searches of residences only when prohibition authorities could prove that 
liquor was being sold at the residence, or that the residence was being used in part "for 
some business purpose," manufacturing for sale. I concentrate in this chapter on the parts 
of the Act that are relevant to my thesis. 
The concurrent enforcement clause, however, was vague enough to permit both drys and 
wets the opportunity to move the enforcement provisions toward their preferred position. 
Drys sought to amplify the power of the federal government in order to create a uniform 
policy enforced across the country, whereas the wets sought to increase the power of the 
states in order to subjugate the federal government to the heterogeneity of preferences 
over prohibition that existed among the states. 
The minority and majority reports reflected the two factions as regards to the meaning of 
concurrent power. Wayne Wheeler, representing the views for the ASL, had appealed to 
the Supremacy Doctrine (Article IX of the Constitution) in testimony before the 
Committee on the Judiciary . He argued that if a state did not enforce the Eighteenth 
Amendment, then the federal government could not be prevented from enforcing it. The 
dry position would guarantee enforcement of prohibition in every state regardless of state 
policy. It also guaranteed a strong central federal power. According to Hamm (1995), 
Wheeler sought to use the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to induce states to adopt 
uniform enforcement laws, conceding the power to define the rules of enforcement to the 
federal government, with the intent of using the state machinery to bring about 
compliance. 
The counterargument, presented by the wets, was that concurrent power was one of equal 
power: the federal government and the states had the same authority to pass the same or 
similar laws. The two levels of government could not have dissimilar laws, because ifone 
were enforced at the expense of the other it would imply supremacy of the one over the 
other. If one law is supreme, then the two sovereigns could not be equal in authority. This 
view of the concurrent enforcement clause obviously runs counter to the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution. 
Henry Steele (R-PA), in defense of the wet position, suggested that the Volstead Act 
could not be valid in any state of the union without the concurrence of that state. Thus if' 
states concurred in the construction of the Volstead Act, then the federal government and 
the state would coequally enforce the law in that state. If a state did not concur in the 
construction of the Volstead Act penalties and provisions, then federal or state officers in 
that state could not enforce it. 
Wheeler disagreed and clarified his interpretation. Wheeler said that if one unit of 
government fails to use its full power, it does not prevent the other unit of government 
kom doing that which the first unit of government had the power to do hut chose not to 
do. Steele (R- Penn) respondii to Wheeler's argument provided an example of the 
problem Wheeler's interpretation presented. According to Steele, Rhode Island had 
passed an Act providing for the manufacture of beverages containing four percent 
alcohol.' If Congress legislated one-half of one percent, he asked, what is to be the 
threshold for intoxicating beverages in Rhode Island? Steele argued that permitting 
federal agents to arrest a state resident for doing somethii his state permitted would be 
intolerable (CR-House 66, 1" session, p. 2430). 
Steele argued another point concerning the reason why the Act had a concurrent 
enforcement section and not an exclusive federal enforcement section. Steele claims that 
the concurrent enforcement clause was inserted because the original bill used the wording 
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, i.e. that "Congress shall have 
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." This reminded members of 
Congress of a time when federal officers occupied Southern states (CR-House 66, 1' 
session: 2429). To avoid this situation, the text was changed to call for concurrent 
enforcement. Others concurred with Steele, claiming that Wheeler. the most prominent 
ASL lawyer, had defined concurrent as equal power (CR-House 66, 1' session: 2450) 
during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. 
At the close of debate in the 66' Congress, it was clear that the two sides had very 
different positions on how the concurrent enforcement clause originated and what it 
meant. Such wide differences in interpretation may explain why the amendment was 
ratified in all hut two states. Perhaps the vagueness of the enforcement clause made the 
amendment satisfactory to both sides of the issue. It would be up to the Supreme Court. 
however, to decide on one interpretation of the concurrent enforcement clause or the 
other. 
On July 22, 1919, the House passed the Volstead Act by a vote of 287 to 100; the hill was 
referred to the Senate where it passed on September 5 by voice vote. On October 27, 
President Wilson vetoed the hill, chiefly because it made provisions for wartime 
prohibition, even though demobilization was already underway. The President's veto. 
however, was promptly overridden by the House, 176 to 5, and by the Senate the 
following day, 65 to 20. 
Eugene Chaiiq the most well-known member of the Prohibition Party as well as their 
1912 presidential candidate, clearly foresaw the problems that the construction of the 
Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act created. Storm (1972) reports that 
When the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted, C h a h  lay on his 
deathbed. Friends who had worked with him for a lifetime in the cause 
gathered around him to celebrate. But C h a h  shook his head. He predicted 
that the Volstead Act would prove in the end to be a bi-partisan conspiracy 
to discredit the legitimate temperance movement by non-enforcement of a 
law, which the major parties really opposed. Before he died, he prophesied 
to them that the Eighteenth Amendment would be repealed in meen years 
and that the efforts of a century would have to be done all over again. As it 
turned out, it took only thirteen years (p.32). 
The Supreme Court and Judicial Review 
On January 16, 1920, the country became oecially dry. Immediately the validity of the 
concurrent enforcement clause was challenged. By 1920, the Supreme Court had already 
established precedents for concurrent enforcement arrangements betw-een two sovereigns. 
In 1909, the Court handed down a decision in Nielson v. Oregon concerning the 
jurisdiction of the Columbia River between Washington and Oregon. The Court's 
decision in that case held that the statute that designated the Columbia River as the 
common boundaries of both states gave both states concurrent jurisdiction over the 
waters of that river. The Court held further that concurrent jurisdiction implied that 
successive prosecutions could be proscribed, even in cases where two different 
governments had legislative authority to make the same conduct criminal. This precedent 
was applied to the Eighteenth Amendment. 
The Court's decision on the meaning of concurrent enforcement with respect to 
Prohibition was handed down in United States vs Lanza (253 U.S. 350.) The U S .  vs. 
Lanza ruling was in part a response to a lower court ruling in United States v Peterson. 
In that case, the defendants were charged with violating the Volstead Act by 
manufacturing, transporting and possessing intoxicating liquor. The defendants had filed 
a plea claiming that they had been previously convicted for the offense in violation of 
Washington's prohibition statutes. The district court held that further prosecution by the 
federal government would constitute double jeopardy. The defendants in United States v. 
Lanza appealed to the same principle as that of the defendants in United States v 
Peterson. 
When United Stares v. Lanza comes before the Court in 1922, the Court appealed to the 
doctrine established in United States v Nielson to make its decision. In so doing 
overturned the lower court's decision in United Slates v. Peterson. The Court ruled that 
concurrent enforcement means that Congress can establish one law for the entire U.S. and 
its territories, while at the same time States can establish another law within their 
respective boundaries. The Court also established that federal law did not impinge on 
state laws that were consistent with it. Most importantly when the same Act is an offense 
against both state and federal government, prosecution by one sovereign does not 
preclude prosecution by another sovereign for the same offense. Finally, no state law 
could allow what the Eighteenth Amendment forbade. 
Commenting on the Lanza decision, McBain ( I  930), a legal scholar of the time, said that 
the court construed "concurrent" to mean -'independent," at least so far as the power of 
Congress is concerned. Statutorily, administratively, and judicially, enforcement of 
National prohibition was held to be wholly independent of the enforcement of state 
prohibition, 
MeBain (1930) goes on to discuss the implications of the concurrent enforcement 
doctrine for State's rights. 
State prohibition laws, say the court, do not derive their force from this 
amendment. In other words, the States derive no power whatever from the 
amendment accept perhaps the power to Act upon interstate and foreign 
liquor power, which had already been effectively granted to them by Act 
of Congress some years before the amendment was proposed. The 
amendment took power from the states; they cannot legalize liquor ... 
If the power which they now possess to adopt and enforce a policy of state 
prohibition is merely the power "'originally belonging" to them, "preserved 
to them by the Tenth Amendment." clearly a state has today, as it has 
already had, complete option to adopt or decline to adopt prohibition as a 
state policy (p.30). 
The concurrent enforcement clause implied, then, that the federal government had no 
coercive power over the state, and the state had no coercive power over the federal 
government. By appealing to the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court clearly 
established that the separation of powers required that state and federal laws were 
independent. McBain (1930) goes on to assert that if the states derive no power to enact 
prohibition laws. they are under no obligation. morally or legally, to enact such laws 
because of the amendment. Thus, the Supreme Court, in U.S. vs. Lunzu, was compelled to 
maintain the boundaries between the federal and state governments. While expanding 
federal powers and limiting states' Tenth Amendment powers, the amendment 
nevertheless had no power to compel the states and federal government to cooperate with 
each other in enforcing National prohibition. States had no moral or legal obligation to 
enforce National prohibition, They simply could not make legal what it forbade. The 
concurrent enforcement clause thus established the right of a state not to enforce federal 
prohibition law which given the vast asymmetry between federal and state enforcement 
capability, was tantamount to allowing states the right to nullify the Eighteen 
Amendment. 
Every state, with the exception of Maryland, adopted enforcement statutes. If states found 
that the costs of enforcing prohibition were too heavy, however, they could repeal their 
enforcement statute and shift the burden of enforcement onto the federal government. 
The federal government could be left shouldering the whole burden of enforcement. 
Nullification by the states was thus a real possibility. As we will see below, states took 
full advantage of the opportunity to explicitly and implicitly nullify the Eighteenth 
Amendment. 
Asymmetries in Capabilities 
The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the National prohibition Act inaugurated 
the most extensive and sweeping efforts in history to change the social habits of the 
nation. One would naturally expect that the federal government would have had the 
institutions in place to handle such a sweeping reform. However, prohibition advocates 
were not prepared for the Supreme Courts interpretation of the Eighteenth Amendment. 
The federal government was at a disadvantage for several reasons. First, there were no 
well-established federal agencies for enforcing National prohibition. Second, the 
institutions that were in existence were not suited for enforcing National prohibition. The 
federal government thus did not have any agency at the time of Prohibition that was 
readily available for the enormous task of enfnrcing the Volstead Act. 
Even before Prohibition was adopted, there had been doubt as to whether the federal 
government would be capable of enforcing it. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in 
his Annual Report to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 
1919 (made while the National prohibition Act was pending in Congress) noted that the 
pending bill would place responsibility for the enforcement of its provisions upon the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue in the Treasury Department. The IRS, however, was already 
burdened with enforcing the revenue laws of the federal government. 
Following passage of the Volstead Act, the Bureau of Internal Revenue proceeded to 
organize departments under supervising federal prohibition agents for the enforcement 
work. It created in each state an organization under a federal prohibition director for the 
regulation and control of the nonbeverage trade in alcohol. The country was divided into 
twenty geographic zones for enforcement of the law. 
There were other federal agencies at that time that had trained police officers. but none 
were equipped to handle the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. The largest 
federal police agency at the time, the Bureau of Investigation, was located in the 
Department of Justice. The Bureau of Investigation was charged with the investigation of 
offenses against the United States, and with the collection of criminal identification 
records and police inf~rmation.~ The chief offenses were related to cross-state activities. 
such as motor vehicle theft and traiKckiig in prostitution. The Bureau was able to do an 
effective job enforcing these laws, even though it had less than 600 total employees. 
In contrast to agents of the Bureau of Investigation, prohibition directors and agents were 
not subject to Civil Service laws. Salaries of prohibition agents were also too low to 
attract quality employees. Much of the criticism of the prohibition unit was directed 
toward the competence of the agents. In the first six years of Prohibition, 148 officers and 
employees were convicted on charges of criminality, including drunkenness. 
Table 1 below shows the extent of turnover within the agency. In 1921, almost all 
enforcement agents were either replaced or quit. In 1923, 1924, and 1926, almost 50% of 
the agents were replaced. No agency can be expected to operate harmoniously with such 
high turnover rates. Clearly, the federal government did not have large, capable, welt- 
established institutions to enforce National prohibition. 
Table 1 here 
Public outcry and media attention was focused on the failure of the federal government to 
enforce National prohibition. In the wake of the scandals and press coverage, Congress 
held hearings concerning the enforcement of the Volstead Act and the structure of the 
Bureau of Prohibition. In April 1926, an inquiry was opened before a subcommittee of 
the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, charged with the duty of 
investigating and makimg a report to the full Judiciary Committee on the problems of 
enforcement and the Bureau of Prohibition. Actions taken because of the hearings were to 
make appointments to the Bureau of Prohibition subject to the provisions of the Civil 
Service laws and to raise salaries. In April 1927. the members of the Bureau of 
Prohibition were subjected to examination to determine their eligibility to continue in the 
service. Of those on the force who took the examinations, 41% passed and continued to 
hold their positions, while 59% failed. 
Another issue brought before Congress was the lack of funding provided for prohibition 
enforcement. As shown in Table 2, even in the peak year of 1930, Congress appropriated 
less than fifteen million dollars a year to the Prohibition Bureau. This amount was twenty 
times smaller than Lawrence Andrews, the Director of the Prohibition Bureau, estimated 
wodd be required to adequately enforce national prohibition.4 But even after the 
hearings, appropriations only increased marginally. 
Table 2 here 
Not willing to take all of the blame for enforcement failure, the Bureau of Prohibition passed the 
blame on to the states. The Bureau argued that the federal government simply did not have the 
capability to enforce National prohibition without state cooperation. The Bureau. in essence, was 
asserting that the states were implicitly and explicitly nullifying the law (Andrews 1930). 
State NuNifica tion 
This claim was not without substantial merit. On May 31, 1923, New York becanle the 
first state to repeal its prohibition enforcement Act. In the same year Nevada repealed its 
statute and enacted the much weaker California prohibition law in its place. This Act was 
subsequently held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the State. No new Act was 
substituted, thus making Nevada a free rider like New York. Montana formally repealed 
its prohibition law by a constitutional repeal amendment. As indicated earlier, Maryland 
had never adopted an enforcement statute, even after repeated attempts by dry forces 
within the state. By 1926, several states had repealed their state enforcement acts. 
States also resisted federal attempts to coerce them into enforcing federal prohibition 
law. In 1926, President Coolidge attempted to coerce state cooperation by deputizing 
state, county and municipal officers as federal prohibition police officers through an 
executive order (Patch 1926). The response to the order was largely unfavorable. Five 
governors explicitly declared their opposition. Seven other governors indicated that their 
state supreme courts would have constitutional or legal difficulties with the order. One 
legal difficulty was evident in Louisiana. The governor had planned to draft state parish 
and municipal officers into the federal prohibition force. A clause in the Louisiana 
Constitution, however, provided that no state or municipal officer shall hold an office in 
the federal government. In the face of public opposition and strong resistance in 
Congress, Coolidge subsequently withdrew the order (Patch 1926). 
Upon taking office in 1929, Herbert Hoover urged state and local governments to help 
the federal government enforce the Volstead Act. That same year, though, Wisconsin 
held a referendum on its enforcement Act and the people voted to repeal the state 
enforcement Act. Still bent on enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress increased 
the penalties for prohibition violations. The Jones Act of 1929 actually increased the 
maximum penalties for most prohibition violations and made sale of intoxicating liquors 
a felony. 
Although Congress stiffened the law, it only increased public resistance. After 1930 
opposition to prohibition increased significantly. The Depression enabled opponents to 
add the economic arguments that repeal would mean more jobs and increased taxes to 
their earlier claims that repeal would safeguard personal liberties. President Hoover, who 
was still set on making the Eighteenth Amendment work, appointed a National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, led by George Wickersham, a former 
attorney general. While the commission was investigating the issues of state capabilities 
and effectiveness in cooperating with the federal government in enforcement. a cascade 
effect was taking place. In 1930, Massachusetts, Illinois and Rhode Island all repealed 
their prohibition enforcement acts. The wave of repeals may have helped shaped the 
largely negative report given by the Wickersham Commission on state and federal 
cooperation. 
Table 3 here 
The Wickersham Commission concluded that there were four categories of states that the 
federal government would have to deal with in order to facilitate cooperation. The first 
were those where there was state level prohibition before National prohibition. In those 
states public opinion might be expected to demand and sustain active state enforcement 
and zealous cooperation with the federal government. Virginia and Kansas are given as 
examples of the first type, in which strong cooperation existed between the state and 
federal government. Many states in this categofy set up separate prohibition enforcement 
departments and eased the burden on the federal government. 
In the second category were states where there was prohibition before National 
prohibition, but in which public opinion, either in the state as a whole or in the cities, was 
less supportive. State enforcement was sporadic, and there was at most lukewarm 
cooperation with the federal government. No explicit examples are given of the second 
type of state. All that is reported is that the tendency of these states was to leave 
enforcement primarily to the federal government, particularly in the cities, where people 
were often much more opposed to prohibition. 
The third group was those that did not have prohibition before National prohibition, but 
that had state statutes conforming to it. The Commission reported that in these states, 
enforcement had become less active and had substantially broken down in the cities. New 
Jersey and Missouri were given as examples of this third type. 
Fourth were those states in which there was no prohibition before National prohibition 
Act and which currently had no state statutes. Here the Commission concluded that only 
in localities where local option prohibition was in place before National prohibition was 
there clear evidence of a desire to cooperate with the federal government. Maryland and 
New York were cited as examples of this type of state. 
States in categories two and four can be considered either explicit or implicit nullifiers. 
Explicit nullifiers formally repealed their prohibition laws or enforcement codes and 
shifted the burden to the federal government. When this happened not only was no 
assistance rendered from the state's police forces, hut the courts were no longer available 
to the federal government. Implicit nullifiers provided little by way of effort or 
expenditures and thus shifted the enforcement burden on to the federal government. In 
order to show more clearly how a state's nullification made federal enforcement of 
prohibition impractical, I turn to a case study of New York. 
The New York Nullification Experience 
In 1921 the New York state legislature passed prohibition enforcement legislation, known 
as the Mullen-Gage Act. Intoxicating liquor was defined as any liquor containing over 
one-half of one percent alcohol. The penalties for manufacture were not more than 
$1,000 for the first offense and not more than $2,000 for suhsequent offenses, and thirty 
days to a maximum of five years in jail. For illegal sale, the first offense was not more 
than $500 fine, and suhsequent offenses were not more than a $1,000 fine. For sale of 
intoxicants the offender could spend a maximum of two years in prison. 
There were, however, several exceptions to the above provisions. First, manufacturing 
cider for personal use was not a crime. Second, possession of intoxicating liquor in one's 
home for personal use, which was legally owned at the time the Mullen-Gage Act was 
passed, was not a crime. However, like the Volstead acts provisions, possession of liquor 
without a permit was prima facie evidence that such liquor was kept for the purpose of 
sale, and the burden of proof was on the possessor to show that it was legally acquired 
liquor. 
The Mullen-Gage Act was enforced for two years until the state legislature, with the 
strong support of Governor At Smith, repealed it in 1923. Following repeal, small rural 
towns wanted to continue to assist the federal enforcement effort. A provision in New 
York's statutes allowed local officials to take action against maintenance of premises for 
trafficking in intoxicating liquor, conducted without sanction or regulation of the state 
and in violation of the federal laws consistent with nuisance.' The Wickersham 
Commission reported that after the repeal of New York's enforcement Act, sheriffs and 
local officers in rural areas brought prohibition-based nuisance cases to federal court. 
Larger towns and cities, in contrast, showed little initiative in enforcing liquor laws or in 
aiding the federal government. The biggest problem in federal enforcement was of course 
New York City, which had a population of roughly six million in 1923. 
The enforcement burden placed on the federal government was exacerbated by five 
factors. Fist, in many places there was strong popular sentiment against the law. Second, 
there were well-organized bands of law violators. Third, there was in many places a close 
connection between the lawbreakers and the local police. Fourth and most important, 
was the inability of the federal courts to handle liquor cases, when the disposition on the 
part of the city officials was to bring whatever cases they made to federal court. Fifth was 
the shortage of local officers and officials willing to cooperate and furnish information to 
federal agents. Table 4 reveals the dramatic asymmetry in capability in enforcement in 
New York. 
Table 4 here 
The asymmetry between state enforcement potential and federal enforcement potential 
can also be seen in the number of officers that states had to enforce the law relative to the 
federal officers. States had 30,887 marshals, constables, 10,635 sheritts, 81,874 
policemen, for a total of 130,276, versus 2,000 federal prohibition agents. This difference 
is also evident in the judicial machinery of the states. 
Table 5 here 
Model and Analysis 
Hypotheses 
In order to assess the impact that the concurrent enforcement clause of the Eighteenth 
Amendment had on the federal enforcement burden, I examine the effect that explicit and 
implicit nullification of states had on the increase in per-capita federal arrests and other 
measures. In order to assess the validity of my hypothesis, an econometric analysis will 
be employed. First is the explicit nullification hypothesis: a state repealing its 
enforcement provision is likely to increase the number of prohibition cases brought to 
federal court as well as the number of federal arrests. 
The implicit nullification hypothesis is a bit different: states that allocate meager fiinds to 
their state enforcement efforts, or to local government efforts, thereby are shifting the 
burden of enforcement over to the federal government. Implicit nullification is not as 
readily identifiable as explicit nullification and thus much harder to measure. If implicit 
nullification exists, we would expect that states that allocate a lower amount of resources 
to policing prohibition might shift the burden onto the federal government. Both 
hypotheses are tested within the same models. 
I employ three regression models using three different dependent variables in order to test 
whether state free-riding behavior increased federal burden. I first test whether 
nullification increased the federal prohibition arrest rates. Secondly, I test whether 
nullification increased amount of prohibition cases coming before federal courts. The 
third model is similar to the first. In this model I test whether nullification affected total 
federal enforcement efforts. Total federal enforcement effort is measured as total arrests 
by federal prohibition officers plus arrests made by state officers with federal aid. There 
are more observations with this third dependent variable than with the other two. 
Nullification is measured both explicitly and implicitly as discussed above. Explicit 
nullification is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one when a state repeals its 
prohibition laws, otherwise the variable is assigned a one the year the repeal event takes 
place and all subsequent years. 
Implicit nullification is measured by two variables. The first is how major cities allocate 
monies to law enforeement over time. If a major city increases its enforeement of a 
budget over time, we might expect to see a shift downward in federal arrest rates, a5 
violators are being prosecuted in state courts. The reverse holds true also. Another 
measure taken from the Wiekersham Commission report is the type of state. Recall that 
the Commission said that there were four types of states that diered in the level of 
cooperation with the federal government. A good proxy for the different types of states 
may be given as follows: 
In the ideal situation, the Wickersham Commission would have provided an exact list of 
those states that were cooperators and those states that they believed were free riding, 
either explicitly or implicitly. For that reason it is safe to only use two categories rather 
than to attempt to place every state into the four groups. We identi% cooperators as 
absolute-majority adopting prohibition states (see chapter 2) along with the southern rural 
states that adopted before 1917. The Wickersham Commission gives Virginia and Kansas 
as examples of these states. These states likely had populations that voted for prohibition 
because a large majority of the people wanted it. 
Regression Model 
Random Effects vs. Fixed Effects 
Two competing specifications are normally used for panel data. These models are the 
fixed and random effects models. The fixed effect model is a reasonable approach when 
one can be confident that the differences between states can be seen as parametric shifts 
of the regression function. A fixed effects approach would require the estimation of 48 
coeficients in addition to the betas that are specified in the model. With such a small 
number of observations, the fixed effects approach would greatly diminish the degrees of 
freedom. A random effects approach specifies that the state-specific coefficients are state 
specific disturbances. There is but a single random draw from a distribution that enters 
the regression identically in each period. I chose the random effects specification. 
Generalized Least Squares Theoretical Specification 
(Per-Capita Arrest) = + Bt(NuIIify3 - B~(Cooperate,>- f&,(Police,,) + B7( Urban,,>- 
Bs(Catholic,,)+  state,] + elstate,,] 
Where ~[Statei] is a vector of unobserved state characteristics that are unique to the state 
and elstateit] is random noise. 
Dependent Variables 
My hypotheses assume that all three dependant variables share the common relationship 
with the independent factors in the model. These are: 
Federal per-capita prohibition arrest rates. This variable is the arrest made by federal 
prohibition agents for the violation of the Volstead Act. The data is from 1924-1931. 
Federal per-capita court cases. This variable is the per capita amount of cases facing each 
federal judge within a state-year. The data is f?om 1925- 1932. 
Federal per-capita effort. This variable is the per-capita amount of federal prohibition 
arrest, in addition to the per-capita assistants federal prohibition agents made to state law 
enforcement officers. 
Independent Variables 
Nullify 
Explicit nullification are the states that have repealed their state enforcement acts or 
prohibition laws by state legislature or referendum. Explicit nullification increases the 
burden to the federal government. This variable is expected to have a positive 
relationship with the dependent variables. 
Cooperators 
The variable cooperators measures the overall general attitude of the enforcement 
agencies within the states that had an absolute majority as well as southern rural states 
that had adopted prohibition prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. The 
longer a state has prohibition with the people behind it, the more likely that state is to pull 
its weight in enforcement. This variable is expected to be negatively related federal 
burden. Slate cooperation lowered the burden to federal enforcement. 
Police 
This variable is the average of a state's major cities budget proportion expended on law 
enforcement for a given state-year. This variable is a proxy for implicit nullification. I 
assume that there is a correlation between the h d s  allocated to the police department 
and the willingness to enforce prohibition. As cities decrease their expenditures on law 
enforcement, I assume that they are decreasing their efforts in enforcing the state 
prohibition laws. The relationship is thus expected to be negative with all the dependent 
variables. 
Urban and Catholic 
Percent urban and percent Catholic. measured at the state level, provide controls for 
analysis. Percent urban is expected to be negatively related to federal and state arrest 
rates because urban areas were less likely to cooperate with either the federal or the state 
government in prohibition enforcement (Wickersham 1930). Within urban areas 
Catholics and foreign born were likely to be the targets of arrest. Thus, the sign for 
Catholics is expected to be positive. 
Results 
Tables 6a-6c present the regression results. All of the models meet the specification 
criteria (see data appendix for a description of the I-Iausman and Breusch and Pagan test). 
All the overall models are siyniticant as indicated by the Wald statistics. In general the 
models do a better job explaining the variation between states then within states. I will 
discuss each model in turn. 
Turning first to per capita federal arrests, the .51 coefficient of the nullification variable 
tells us that the number of federal arrests per year increases by 51 for every 100,000 
people in a state when a state repeals is prohibition laws. This coefficient is significant at 
the .01 level. Thus, a state with a million people that repeals its prohibition laws can 
expect to see the federal government arrest 51 0 more people per year than would be the 
case had the state kept its enforcement Act. 
The -.34 coefficient of the cooperate variable means that in absolute-majority and 
southern prohibition states, federal arrest rates were lower by 34 for every 100,000 
people. This relationship is not significant, but the sign of the coefficient is in the 
hypothesized negative direction. 
The police variable, on the other hand, has a sign in the opposite direction of that which 
is hypothesized. The coefficient indicates that the more money that cities spend on 
enforcement, the higher the per-capital arrest burden to the federal government. The .82 
coefficient, however, is not significant. 
The coefficient of percent urban is in the hypothesized direction and significant. A one 
percent increase in the urban share of a state's population reduces the federal arrest rate 
by 92 for every 100,000 people (-.92). It must he noted that the dependent variable is per- 
capital arrest, thus the larger the population, the more violations. Thus, overall urban 
areas had more arrests, but fewer arrests per capita. 
As hypothesized, the sign for the coefficient is positive. A one percent increase in the 
Catholic share of a state's population leads to an increase in the federal burden by 62 for 
every 100,000 people. 
Federal Court Cases 
The nullify, urban, and Catholic variables were all significant predictors of caseload in 
the federal courts. I'er-capita arrests were occurring less in more urban states. States with 
a high proportion of Catholics were also experiencing higher nun~bers of federal court 
cases. Again, the nullify variable produces an increased burden on the federal 
government. The cooperate coefficient has the right sign, but it is insignificant. The 
police variable is insignificant and has the wrong sign. The overall model explains 14 
percent of the observe variance in federal per capita court cases. 
Total Federal Prohibition Effort 
This model has the poorest fit of the three specifications. Nullify (0.17) and Urban (-0.91) 
are the two important factors. The model explains none of the variation withim states. 
The police measure again had a coefficient that was not in the hypothesized direction but 
not significant. The cooperate variable had a coefficient in the hypothesized direction, but 
it was not significant. 
In short, these models indicate that a state withdrawing its enforcement machinery from 
the prohibition enforcement effort increased the enforcement burden to the federal 
government. The model supports the Wickersham Commission Report findings that 
states were the key drivers of prohibition success, or prohibition failure. 
Conclusion 
The three regression models show clear evidence of the impact that explicit and implicit 
nullification played in the enforcement of prohibition. Why is this result important? If the 
federal inability to enforce National prohibition was the key factor that drove public 
opinion against the experiment, then it no longer is clear that national prohibition would 
not work. The Eighteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, did two 
things. One, it gave the state's the explicit and implicit right to nullify. Second, the 
federal government was left without the power to coerce states to cooperate. Prohibition 
took place at a time when the federal government was considerably smaller than it is 
now. The federal government was wholly dependent upon state machinery to enforce the 
amendment. Had Congress adopted an amendment akin to the Morrison Amendment that 
preserved the existing federal and state powers, a National prohibition might have been 
considerably more effective. 
Looking hack in hindsight after eleven years of the failed prohibition experiment, the 
Commission had this to say: 
In the beginnings of the federal government it was believed that state 
officials and state tribunals could be made regularly available as the means 
of enforcing federal laws. It was soon necessary to set up a separate 
system of federal magistrates and federal enforcing agencies. We had no 
traditions of concerted action between independent governmental 
activities and it was not until the World War that we succeeded in 
developing a spirit of cooperation at least for the time being. In spite of 
that experience, the Eighteenth Amendment reverted to the policy of state 
enforcement of federal law, and again there has been not a little falling 
down of enforcement between concurrent agencies with diffused 
responsibility. The result was disappointing. Too frequently there has been 
a feeling, even in states, which had prohibition laws before the National 
prohibition Act, that enforcement of prohibition was now a federal 
concern with which the state need no longer trouble itself. Thus, there has 
often been apathy or inaction on the part of the state agencies, even where 
local sentiment is strong for the law. (House Document no. 722, 71"' Cong, 
3d sess, p.53) 
The Commission goes on to show that the federal response to state nullification is to also 
free ride: 
It seems now to be the policy of federal enforcement to make its own 
motion a partition of the field, leaving interstate combinations and 
commercial manufacture to the state. This relinquishing of much of the 
field of concurrent jurisdiction, to be taken on by the states or not as they 
see fit, is a departure from the program of the Eighteenth Amendment 
(IIouse Document no. 722,7lS Cong, 3d sess, p.54). 
With the failure of National prohibition, the Wickersham Commission recommended 
allowing states to determine for themselves whether to enforce the Eighteenth 
Amendment, and to give the federal government power to aid states where prohibition 
existed by state law. In addition the federal government was to maintain enforcement in 
certain jurisdictions, such as importation &om outside the U.S., interstate organization of 
illicit traffic, and interstate conspiracies to violate the law. 
When it convened on March 30. 1930, however, Congress was considering seven joint 
resolutions for the repeal or amendment of the Eighteenth Amendment. La Guardia (R- 
NY) and Adolph Sabath (D-Ill) made two of the more interesting proposals. La Guardia's 
plan reserved to Congress the same power guaranteed under the Eighteenth Amendment. 
hut the states were left to detennine the level of intoxication at which the federal 
government could enforce prohibition within the state. Representative Sabath submitted a 
bill proposing to establish a national monopoly system, which would allow intoxicating 
beverages to be permitted in states without enforcement acts, subject to the monopoly 
power of Congress over such beverages. 
Neither one of the proposals were adopted. In the end, a proposal to repeal the Eighteenth 
Amendment was adopted. After 14 years of sharing police powers within the states, the 
federal government was about to hand those powers back over to the states. The Twenty- 
first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, while forbidding the 
transportation of intoxicating liquors into any state against its laws. The law was 
proposed on February 20, 1933. Michigan was the first state to ratify the Twenty-first 
amendment and Utah was the last, on December 5, 1933. 
Table 1: Turnover in the Federal Prohibition Agency (in Percentage) 1920-1930 
Source: House Document no. 722 71'' Congress, 3d Session p. 16 
Enforcement 
group 
Clerical 
group 
Administrative 
group 
Total all 
groups 
Table 2: Appropriations for Prohibition Enforcement 
I I 
Source: House Document no. 722 71"' Congress, 3d Session p.18 
These numbers includes allocations for the Coast Guard. 
Year Total appropriations (in millions) 
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Table 3: State Nullification of Prohibition, 1923-1932 
For 
Repeal 
I I I 
Mode of Repeal 
Never adopted 
Year 
-- 
I 8 I 
I 
1929 / Wisconsin / Referendum on enforcement / 339,337 1 
State 
Maryland 
State Legislature 1923 
I I I 
New York 
State Supreme Court 1923 
1930 / Rhode / State Legislature 
Nevada 
83,23 1 1926 
1930 
1930 
Against 
Repeal 
Montana 
Massachuse 
tts 
Illinois 
1932 
Referendum 
I I I 
Michigan Referendum 1,022,50 / 475,265 
8 i 
Act 
Referendum on Enforcement 
Act 
State Legislature 
Island 
Arizona 
I I . I 1 New Jersey 1 Referendum ' I 1,012,52 / 223,855 
641,932 
I 
1932 
1 North / Referendum 1 134,742 1 99.3 16 
Referendum 
Louisiana 
Dakota 
.- 
Oregon Referendum 206,619 138,7%- 
63,850 
38,098 Referendum 188,597 
1932 
-- 
Washi ion  Referendum 
! 
341,450 I 208,211 
I 
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Table 4 Share of Enforcement Burden in New York 
Source: State Cooperation in Enforcement of Prohibition Laws, 1930,. p.52-3. 
Total 
10,529 
11,230 
13,201 
304 
23,512 
Indictments 
1921 
1922 
1929 
Judges 
Officers 
Federal New York I 
36% 
35% 
100% 
I 
2% 
1 % 
64% 
65% 
I 
0% 
98% 
99% 
Table 5: Number of Federal and State Judges, 1926 
State 
Alabama 
Judges 
...~ ~ 
3 
Judges ,~ 
88 
Arizona 2 10 
Arkansas 2 93 
California 6 132 
Colorado 1 69 
Connecticut 2 85 
Delaware 1 5 
Florida 4 50 
Georgia 8 117 
Idaho I 21 
Illinois 6 143 
Indiana 2 123 
Iowa 3 86 
Kansas 2 76 
Kentueb 2 47 
Louisiana 2 58 
Maine 2 20 
Maryland 2 103 
Massachusetts 3 127 
Michigan 5 74 
Minnesota 3 50 
Mississippi 2 83 
Missouri 4 152 
Montana 2 31 
Nebraska 2 35 
Nevada 1 14 
New Hampshire 1 114 
New Jersey 5 123 
New Mexico 1 31 
New York 18 165 
North Carolina 4 25 
North Dakota 2 24 
Ohio 6 135 
Oklahoma 3 42 
Oregon 2 40 
Pennsylvania 9 135 
Rbode Island 1 21 
South Carolina 4 34 
Sonth Dakota 2 69 
Tennessee 3 29 
Texas 7 60 
Utah 1 30 
Vermont 1 35 
Virginia 2 62 
Washington 3 65 
West Virginia 2 29 
Wiseonsin 2 72 
1 18 
--.-",-- .-- ---- "--- 
From State Cooperation in rhe Enforcement ofNut~onulprohihirion Lms, 1930, p. 9 
Table 6: Against: Per Capita Federal Prohibition Arrests Rates, 1924- 
1931 
0, = 0.32 r2: within = 0.04 
g =0.31 between = 0.36 
p= 0.51 overall = 0.25 
X2(7) = 37 Prob > X2(7) = 0.0000 
N=384 Groups = 48 Observations per group = 8 
Police 
Urban 
Catholic 
1.84 
-0.92 
0.62 
2.23 
0.28 
0.26 
0.82 
-3.22 
2.33 
0.40 
0.00 
0.02 
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Table 6B: Per Capita Federal Prohibition Court Cases, 1925-1932 
cri =0.33 r2: within = 0.08 
0, =0.21 between = 0.17 
p = 0.69 overall = 0.14 
x2(5) =31.63 Prob > X Z  (5) = 0.0000 
N=384 Groups = 48 Observations per group = 8 
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Table 6C: Per Capita Federal Prohibition Efforts,* 1924-1933 
0, =0.38 r' : within = 0.00 
cr, = 0.42 between = 0.14 
p = 0.45 overall = 0.09 
~ ' ( 5 )  = 11.9 Prob > X2 (5) = 0.03 
N=479 Groups = 48 Observations per group = 10 
* This variable equals persons arrested by federal prohibition officers plus persons arrested 
by state officers assisted by federal officers, on a per capita basis. 
Police 
Urban 
Catholic 
1.49 
-0.91 
0.52 
2.33 
0.32 
0.30 
0.64 
-2.80 
1.69 
0.52 
0.00 
0.09 
Specification Test for GLS Regressions 
Breusch Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Tests 
Per Capita Arrestr XB  state] + e[State,tJ X 2= 268.85 
Pcr-Capita Arrest 
Noise eferror) 
State  error) 
P a  Capita Docket - XB  state] + e[State,t] X = 514.05 
As mentioned earlier, there is a state specific error that is constant across time periods and there is noise 
Per-Capita Arrest 
Noise e(error) 
State  error) 
Per Capita Effort = XB + u/State] + e[State,t] X ' - 366.58 
Variance 
.3 1 1 
.I02 
.I07 
I Per-Capita Arrest 
i- Noise @error) qtate z~(e*rfiv\ 
Sqrt(Variance) 
,557 
.3 19 
,326 
Variance 
.203 
.046 
,104 
Sqrt(Variance) 
.45 
215 
.323 
Variance 
.412 
,178 
I A7 
Sqrt(Variance) - 
,642 
.422 
2x2 
Hausman Specification Test 
Per capita Arrest 
Nullify 
Police 
Catholic 
Urban 
Fixed 
5.878 
4.096 
-0.592 
Random Effects 
Difference 
-0.322 
Police 
Catholic 
tirban 
Per capita Docket 
1 Fixed Random Effects 
Fixed Random Effects 
Effects Difference 
Per capita Efforts I 1 Effects Difference 
Nuilifv ! ,0027 0.170 -0.121 
Nullifv / ,094 0.097 -0.057 
~oiic; 
Catholic 
Urban 
Test: Ho: Difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(5) = (b-B)'[SA(-l)](b-B), S = (s-fe- s-re) : Arrest Docket Effort 
40.84 110.31 43.24 
Prob >chi2 = 0.000 
(s-fe- s-re): Is the difference between the standard errors of the fixed effects and the random 
effects specifications. 
Data Appendix 
Construction of State's Major Cities Police Expenditure 
Measures 
These data were obtained from the Financial Stutistics of Cities, which published the 
percent of city budget spent on law enforcement and police department overhead for the 
248 largest cities in America. The available years were from 1924 to 1931. The 
information was taken from table 14. -Percent Distribution of the Payments for 
Operation and Maintenance of General Departments, by Principal Divisions of the 
General Departmental Services: 1924-31. 
The 248 cities were grouped into five groups based on population. Within each group, the 
cities were rank ordered. The five groups are as follows: 
Group I: population 500,000 and over 
Group 11: population 300,000 to 500,000 
Group 111: population 100,000 to 300,000 
Group IV: population 50,000 to 100,000 
Group V: population 30,000 to 50,000 
Not all states had observations. Roughly nine states (the ones not included in the list 
below) had all of its cities smaller than 30,000 between the years 1924-193 1. For these 
states, the missing data was assumed Missing At Random (MAR), and the STATA 
imputation routine was used to impute value for the missing data. The variables used to 
impute values for these small states were state population, percent Catholic, and percent 
urban. 
I then developed a weighting scheme that gave greater weights to very large cities and 
less weight to small cities. Groups I through 111 comprised the 79 largest cities. Group IV 
comprised the range 80 to 160, and group V, the rest. The purpose was to make a set of 
consistent criteria that did not overweight smaller cities, nor overweight larger cities. 
Criteria: 
1) Use Group I 
2) Average Group I and Group TI 
3) Average Group I1 and Group 111 
4) Average Group 1V and Group IV 
5) Average Group V and Group V 
1) Average Group I with Group I11 or less 
2) Average Group 11 with Group IV or less 
For example, state with a very large major city with a population over 500,000 (i.e. New 
Orleans) would not be averaged with Shreveport, which had a population under 50,000. 
Data Sources 
Per Capita Docket 
These data were obtained from the Report of the Commissioner of Prohibition Table 63. 
Table 63-Prosecutions under the National prohibition Act in Federal Courts, fiscal year 
1925-3 1. 
The number of new cases for each state and year were aggregated from federal judicial 
districts into a state measure. This number was then divided by the census population 
estimate for the year. The resultant per capita number was divided again by the number of 
federal judges within a state, to get the per capita number of new cases facing each 
federal judge by state-year. The years available were 1925 to 1932. 
Per Capita Arrest and Efforts 
The arrest data was obtained from the Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 
The table used was table 63. Table 63- Statement of number of arrests, seizures. etc., by 
federal prohibition directors, and by general prohibition agents, during the fiscal year 
ended. 1924-33. 
'The variables of interest were: Persons arrested by Federal Prohibition Officers, persons 
arrested by State officers assisted by federal officers, and persons arrested by State 
officers on information furnished by federal officers. The variables were combined into a 
total federal arrest effort measure for the years 1924 to 1933. The variables with separate 
measures could only be obtained for 1924 to 193 1. 
Notes 
I The rule decided on for the vote on the Hohson Resolution stipulated that each section 
would be open for amendment under a five-rninute rule. The preamble determined the 
means of the ratification of the amendment. An amendment presented by Mann (D-Ill) 
called for the adoption of prohibition by state convention. This amendment received a roll 
call vote, but failed passage. Section 1 defined what was to be prohibited. Morrison (D- 
Ind), offered an amendment to ban all intoxicating liquors not just for sale but for use. 
His amendment gave Congress the power to ban intoxicating liquors in interstate 
commerce, thus leaving to the states the rights to decide what form of prohibition they 
wanted to have. Section 2 was the section that defmed at which level of government 
should the power to enforce the amendment reside. 
Although Rhode Island was a wet state prior to national prohibition, they were under a 
wartime restriction on intoxicating beverages. The passage of a four percent manufacture 
law was the result of the legislature defining its own law on what constituted an 
intoxicating beverage. 
"n 1935, under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, the bureau changed its name to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
4 Some of the budgets of the Coast Guard and Custom Services were also allocated to 
prohibition enforcement. 
' The Volstead Act defined premises used for the manufacture or sale of intoxicating 
liquor a nuisance to the community. This usually led to civil suits in which the U.S. 
government imposed injunctions on the property deemed a nuisance. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
The swiftness of the spread of the state prohibition and the subsequent adoption and 
repeal of national prohibition certainly represent anomalies in public policy adoption. 
FIistorians and social scientist have sought to explain these anomalies. Social Scientists 
have developed a research agenda that seeks to explain prohibition policy adoption 
through the theory of collective action or the economic theory of regulation. They have 
found that the relative strength of interest groups has indeed played a role in the adoption 
of prohibition policy at the state and national level. I have chosen to take a different 
approach to the study of the prohibition era. In this thesis. 1 have chosen to make the state 
and federal constitutions the primary focus in determining what shaped prohibition policy 
outcomes at both the state and national levels. 
I have sought to show three things. First, state institutions played a key role in the spread 
of prohibition policy. Second, the state's ability to enforce prohibition was compromised 
by the conflict between state police powers and the federal interstate commerce powers. 
Third, the ambiguous wording of the Eighteenth Amendment was a major factor in the 
failure of national prohibition enforcement. 
In chapter 2, I showed that pro-prohibition forces preferred constitutional amendments to 
statutory laws. The ability to adopt state constitutional amendments, however, was 
hampered in some states by high institutional barriers at both the initiation stage and 
ratification stage. Through regression analysis and subsequent counterfactual analysis, I 
showed that if all of the states had low barriers to constitutional amendment adoptions, 
prohibition would have not only spread much more quickly , hut just about every state 
would have adopted prohibition, controlling for demographic characteristics. 
In chapter 3, 1 showed that prohibition states had limited success in prohibiting alcohol 
sales because their police powers conflicted with federal interstate commerce powers. In 
order for state prohibition to be enforced affectively in the presence of externalities 
generated from alcohol markets in neighboring states, congress had to redefine the limits 
of federal interstate commerce powers. 
In chapter 4, I showed three things. First, the ambiguous wording of the Eighteenth 
Amendment was the result of a compromise, which caused confusion. Second, the 
Supreme Court's interpretation gave states incentives a free ride on the federal effort. 
Third, the asymmetry in enforcement capabilities was a chief cause in the failure of 
enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. 
It is my belief that prohibition. studied from a federalism and institutionalist perspective. 
may help state policy scholars refocus their research agenda as regards to social policy in 
general. First, iYom this perspective, prohibition policy might shed some light on the 
current direction of research on how policies, particularly moral policies, diffuse across 
states. Second. the federalism perspective I have adopted may shed some light on the 
likely life cycle of moral policies, e.g., the "war on drugs," that are tending toward 
prohibition today. 
Social scientist have defined moral policies as those that seek to regulate social norms 
which invoke strong moral responses from citizens for some reason. This occurs when 
the policy impinges on citizens' core values. This usually means that for some groups 
compromise is difficult or next to impossible. Lowi (1998) distinguishes these policy 
types from economic policies because of the uncompromising radicalism with which 
these policies so often are pursued. Money and Lee (1997), not surprisingly, classif) 
alcohol prohibition as a moral policy. 
Accordmg to Mooney (1995), research on interstate policy variation can be characterized 
by the study of three distinct dimensions or pattern? of policy adoption across the states. 
First, there is the study of geographic and temporal diffusion, i.e., how policy spread 
across states and over time. The study of policy modification deals with how policies 
change across states given the experience of other states. Third. research on state 
characteristics measures how socioeconomic characteristics, public opinion, and the 
resources of opposing interest groups affect the likelihood of policy adoption. It is the 
tirst and third dimensions that my thesis addresses. Among other policies, tobacco and 
gun control policies can also be understood in this fashion. 
Tobacco and gun control advocates face problems similar to those faced by pro- 
prohibitionists. First, both tobacco and firearms markets have third-party affects. In 
1993, the EPA published a report on second-hand smoke, which found that airborne 
cigarette smoke was a serious, and substantial, health risk. The report also attributed 
seven percent of the nation's annual health bill directly to the consequences of cigarette 
smoking. The externality effects of the proliferation of handguns yield similarly 
appealing statistics. Roughly 40,000 Americans are killed each year at the hands of guns. 
Americans wielding guns wound another 100,000 Americans each year and intimidate 
and threaten millions more. 
Interestingly, though, interest groups first formed in response to the sale of cigarettes 
during the Progressive Era. A schoolteacher from Illinois, Lucy Gaston, raised the fight 
against cigarette consumption because she saw the effects of cigarette consumption on 
her students. She believed that the "cheap little smokes" injured the little boys in her 
class, physically and mentally. Beginning with church and school meetings. she was able 
to build a formidable coalition. By 1898. the National Anti-Cigarette League was 
established with state affiliates. The ACL, like the ASL, had the goal of securing state 
prohibition. By 1900, Iowa, Tennessee, and North Dakota all had outlawed the sale of 
cigarettes. By 1901, a dozen more states were weighing a ban on cigarette sales. 
The early success of state prohibition even led Lucy Gaston to run for president in 1920. 
After the adoption of National Prohibition of alcohol, the WCTU and other reformers 
such as the Reverend Billy Sunday turned their attentions fiom Demon Rum toward what 
they referred to as Demon Weed. The movement to prohibit cigarettes, however, faded 
after the repeal of cigarette prohibition by Kanras in 1927. 
The prohibition of cigarettes thus went the same way as the prohibition of alcohol. The 
state regulation movement was revived when the environmental protection movement 
emerged during the 1970's. Environmentalist viewed cigarette smoke as an indoor 
pollutant, an imposition by self-indulgent smokers on the ability of non-smokers to enjoy 
clean air. The primary group pushing state legislation was the Group Against Smoke 
Pollution (GASP). GASP pressed for state clean air acts. These acts would ban smoking 
in public places or limit where a person could smoke cigarettes. By 1980, Arizona, 
Minnesota, Utah, Nebraska, and Montana had pressed clean air acts and thirteen states 
had raised their excise taxes on cigarette sales. 
Compared to anti-tobacco groups, pro-gun control advocates were late arrivals onto the 
regulatory scene. This is mainly due to state conrtitutions concurring with the federal 
constitution in securing a citizen's right to bear arms. According to Spitzer (l998), 39 
states make some mention of a right to bear arms in their constitutions. Much of the 
recent push for tougher gun control laws is due to the pro-gun control group Handgun 
Control Incorporated (HCI). Violence in Stockton California in 1989, in which a lunatic 
wielding an assault rifle murdered school children, prompted President Bush to give an 
executive order banning imported assault rifles. Recent violence in Jonesboro, Arkansas, 
Springfield, Oregon, Pearl, Mississippi, Fayetteville, Tennessee. and West Paducah. 
Kentucky, has led interest groups to press for tougher legislation by the kderal 
government in order to protect citizen's from gun violence. 
Policy scholars also seek to understand the rate at which policies diffuse across the states. 
Many researchers have found a geographic pattern of policy diffusion. in which a few 
leader states will adopt a policy innovation, while other states wait to see if the policy 
will work or not. If the policy works, other states will join with ever increasing 
frequency. Walker (1969) found that after a certain number of states have adopted a new 
policy, a "take-off' point is reached, where the rate of adoption increases at an increasing 
rate and, after a certain point, this rate again declines. Subsequent scholarship has 
documented this phenomenon, which exhibits the s-shaped pattern similar to social 
learning curves. For policy adoption, this curve would represent slow adoption in the 
first stage, swift spread of the policy in the middle stage, and those most resistant states 
adopting the policy in the last stage over extended periods. 
Figure 1 and 4 of appendix I1 best illustrates this. Figure 1 shows a clear geographic 
pattern of policy diffusion, which corroborates the theories of state policy diffusion. The 
regional pattern is clearly correlated with the type of policy adopted. With the exception 
of California, Washington and Nevada the entire western U.S. adopted constitutional 
amendments, to prohibit the sale of alcohol. Nevertheless, it is also the case that none of 
these states, including the five eastern states, had two-legislature approval requirements 
at the initiation stage. Figure 4 shows that no states requiring an absolute majority of the 
electorate had Catholic proportions over 50%. Thus, states that might be thought of as 
being resistant to a policy can adopt a policy quickly if the institutional hurdle is low. On 
the other hand, states that have socioeconomic characteristics favorable to a policy may 
not adopt because the institutional hurdles are too high. 
In chapter 3 1 showed how the inherent problems of federalism led to federal involvement 
in state prohibition. Externalities &om neighboring states were making enforcement of 
state prohibition impossible. There are already indications that the same state conflicts 
are occurring with gun control policy. Interest groups that are fighting to protect the 
markets for firearms. such as the NRA, appeal to the Second Amendment of the 
Constitution as a means of protection against the threat of prohibition. According to 
Spitzer (1997), the states with the toughest gun control laws are located in heavily urban 
and high population states. Spitzer also reports that states such as New York have a tough 
time policing their strict handgun control laws because rural southern and western states 
are exporting guns to New York. If the problems in urban states become worse we might 
see an increasing pressure for Congress to exercise interstate commerce powers in order 
to help protect states' Tenth Amendment rights to place tough restrictions on gun 
markets. 
In closing, prohibition is clearly an important case study in the conduct of public policy. 
There are clear implications for state policy studies when prohibition is studied from an 
institutional and federalism perspective. The goal of this thesis was to help broaden the 
perspective of the empirical study of state policy adoption by challenging scholars to 
consider modeling state legislation adoption, as well as the role federalism plays in the 
spread of state policy. Hopefully, I have had at least some success in this endeavor. 
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Appendix I 
State Prohibition Legislation, 1834-1934 
This appendii tracks prohibition legislation in each state fkom 1834 until 1934. These 
data are used in the event history analysis of chapter 2 and the panel data regressions in 
chapter 4. These state histories document all of the political institutional developments 
relevant to this dissertation such as prohibition votes, adoption and repeals of state laws. 
Data Sources on State Prohibition Legislation 
Andrews, B.W. (Ed.) 1930. Summary of State Luws Relating lo TrufJic in Intoxicating 
Liquor: U.S. Bureau of Prohibition. 
State Law Index. 1929-1941. An Index and Digest to The Legislation ofthe States of the 
United Stales Enacted during the Biennium. Vol. I -vo1.8 U.S. G.P.O. 
Lindley, Laura (Ed.) 1930. Statewide Referenda in the United States on the Liquor 
Question: The American Issue Publishing Company Westerville, Ohio. 
ALABAMA 
First prohibition laws passed. 
Women's Christian Temperance Union begins work. 
The Anti-Saloon League organized. 
First County unit local option law enacted. 
Passage of statutory prohibition law. 
First submission of Constitutional Prohibition, rejected by voters. 
Against: 76,272 For: 49,093. 
Whiskey -option law allows counties to vote themselves wet. 
Passage of statewide statutory prohibition. 
Passage of bone-dry law. 
Act passed legislature maki i  it a misdemeanor to drive a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated. 
The legislature passed three laws tightening up the prohibition code. the most 
important of which made the transportation of five gallons or more of intoxicating 
liquor a felony. 
An attempt was made to weaken the State enforcement laws by repealing the 
portion of the statute that prohibits the manufacture or sale of anything that "looks 
like" or "taste like" malt. The so-called Edge Near-beer bills were defeated in the 
senate. 
ARIZONA 
1907 First statewide license fee legislation 
1909 County-Option Act was passed 
1910 ASL organized. 
1912 Arizona admitted to state-hood 
1914 Prohibitory amendment to state constitution was submitted to the people. For: 
25,887 against: 22,743. 
191 5 Statewide Prohibition adopted 
1916 Amended to outlaw personal alcohol use. For: 28,443 against: 17,379. 
19 1 9 Search and seizure added to amendment. 
1923 Imprisonment for first offense, of person who drives a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated. 
1927 The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment ( M A )  introduced a bill to 
abolish the search and seizure provisions, but the measure was defeated by a vote 
of31 to 19. 
1932 Vote to repeal the state constitutional amendment For: 63,850 Against: 36,218. 
ARKANSAS 
First steps toward local option. A majority petition was needed in any town to get 
a license. 
Liquor sale was prohibited within three miles of any institution of learning 
Local-option elections held. 
Statewide prohibition submitted to the people, rejected by a wet majority of 
15,968. Against: 85,358 For: 69,390. 
Goings law adopted d i g  it illegal to give any license without consent of the 
majority of the white-male population. 
Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
A bill submitted to the people to repeal the statewide law, was defeated by a 
majority of 51,633. Against: 109,697 for: 58,064. 
Bone-dry law enacted. 
Law passed to harmonize state with Volstead Act. 
Several measures were passed to strengthen the prohibition laws of the state. 
Legislature passed a bill making the possession of any alcoholic, vinous, malt, 
spirituous or fermented liquor or compound unlawful. and providing a fine from 
fifty to one thousand dollars. 
1927 Bill introduced by wholesale druggist to amend the bone-dry law was not reported 
out of committee. 
CALIFORNIA 
1879 WCTU begins work. 
1898 Supreme Court rule in the "Pasadena Case, "counties and cities have the right to 
restrict licenses. 
1898 ASL organized. 
1909 Attempt at uniform local option law failed passage. 
191 1 Wylie local option law adopted. 
1914 Statewide prohibition was rejected by a majority of 169,245. Against: 524,781 
and For: 355,536. 
1916 Two prohibition Amendments were defeated by a majority 101,561 and 44,744, 
one to prohibit manufacture, the other to close existing drinking places. 
1918 Prohibition amendments defeated by the majority of voters. Against: 306,488 for: 
275.643. 
1918 Prohibition amendment to prohibit distilled spirits only. Against: 341,897 For: 
256,778. 
1920 Harris bill to enforce national prohibition was defeated by a majority of voters. 
Against: 465,537 For: 400.475. 
1921 Wright Act, an enforcement measure was adopted without submission to the 
people for vote. 
1921 The California Grape Protective Association secured the necessary signatures to 
submit "Wright" to popular vote. 
1922 Wright Act approved by a majority of the popular vote. 
1926 Another referendum was taken on the Wright Act. The margin of victory for the 
drys had increased to 62,623 over 33,943 in 1922. 
1932 State prohibition enforcement Act referendum vote for repeal. For: 1,458,835 
Against: 658,351. 
COLORADO 
WCTU organized. 
ASL organized. 
State Local option adopted. 
Statewide prohibition defeated. Against: 1 16,774 For: 75,877. 
Statewide Prohibition adopted by a majority of the people. For: 129,589 Agaht: 
118.017. 
Stringent enforcement law adopted. 
Amendment allowing sale of beer defeated. Against: 163,134 For: 77,345 
Majority: 85,789. 
Permit law allowed householders to import alcohol for medicinal purposes. 
Bone-dry law was carried by voters. For: 113,636 Against: 64,740 Majority: 
48.896. 
1923 Colorado law prohibiting the transportation of liquor was sustained by the state 
supreme court. 
1926 Amendment to provide for manufacture and sale for personal and domestic use, to 
be inoperative as long as in conflict with federal law. Against: 154,672 For: 
107,749 Majority: 46,923. 
1927 By a vote of 33 to 30, the House defeated a measure known as the "pint of liquor" 
bill, which would have authorized physicians to prescribe a pint of liquor instead 
of the four ounces maximum permitted. 
193 1 All three wet measures introduced in the legislature were defeated. 
CONNECTICUT 
1839 Local option law enacted. 
1842 Local option law repealed. 
1854 I'assage of Statewide prohibition law 
1872 Prohibition law repealed in favor of license. County commissioners were 
authorized to license with majority consent. 
1874 WCTU organized. 
1887 Attempt was made to re-establish prohibition. 
1889 Failed attempt by elements in state-legislature to re-establish prohibition. 
1917 No new licenses would be granted, only renewal licenses. 
1921 Passage of prohibition enforcement Act. 
1924 Congressman O'Sullivan declared spokesman for the liquor interest in the state, 
was ovenvheLmingIy defeated by a dry candidate in the 1924 elections. 
1925 The Wheeler bill, intended to provide a much stronger state prohibition 
enforcement code, was introduced, but failed passage. 
1929 An attempt was made to defeat the prohibition laws in the legislature, but was 
defeated in the Judiciary Committee. 
DELAWARE 
Local option enacted. 
Law declared unconstitutional in Rice v. Foster. 
Local option law passed in lower house defeated in state senate. 
Constitutional convention adopted local option. 
Hazel Anti-Shipment law prohibited shipment of liquors by citizens of Delaware 
into dry territory. 
Hazel law repealed. 
Loose Anti-liquor Shipment Law enacted. Prevented common carriers from 
bringing shipments into dry towns. 
State Prohibition Enforcement Act enacted to take affect in 1920 with National 
law. 
1922 Measure introduced in legislature to nullify all state prohibition laws received 
only four votes. 
1922 Movement was made to repeal the Delaware enforcement code in 1926 known as 
the Klair and loose laws. The argument was made that the laws were so stringent 
that physicians could not properly prescribe alcohol to ailing patients. The vote 
was 25 to 6 against repeal. 
1932 A former Senator and member of the board of directors of the AAPA was a 
candidate for election to the United States Senate. hut was defeated by Senator 
Hastings a dry. 
1932 A hiU introduced in the House calling for a statewide referendum on the 
Eighteenth Amendment at the 1932 elections was defeated by an overwhelming 
vote. 
FLORIDA 
1880 WCTU organized. 
1885 Local option enacted. 
1901 Act gave localities power to adopt laws more stringent than state laws. 
1908 ASL organized. 
1910 Statewide prohibition amendment passed by legislature defeated by popular vote. 
Against: 29,271 For: 24,506. 
1913 Blind Tiger law passed to decrease illicit shipment of liquor within dry territory. 
I918 Statewide prohibition amendment passed by popular vote. For: 21,851 Against: 
13.609. 
1923 Strengthened the enforcement code. 
1923 The legislature enacted a search and seizure law. 
1930 Every candidate who announced as an advocate of the repeal measure was 
defeated in the primaries. 
GEORGIA 
First state to adopt local option. 
WCTU organized. 
Local option enacted. 
ASL organized. 
Statewide Prohibition passed. 
State legislature enacted measure to license near beer and locker clubs. 
Bone-dry law enacted. 
Attempt to repeal the state prohibition law of Georgia was defeated by vote in the 
house. 
IDAHO 
1886 WCTU organized. 
1909 County-option Iaw enacted. 
1913 Haight hill to regulate the sale of liquor by druggist enacted 
1916 Statewide Constitutional prohibition adopted by popular vote with a majority of 
55,120. For: 90,576 Against: 35.456. 
191 6 Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
191 7 Law empowers the sheriff or peace officers to search and seize without warrant. 
ILLINOIS 
1839 Local option adopted. 
1841 Local option repealed. 
185 1 Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
1853 Supreme Court of the state rules law unconstitutional. 
1855 Statewide statutory advisory referendum prohibition rejected by popular vote. 
Against: 93,059 For: 79,913. 
1874 WCTU organized. 
1898 ASL organized. 
1901 Local option bill rejected. 
1903 Local option bill rejected again. 
1907 Township-local option enacted. 
191 7 A bill failed to pass state legislature calling for a referendum vote on prohibition. 
19 19 State enforcement Act passed. 
1921 Dry forces wage war for more stringent enforcement Act. 
1922 Advisory referendum to allow for 4 percent wine and beer. For: 1,065,242 Against: 
512.111. 
1923 O'Grady bill provided for the repeal of the Illinois Prohibition Act (never made it 
to roll call), 
1923 Tgoe-Dailey bill provided for the automatic harmonization with any future 
changes in the National Amendment. Fifteen wet bills and resolutions were 
introduced and defeated. 
1923 Lee O'Neil Browne, a democratic wet leader of the state, was defeated in his 
campaign for governor on a wine and beer platform. Dry candidate for senate, 
beat the wet candidate for senate by more than 700,000 votes. 
1926 In the legislature the drys made a gain of six members, and retained control of the 
senate. Anton Cermak a wet candidate for senate was defeated. Of the 25 
candidates for Congress 18 of the candidates were dry. 
1930 November 4, general elections regarding the repeal of the Eighteenth 
Amendment of the Illinois State Prohibition Act. The vote was 1.060.004 in favor 
to 523,130 against. The dry forces abandoned Republican candidates for offices 
announcing they would switch from dry to wet as a result of referendum votes. As 
a result of the referendum, the O'Grady bill to repeal the Illinois Prohibition Act 
was passed by both Houses (91 to 56) and the Senate (26 to 24). The governor 
vetoed the bill. The Supreme Court stopped an attempt to put the bill to a 
referendum vote of the people. 
INDIANA 
Township-local option enacted. 
Statewide prohibition law. 
Statewide prohibition law repealed. 
Township-local option enacted. 
Baxter law required a citizen desiring to engage in liquor traffic secure majority 
town approval. 
WCTU organized. 
ASL organized. 
Blind Tiger Law enacted. 
County-option law enacted. 
County option repealed. 
Statewide prohibition enacted. 
Three additional acts more stringent in enforcement. Buchanan-Drake, Buchanan- 
Ogden and Dunn-Holm hills. 
Anti-prohibition forces introduced two measures in the legislature to weaken 
prohibition laws; both measures were defeated. 
1931 A joint resolution calling Congress to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment was 
defeated. A bill to repeal the state prohibition law was defeated in the public 
morals committee. 
IOWA 
1846 Local option enacted. 
1855 Main Law prohibition (Advisory referendum). For: 25,555 Against: 22,645. 
1857 Main Law prohibition declared unconstitutional. 
1874 WCTU organized. 
1882 Statewide constitution prohibition vote For: 155,436 Against: 125,677. 
1884 Statewide statutory amendment enacted after state supreme court invalidates 
constitutional amendment. 
1894 Mulct law nullifies prohibition because dealers who complied with certain 
regulations are allowed to sell in state. 
1896 ASL organized. 
1907 Five year limit law required all cities to obtain vote of a majority of people to 
operate saloons. 
1915 Legislature repealed Mulct law, leaving prohibition statutes of 1884. 
19 17 Bone-dry law enacted. 
191 7 Statewide Constitutional prohibition rejected by popular vote. Against: 21 5,625 
For: 214,693. 
1923 Seven tougher prohibition bills enacted. 
1924 First time in state history, 1 10% dry delegation was elected to Congress. Dry's are 
also in complete contfol of legislature. 
1927 State legislature passed three prohibition enforcement hills. 
193 1 A bill attempting to repeal a11 state prohibition laws was defeated in the House by 
a vote of 95 to 6. A hill was adopted that made bringing intoxicating liquor into 
the state a felony. 
KANSAS 
Dram shop law requires a majority vote to get a license. 
Amendment to make Dram Shop Act more stringent. 
W T U  organized. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted. For: 92,302 Against: 84,304. 
Whiskey war occurred, as the result of court decisions with regard to the 
"Original Package" cases. 
Search and seizure laws provide severe penalties for violations of the prohibition 
law. 
Prohibition laws were strengthened to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors for 
any purpose other than sacrament. 
Bone-dry law enacted. 
Anti-Saloon League organized, merges with Kansas state Temperance Union. 
Anti-moonshine law six months in prison or fine $500 for being found with a still 
on one's possession. 
Kansas increased its prohibition appropriations. 
KENTUCKY 
1864 Local option law enacted. 
188 1 WCTU organized. 
1904 ASL organized. 
1918 Kentucky becomes the tlkd state to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment and the 
first wet state to do so. 
1919 Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 208,755 Against: 198,038. 
1922 Legislature enacted laws that increase fines up to $10,000 for violations of liquor 
laws. 
1924 Wet Senator Stanley, who had been leader of the wets throughout his career, was 
defeated for re-election to the United States Senate by Fred Sackett, a dry. 
LOUISIANA 
1852 Local option law enacted. 
1883 WCTU organized. 
1905 ASL organized. 
1916 JohnsonNear-beer Act. prohibiting the sale of malt liquor in prohibition territory. 
1921 Wood-Jordan Act passed, authorizing the courts of Louisiana to exercise 
concurrent power in enforcement. 
1924 The "Hood Act amended enforcement code, to bring the definition of 
intoxicating liquor into conformity with Volstead. 
1930 Resolutions were introduced in the Senate to call on Congress to repeal the 
Eighteenth Amendment and call a referendum on the repeat of the state law. Both 
measures were defeated. 
1932 State enforcement Act referendum vote for repeal For: 188,597 Against: 38,098. 
185 1 Maine law designed to close the liquor shops. 
1855 Militia fires on mob protest of prohibition law. 
1856 Governor Sam Wells calls for the repeal of prohibition. 
1857 Parties take-sides on license v. Maine law, Republicans for Maine law and 
Democrats for license. 
1858 Prohibitory law re-instituted. For:28,864 Against: 5,912. 
1867 State law strengthened with advisory referendum For: 19,358 Against: 5,536. 
1875 WCTU organized. 
1 884 Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted. 
1905 Sturgis Act passed to increase enforcement power of police. 
191 0 Democratic legislature repeal "Sturgis" law. 
191 1 Repeal of Prohibition Amendment to state constitution Against: 60.853 For: 60,095. 
1919 Maine law brought into harmony with Eighteenth Amendment. 
1923 Strengthened penalties for transporting intoxicants. 
1925 Change laws on transportation of intoxicating liquors, which placed the burden of 
proof on the possessor. 
MARYLAND 
WCTU organized. 
ASL organized. 
First attempt to enact statewide local option failed. 
High license goes into affect. 
Statewide prohibition amendment defeated. 
Passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. Maryland became the sixth state to ratify. 
F a h e  to enact an enforcement measure. 
Failed attempt to pass a law to enforce the federal amendment. 
Statewide prohibition amendment defeated. 
Legislature refuses to pass a law-enforcement bill for the state. 
Wet's introduced several measure memorializing Congress to amend and repeal 
the Eighteenth Amendment. Every wet effort was defeated. 
MASSACHUSETTS 
1852 Maine law designed to close the liquor shops. 
1868 Maine law repealed. 
1874 WCTU organized. 
License Act adopted providing for fees from $100-$1,000. 
Local option law enacted. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition defeated. 
ASL organized. 
Express Permit law gave local authorities the right to refuse to give liquor 
licenses. 
The legislature ratified the Eighteenth Amendment becoming the eleventh state to 
do so. 
A number of bills introduced in legislature seeking to define beer as non- 
intoxicating. Vetoed by Governor. 
Temperance forces introduce bill that would harmonize liquor laws of 
Massachusetts with National laws. 
Referendum was taken on 2.75 beer and passed by a majority. 
Legislature passed enforcement code. which was signed by the governor May 17, 
1922. The wet organization, the constitutional Liberty League, filed a petition 
asking for a referendum at the November 7, 1922, elections. A majority voted to 
repeal enforcement Act. Governor rehsed to Act given referendum 
A series of wet measures were defeated. 
Another referendum taken on liquor question showed a majority for modification. 
but not as much as the 1922 vote. For: 454,656 Against: 446,473. 
A bill to repeal enforcement code was defeated. 
During the 1928 session of the legislature, the pad-lock law was enacted by a vote 
of 11 6 to 88 in the House and 26 to 11 in the Senate. The measure closed the 
place of habitual violators for a year. Two wet measures for referendums on 
Eighteenth Amendment repeals were defeated, one by a vote 114 to 96; the other 
was rejected by the state supreme court. 
1930 Both houses defeated a bill to repeal the baby Volstead Act. The bill was placed 
on the ballot as a referendum; the Act was repealed by referendum. 
MICHIGAN 
Local option law enacted. 
No license law passed, enacted to state constitution. 
No license law nullified. 
Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. Advisory referendum For: 40,449 
Against: 23,054. 
Supreme Court invalidates prohibition law. 
Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
WCTU organized. 
Amendment removing the prohibitory clause from constitution was approved by 
the electorate. For: 60,639 Against: 52.561. 
County option enacted . 
ASL organized. 
The Pray law, prohibiting shipment of liquor into dry territory enacted. 
Statutory prohibition failed passage. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 353.378 Against: 284,754. 
1916 Home rule failed passage as a substitute for statewide prohibition Against: 
378,871 For: 256,272. 
1919 Amendment to state constitution to allow sale of malt liquors. Against: 530,123 
For: 322,603. 
1926 Houses of the legislature split on adoption of advanced prohibition measures. 
AAPA introduced anti-prohibition measures that were defeated. 
1929 AAPA circulates petitions to place on the ballot an amendment to the Constitution 
a measure to tax beer. After the secretary of state had filed the petition, the Anti- 
Saloon League raised the question of the legality of the measure. The State 
Supreme Court refused even to issue an order to show cause. 
1930 Both dry congressmen up for re-election were defeated by wet candidates. 
1931 A bill provided for the taxation of illicit malt and wort passed the legislature. 
The revenues were to be used to build a hospital in northern Michigan. 
1932 Referendum vote for state prohibition repeal For: 1,022,508 Against: 475,265. 
MINNESOTA 
1877 WCTU organized. 
1897 ASL organized. 
1910 Local-option law enacted. 
1913 Municipal locai option taw applies to all cities and towns with less than 10,000 
people. 
1915 County-option law enacted. 
1917 Statewide constitutional prohibition failed passage although had a majority vote 
on amendment. For: 189,614 Against:173,665. 
1921 State prohibition enforcement code strengthened. 
1923 State prohibition code strengthened beyond Volstead. 
1925 Three wet measures were defeated. Laws were enacted making certain sells of 
liquor a felony. 
1926 An attempt was made to provide a referendum on the Eighteenth Amendment. 
The measure was defeated by a vote of 77 to 51 in the lower house. 
1926 One of the two dry senators, Senator Shipstead, was re-elected to the U.S. Senate. 
The other was not up for election. The wets were able to elect a wet congressmen 
over a dry incumbent. 
193 1 The "If' bill passed, requiring the state to change its intoxication limit if Congress 
should raise the allowable percentage of intoxication at a later date. 
MISSISSIPPI 
1842 Gallon law passed, stipulating that one could not sell intoxicating liquors in 
quantities less than a gallon. 
1883 WCTU organized. 
1886 Local option law enacted. 
1904 Statewide constitutional prohibition failed passage. 
1909 Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
191 1 ASL organized. 
1914 Strict enforcement laws passed with interstate shipment features. 
191 8 Mississippi moved to bone dry prohibition. 
1921 Merriwether v. State-Supreme Court rules that Federal prohibition laws do not 
nullify State Prohibition laws. 
1922 The legislature strengthened the state prohibition laws, as regards to possession. 
MISSOURI 
Law prohibits slaves iiom selymg liquor on pain of 39 lashes. 
Local option law enacted. 
Act prohibits dam-shop keepers fkom selling more than 10 gallons of liquor and 
prohibits selling without license. 
WCTU organized. 
The County-option law exempts cities with a population more than 2.500. 
ASL organized. 
Statewide constitutional amendment rejected Against: 425,406 For:207.281 
A County-option law, much stronger than original fails passage. 
A County-option law that does not exempt cities of 2,500 was voted down by 
popular vote. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition defeated. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition defeated. 
Statewide Prohibition With Advisory Referendum For: 481, 880 Against: 420, 
581. 
1921 State enforcement code for Volstead Act strengthened. 
1923 Missouri adopted most drastic enforcement code of any state. 
1926 The AAPA brought about a referendum vote on the proposition to repeal 
enforcement. The proposition, #4, was defeated by a vote of 275,543. 
1930 Several bills were introduced to either repeal or mod* prohibition statutes. All 
were defeated in committee or killed on the House floor. 
1931 Ten measures for repeal or modification of the national prohibition amendment 
were all unsuccessfitl. They were either defeated or abandoned. 
MONTANA 
1883 WCTU organized. 
1906 ASL organized. 
1916 Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 102,776 Against: 73,890. 
1921 Sig&eid Act permits physicians to prescribe spirituous liquors for medicinal 
purposes. The legislative assembly adopted a law known as the Sigfieid Act 
permitting physicians to prescribe spirituous liquors for medicinal purposes, 
repealing a part of the law adopted by referendum of the people. 
1923 Prohibition laws were strengthened around search and seizure and possession. 
1926 Anti-Prohibition Society of Montana initiated a petition providing for repeal of all 
laws relating to intoxicating liquors with exception to the laws related to minors. 
The measure was adopted by a vote of 83,231 for repeal and 72,982 against 
repeal. 
1928 Drys try to repeal the repeal during the 1928 election but lost. The vote for 
prohibition was 64,079; vote for maintaining the status quo was 97,752. 
1930 The candidates for U.S. Congress defeated their wet opponents. 
NEBRASKA 
Nebraska territorial law passed prohibitory law against the sell of intoxicants. 
Prohibitory law repealed. 
WCTU organized. 
High license goes into affect. 
Republican legislature defeats statewide prohibition proposal. 
Mass withdrawal fiom Republican Party leads to formation of the Prohibition 
Party. 
To amendments submitted to the people and voted on separately; one for 
prohibition and one for license. 
Farmer's accused of pro-liquor propaganda. 
Prohibition amendment defeated. 
ASL organized. 
A County-option law fails passage. 
County-option law enacted. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted. 
1925 The legislature passed stringent legislation making jail sentences mandatory for 
the first offense. 
1928 Anti-Prohibition forces sought to force a vote on the repeal of the state prohibition 
amendment. and also a repeal of the state enforcement Act. The Women's 
Christian Temperance Union was able to muster 80,000 protest voters. 
1931 Several measures were added to prohibition laws to make them more stringent. A 
bill introduced to repeal the state prohibition law was defeated. 
NEVADA 
WCTU organized. 
ASL organized. 
Voter petition for statewide prohibition rejected by the legislature. 
Statewide statutory prohibition enacted with advisory For: 13,248 Against: 9,060. 
An attempt to replace prohibition law with an enforcement code declared 
unconstitutional by state supreme court. 
An attempt to amend the constitution to divert h d s  from fines toward 
prohibition enforcement declared unconstitutional. 
Nevada's prohibition law was repealed. 
Taxes increased to pay for the cost of conviction of liquor violations. 
1926 A referendum vote was taken by AAPA, which called for Congress to call a 
convention for proposing an amendment to the Eighteenth Amendment. For: 
12,436 Against: 3,283. 
1927 Mayor Roberts returns red-light district to Reno. 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
1848 Local option law enacted. 
1852 Prohibition law failed passage. 
1855 Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
1874 WCTU organized. 
1889 Vote on constitutional prohibition failed passage. 
1899 ASL organized. 
1903 Local option law enacted. Nullifying prohibition. 
191 5 Prohibition law failed passage. 
191 7 Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
1919 State enforcement code stipulated that violation of federal law was violation of 
state law. 
1924 The drys defeat a wet candidate for governor, and elected John G. Winant on a 
dry platform. They returned a dry Senator and a bone-dry delegation to Congress. 
NEW JERSEY 
Local option law enacted 
Local option law repealed. 
WCTU organized. 
County-option law enacted. 
ASL organized. 
Local option law enacted. 
Municipalities grant liquor licenses during wartime prohibition. Enforcement left 
entirely to federal authorities. 
New- Jersey Attorney General claimed the Eighteenth Amendment 
unconstitutional, appeals to Supreme Court. 
Governor claimed to make New Jersey as wet as the Atlantic Ocean. 
Governor Edwards "Pro-beer" law defines intoxicating liquor as containing more 
than 3.50 percent alcohol. 
Assembly repeals the Edwards "Pro-beer" law. 
The Van Ness Act a bone-dry enforcement Act enacted. 
1922 Republican majority legislature enact a new enforcement Act, the Hobart Act, 
over Governor's veto. 
1922 New Jersey ratified the Eighteenth Amendment. 
1924 The Democratic state convention called for repeal of the prohibition law and the 
Eighteenth Amendment. The Republican convention called for a strict 
enforcement. The result of the election was the replacement of three wet 
congressmen with three dry ones. 
1929 A bill calling for a referendum to repeal the Hobart Act was not reported out of 
committee. 
1930 Dwight W. Morrow was elected U.S. Senator on a platform calling for repeal of 
the Eighteenth Amendment. Twetve congressmen were returned only three whom 
were dry. Two wet senators were elected to state legislators and nine in the lower 
house. 
1931 A special session of the legislature was called memorializing Congress to amend 
the Volstead Act to bring back beer and wine. The resolution passed both houses. 
NEW MEXICO 
1885 WCTU organized. 
1905 ASL organized. 
191 4 Prohibition law failed passage. 
1 9 14 Municipal option passed. 
1917 Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted. For: 28,732 Against: 12,147. 
1923 Law enforcement code enacted making it a felony to give liquor to minors. 
1923 Enforcement code attack because it violates state bi-lingual language code. 
1923 The state Supreme Court declared the enforcement code unconstitutional. 
1926 Militant prohibitionist Senator R.C. Dillon wins state governors race over a wet 
incumbent. 
1928 A strong dry enforcement code was introduced by the ASL and passed the 
legislature. 
1931 A bill introduced by the wet's calling for the establishment of state dispensaries 
was defeated by a vote of 14 to 8 in the Senate. 
NEW YORK 
1846 Local option enacted. 
1854 Prohibitory law enacted, lasted 2 years. 
1873 Local option law re-enacted. 
1874 WCTU organized. 
1890 New York legislature passed a prohibitory amendment. 
1890 Bill to submit the prohibition amendment to the people was defeated in the 
legislature. 
1899 ASL organized. 
County-option law enacted. 
New York ratified the Eighteenth Amendment. 
2.75 beer hill designed to allow drinking at hotels, restaurants and clubs. 
State enforcement code becomes operative. 
Mulligan-Gage enforcement Act repealed, endiig all prohibition and temperance 
legislation in New York. 
Two long-term wet congressmen lost their seats to drys. 
A dry candidate defeated wet senator James Wadworth. Wet resolution 
rnemorializig Congress to modify the Volstead Act passed. 
Wet resolution passed asking Congress to convene a national constitutional 
convention to consider repeal of the National prohibition amendment was 
adopted. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
1881 Prohibition of manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors was submitted to the 
people and defeated. Against: 166,325 For: 48,370. 
1883 WCTU organized. 
1903 Watts law prohibited the sell of liquors to rural sections, without first referring the 
matter to a vote. Provided local option. 
1908 Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. For: 113,612 Against: 69,416. 
191 1 Anti-near-beer law passed. Prohibited the sale of near beer and other similar drii 
containing alcohol or cocaine. 
19 17 Bone dry law passed. 
1923 Turlington Act makes the state law conform to the national law in respect to 
intoxicating liquors. 
NORTH DAKOTA 
WCTU organized. 
County-option law enacted. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 18,552 Against: 17,393. 
Druggist law. Druggist needed signatures of 70% of women of a ward before a 
permit could be issued to sell liquor. 
A number of legislative acts passed, making enforcement more stringent. 
Law enacted against bootlegging with advisory vote. 
Bone dry law passed. 
State prohibition brought into harmony with federal laws. 
State laws amended so as to be in conformity with federal laws, giving the state 
the right to prosecute liquor law. 
Wets introduce bills in legislature to modify dry laws. Bills defeated. 
ASL organized. 
1928 Repeal of state prohibition law Against: 103,696 For: 96,837. Referendum called 
to repeal prohibition clause in the state constitution. Prohibition section of the 
Constitution was set to a referendum vote 
1930 A petition was circulated to repeal the prohibition laws. the secretary of state 
rejected the petitions as insufficient, the actions were upheld by the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota. 
1932 State referendum vote for repeal. For: 134,742 Against: 99,316. 
1932 State Prohibition law repealed. 
Local option law enacted. 
Amendment to state constitution to prohibit further license For: 113,237 Against: 
104,255. 
National formation of the WCTU in Cleveland, Ohio. 
License amendment to the State constitution Against: 179,538 For: 172,252. 
Prohibition amendment to the state constitution For: 323,129 Against: 226,595. 
failed because constitution requires a majority of voters. 
License amendment to state constitution Against: 268,605 For: 99,238. 
Stronger local option law enacted. 
National formation of the Anti-Saloon League, in Oberlin, Ohio. 
Beal law, gave municipalities local option. 
1908 County-option law enacted. 
191 1 State law makes the sell of near beer unlawful in dry territories. 
1912 License Amendment to the State Constitution For: 273,361 Against 188,825. 
1914 Statewide constitutional prohibition defeated For: 559, 872 Against: 547,254 
1914 Home rule amendment adopted, which allowed counties and municipalities to 
repeal prohibition laws. 
191 5 The County-option law way repealed Against: 540,377 For: 484,969. 
1915 Statewide constitutional prohibition defeated. 
1917 Statewide constitutional prohibition defeated Against: 523,727 For: 522,590. 
1918 Statewide prohibition passed For: 463,654 Against: 437,895. 
1919 Amendment to repeal statewide prohibition defeated Against: 496,786 For: 
454,933. 
1921 State bureau of enforcement established. 
1922 Amendment to state constitution Against: 908,522 For: 719,050. 
1923 Considered murder in the second degree to fimish death-dealing alcohol. 
1925 The leader of the Wet's general Isaac Shenvood was defeated by a dry in the 
Congressional election. 
1926 A bill to remedy the defects in enforcement passed the Senate and was forced to a 
referendum vote by opponents of the bill. The bill was defeated by a vote of 
916,016 to 438,458. 
1928 Liquor forces made more gain5 in state electoral offices, giving a set back for the 
drys. 
193 1 Several wet measures were introduced for repeal, but were defeated. 
OKLAHOMA 
Indian territory prohibition law enacted under federal guidelines. 
WCTU organized. 
Part of Indian Territory opened for White settlement opened for license. 
Indian Territory and Oklahoma territory become one state. 
Oklahoma admitted as a prohibition state. 
Repeal of the state prohibition amendment by initiative petition providing for 
license Against: 126,118 For: 105,041. 
Law enacted to prohibit ownership of still. 
Laws making it murder to sell poisonous liquor that causes death were passed. 
Oklahoma elected all dry candidates to Congress. 
A bill was introduced to repeal the state prohibition laws, but was indefinitely 
postponed. 
OREGON 
1844 Territorial prohibition amendment enacted. 
1849 Legislature allows licensing of grocers. 
1881 WCTU organized. 
1885 Statutory prohibition adopted by legislature. 
1887 Statewide prohibition amendment rejected by popular vote.. 
1903 ASL organized. 
1904 Local option submitted to vote of people and passed. 
1906 Wets submit bill in an attempt to undo local option. 
1908 Redy bill to exempt cities &om local option defeated. 
191 0 Prohibition amendment defeated, home rule bill adopted Against: 61.221 For: 
43,540. 
1914 Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For:136,842 Againrt: 100,362. 
1915 Anderson enforcement Act made operative. 
1916 Bone-dry prohibition For: 1 14,932 Against: 109,671. 
1925 Legislature passed laws strengthening existing prohibition enforcement laws. 
1926 The prohibition law was materially strengthened. All members elected to 
Congress were dry. 
193 1 Bills introduced to repeal or modify the state laws were defeated. 
1932 State prohibition repeal referendum vote For: 206,619 Against: 138.775. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
1854 Statewide prohibition referendum lost by 5,000 votes 
1871 Township-local option iniroduced legislature and failed passage 
1872 County-option law enacted. 
1875 The County-option law was repealed. 
1875 WCTU organized. 
"Brooks" high license law enacted. 
Prohibition amendment to state constitution Against: 484,644 For: 296,617. 
ASL organized. 
A Local option hill defeated. 
A Local option bill defeated. 
A Local option hill defeated. 
A Local option hill defeated. 
A Local option bill defeated. 
A Local option hill defeated. 
State legislature ratified Eighteenth Amendment. 
Woner Act, providing for enforcement of Prohibition. Snyder-Annstrong Act 
harmonized state law with federal law. Governor elect member of the ASL. 
The ASL elected twenty-one congressmen on a dry platform. 
Alcohol control hill was introduced into the legislature, this bill passed by a vote 
of 31 to 15 in the Senate and 124 to 82 in the House. 
RHODE ISLAND 
1839 Local option enacted. 
1852 Rhode Island adopted the "Maine law" and institutes statewide prohibition. 
1863 Because of poor enforcement a license law was substituted for the "Maine" law. 
1874 Prohibition law passed repealing license provisions. 
WCTU organized. 
This prohibition taw was repealed; and the license law of 1863 was re-enacted. 
Effort to enact prohibition failed, hut law prohibiting the sale of liquor within 400 
feet of any public school passed. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 15,113 Against: 9,230. 
Statewide prohibition repealed and license system adopted For: 28,3 15 Against: 
9,956. 
Local option law enacted. 
ASL organized. 
Saugy bills pass legislature arranging for license of saloons for sale of liquors less 
than four percent alcohol. 
Sherwood Enforcement Act adopted to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. 
Kiernan bill-a bill that would repeal Sherwood failed passage two-years in a row. 
U.S. Supreme Court renders bills inoperative. 
A wet bill to repeal state enforcement law failed to pass the senate. 
A dozen hills were introduced to weaken or repeal state prohibition laws. A1 
twelve died in committee. 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
1880 The legislature passed a law forbidding the sell of alcohol outside of incorporated 
towns. 
1880 WCTU organized. 
Dispensary system went into effect, providing for the sale of all alcoholic 
beverages by the state. 
There was agitation tbr prohibition, due to corruption in dispensatory system. 
State Dispensatory system abolished on the account of corruption; county 
dispensatory system untouched. 
South Carolina under both county-option and county dispensatory system 
simultaneously. 
ASL organized. 
Statewide prohibition bill failed because house refused to submit to the people for 
vote. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted. 
A solid dry delegation was sent to Congress. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
1883 WCTU organized. 
1887 Local option territorial law 
1889 South Dakota admitted as a prohibition state. 
1896 Voter's struck prohibition from the constitution For: 31,901 Against: 24,910. 
1896 ASL organized. 
1900 High license law enacted. 
1900 Repeal of amendment which provided for state control of liquor For: 48,673 
Against: 33,927. 
1908 A County-option law was defeated.. 
1910 A County-option law was defeated.. 
1916 Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 64,867 Against: 53, 362. 
191 7 Legislature passed laws strengthening existing prohibition enforcement laws. 
1927 Unsuccessful attempt to secure a referendum on the repeal of South Dakota's 
Prohibition statutes. 
1931 Three bills were introduced in the senate to weaken the prohibition laws. The 
measures were all defeated in the senate. 
TENNESSEE 
1876 WCTU organized. 
1877 Four-mile law makes it illegal to sell intoxicants within four miles of small towns. 
1887 Prohibition amendment to the state constitution Against:145,237 For: 11 7.504. 
1899 ASL organized. 
1909 Statewide statutory prohibition enacted. 
19 17 Bone dry law passed. 
1923 Legislature raised many prohibition violations to a felony charge. 
1924 In the elections of 1924, a dry was elected to succeed Senator Shields a wet. The 
entire congressional delegation was dry. 
1927 A hill authorizing the prescription of whiskey was defeated. 
TEXAS 
Local option law enacted. 
WCTU organized. 
Statewide prohibition referendum was defeated Against: 220,627 For: 129,270. 
First attempt to introduce the ASL failed. 
ASL organized. 
Statewide prohibition referendum was defeated Against: 237, 393 For: 231, 096. 
Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 159,723 Against: 140.099. 
Dean Act law enacted to enforce prohibition. 
The legislature passed several bills amending and strengthening the state 
prohibition law commonly known as the Dean Act. 
UTAH 
1888 WCTU organized. 
1907 ASL organized. 
1909 Govenor vetoed legislative prohibition measure. 
191 1 Local option law enacted. 
1913 Booth-startup law makes owners responsible for liquor and vice nuisance 
committed on their premises. 
19 15 Govenor vetoed legislative prohibition measure. 
1918 Prohibition amendment to the state constitution For: 42,691 Against: 15.780. 
VERMONT 
Local option law enacted. 
Prohibition law passed repealing license provisions. 
WCTIJ organized. 
ASL organized. 
Prohibitory law was repealed For: 29,711 Against: 28,982. 
High license law enacted. 
Statewide prohibition referendum was defeated Against: 32,142 For: 18,653. 
Vermont became the forty-third state to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment. 
State enforcement code passed, which was stronger than federal code. 
A dry governor, a thoroughly dry state legislature, and two dry congressmen were 
elected. 
Vermont re-elected its totally bone-dry delegation to the U.S. Congress as well as 
governor. 
Two dry congressmen elected to Congress. 
A number of wet measures were introduced in the legislature hut were defeated. 
VIRGINIA 
Local option law enacted. 
WCTU organized. 
ASL organized. 
Mann law eliminated saloons in towns without police protection. 
Bryd-rnann law abolished small distilleries. 
Statewide statutory prohibition enacted For: 94,25 1 Against: 63,886. 
State enforcement code passed, which was stronger than federal code. 
The law enforcement code was weakened and the enforcement department 
abolished. 
The enforcement department was re-established. 
WASHINGTON 
1909 Local option law enacted. 
1914 Statewide statutory referendum vote For: 189,840 Against: 171,208. 
1916 Statewide conrtitutional prohibition enacted. 
1918 Bone dry law enacted For: 96,100 Against: 54,332. 
1921 Wets in state legislature attempt to repeal state prohibition laws. 
1930 Two bills were introduced to provide for a better enforcement by amending the 
state laws. Both of the bills were defeated 
WEST VIRGINIA 
WCTU organized. 
Constitutional amendment for statewide prohibition was defeated Against: 75,555 
For: 41,668. 
ASL organized. 
Measure passed to make illegal shipment of alcohol to dry parts of state. 
State prohibition bill failed passage. 
Statewide constitutionai prohihition enacted For: 164,945 Against: 73,603. 
Yost law was enacted to enforce the prohibition amendment. 
Bone dry law passed. 
The appropriations for the state prohibition department were doubled. 
WISCONSIN 
1874 WCTU organized. 
1897 ASL organized. 
1908 Local option law enacted. 
1917 Govenor vetoed legislative prohibition measure. 
1921 Bone dry law passed both houses but vetoed by the governor. 
1922 Severs Act enacted to enforce Volstead. 
1927 A resolution was adopted memorializing Congress to provide for a national 
referendum on prohibition. The Duncan bill was adopted which repealed the 
penalties provided in the state enforcement code for possession of 2.75% beer. 
1929 Wisconsin repeals it's' state prohibition laws by vote of the people f: 321.688 
Against: 200,545. 
193 1 The prohibition forces introduced two bills that were defeated. 
WYOMING 
1883 WCTU organized. 
1907 ASL organized. 
191 8 Statewide constitutional prohibition enacted For: 3 1,439 Against: 10,200 . 
1921 State enforcement code passed. 
1927 Penalties increased to felony for some measures. 
Appendix I1 
Appendix 11 contains policy diffusion maps of both adoption and repeal of state 
prohibition. The maps contain some of the variables controlled for in chapter's 2 and 4. 
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